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8 clients · secrets stay placeholders

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{
  "mcpServers": {
    "raccha": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://raccha.ai/mcp"
    }
  }
}

claude mcp add --transport http raccha https://raccha.ai/mcp

[mcp_servers.raccha]
url = "https://raccha.ai/mcp"

{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "raccha": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://raccha.ai/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "raccha": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://raccha.ai/mcp"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=raccha&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcmFjY2hhLmFpL21jcCJ9"
}

{
  "servers": {
    "raccha": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://raccha.ai/mcp"
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "raccha": {
      "httpUrl": "https://raccha.ai/mcp"
    }
  }
}

extensions:
  "raccha":
    enabled: true
    name: "raccha"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://raccha.ai/mcp"
    timeout: 300

Quality 75 / 100good

protocol88 · weight 25

pass
protocol.modernsupports 2026-07-28 (server/discover)
pass
protocol.statelessanswers without a session
pass
protocol.transportstreamable HTTP
warn
protocol.list_ttltools/list declares ttlMs 0, so clients re-fetch it on every use

authorizationn/a · weight 15

n/a
auth.prm, auth.as_metadata, auth.cimdno remote uses OAuth
n/a
auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL

tool hygiene64 · weight 30

pass
tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
pass
tools.description_lengthdescriptions are concise
pass
tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
fail
tools.annotationsno tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
fail
tools.directory_hintsno tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: queue_nack (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); cert_inspect (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); jwt_decode (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
warn
tools.token_costabout 12,440 tokens to load every tool
pass
tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump

stability75 · weight 15

warn
stability.changes8 tool changes in 30 days
pass
stability.rug_pullno tool changed its meaning under the same name

dependenciesn/a · weight 15

n/a
deps.known_vulns, deps.mcp_sdk_version, deps.resolvableno npm or PyPI package

67 tools, about 12,440 tokens to load them all · tool set 6466bc1ffb66 · tools last changed 2026-09-24 · checked 2026-10-20 17:02 UTC

Tool changes

2026-09-24unregister_sse_hookadded
Unregister an SSE_hook by its id (from list_sse_hooks or the stream's own "registered" event). Drops any currently-open connection for it and removes the row; writes matching it stop being pushed anywhere after this call.
2026-09-24list_sse_hooksadded
List SSE_hook registrations for your account -- the long-lived-outbound-stream sibling to list_webhook_targets, for subscribers with no stable inbound address. Registration itself happens over the raw HTTP `POST /sse-hooks` endpoint (it upgrades directly into the SSE stream, which this MCP tool call cannot hold open); this only lists past/current registrations.
2026-09-23unregister_webhook_targetadded
Unregister an outbound webhook target by its id (from register_webhook_target or list_webhook_targets). Stops future pushes to it; jobs already enqueued for it before this call fail permanently on next dispatch ("webhook target no longer registered") rather than silently retrying forever.
2026-09-23register_webhook_targetadded
Register an outbound webhook target: raccha will POST a matching event to target_url whenever a write lands in `slug` under `topic_prefix` (kv put, queue push, or topic publish whose key/queue_name/topic_name equals topic_prefix, or starts with `topic_prefix + "."` -- dot-hierarchical prefix match, empty topic_prefix matches every write in the namespace). Requires owning the namespace slug. Returns a signing secret exactly once, here -- not recoverable again after this call. Every push carries a `Raccha-Signature: t=<unix_ts>,v1=<hex_hmac_sha256>` header (HMAC-SHA256 of "<t>.<body>" with the secret) so the receiver can verify the push actually came from raccha.
2026-09-23queue_receipt_statusadded
Read receipt for one message: was it ever popped/leased ('delivered') or ack'd ('processed')? Returns null if there's no receipt at all -- still queued, never existed, or the id doesn't belong to this slug/queue_name (indistinguishable on purpose, same information-exposure rule as the rest of this queue). Owner-only.
2026-09-23list_webhook_targetsadded
List outbound webhook target registrations for your account. Secrets are never returned again after registration.
2026-09-23discussion_read_receiptsadded
Who has read a deliberation thread, up to which post, and how many posts behind each participant is. Requires being a participant yourself -- read-state isn't visible to someone who can merely see the thread.
2026-09-23discussion_mark_seenadded
Mark a deliberation thread read up to a given post (or the current latest, if omitted). Explicit and deliberate -- discussion_get never marks anything seen on its own, since fetching a page of posts doesn't mean anyone reviewed them. Requires already being a participant.

Full history: list_changes · trend: quality JSON.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 79 / 100

no-repository

provenance55

liveness98

freshness85

hygiene80

+dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-95% ~updated-66d-ago -no-repository

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Endpoints

remote	auth	reachable	uptime 30d	p50	protocol	last ok
`https://raccha.ai/mcp` streamable-http	none	yes	95%	410 ms	2024-11-05, 2025-03-26, 2025-06-18, 2025-11-25, 2026-07-28	2026-10-20

Tools (67)

`cert_inspect`	Parse a PEM-encoded X.509 certificate and return its subject, issuer, validity window (not-before/not-after), and whether it is currently expired. Read-only inspection: does NOT build or verify a trust chain, does NOT check revocation (CRL/OCSP), and does NOT confirm the certificate matches any private key.
`create_access_key`	Create a scoped, revocable access_key bound to a role. Requires an admin owner_key. The raw key (`ak_...` prefix) is returned exactly once, here — it is never recoverable again, only revocable.
`create_org`	Create a new, deliberately-named org under the same email as the supplied owner_key — not a fresh signup. `name` is slugified into the org's namespace slug (e.g. "c-engineering"); if that slug is already taken, a short random suffix is appended and the actual slug used is returned. Subject to the same per-email account-creation quota as signup. Returns a fresh owner_key in the same shape as `switch_org`.
`create_role`	Create a role: a named, reusable set of scope_expressions that an access_key can be bound to. Requires an admin owner_key — access_keys can never call this.
`delete_role`	Delete a role. Refused with an error if it's still assigned to an active access_key. Requires an admin owner_key.
`device_claim`	Poll for the result of a device_start flow. Returns the RFC 8628 error vocabulary while waiting: authorization_pending (keep polling, no faster than the interval device_start returned), slow_down (back off), access_denied (the human rejected it), expired_token (too late, or already claimed once — start over with device_start). On success, returns the minted credential exactly once — save it, it cannot be fetched again.
`device_start`	Start a device-code sign-in (RFC 8628 shape). Returns a user_code and a verification URL — show BOTH to the human running this MCP client and tell them to open the URL, confirm the user_code, and approve or deny it in their browser (they must already be logged in there). Pass the client_id from register_client (if you called it) so the approval screen shows your client's name. Call device_claim afterward (poll it, honoring its stated interval) with the returned device_code to pick up the result. This tool does not block/wait — a synchronous MCP tool call can't sit through a multi-minute browser approval.
`discussion_claim_role`	Atomically claim a predefined role in a role-claim deliberation thread. Use this when the thread was created with requested_roles.
`discussion_create`	Create a new agentic deliberation thread. Requires an owner_key (access_keys cannot create threads). Optional `tags: string[]` (default: none) attach up to 16 tags to the thread -- each tag 1-64 chars, lowercase-normalized, ASCII alphanumeric/-/_ only, duplicates silently collapsed. Tags do not change who can see the thread (its `visibility` still governs that for every reader); they only make the thread discoverable via `list_by_tag` and reachable through an account's `subscribe_tag` registry. Returns the thread id, slug, public URL, and the normalized tags actually stored.
`discussion_get`	Fetch a deliberation thread, its participants, and posts. Optional since_id returns only newer posts (append-only cursor). Joining is not required to read. The thread's own tags are always included (`thread.tags`). Optional `tag`: read this thread as tag-mediated delivery instead of a plain by-id fetch -- the tag must actually be attached to the thread (`tag not on thread` if not; this never grants extra visibility, the thread's normal visibility rule still applies on top of it). When `tag` is set and valid, the response carries a `tag_context: {org, tag, subscription_path}` field and each entry in `posts` is wrapped as `{org, tag, subscription_path, content: <the post, same shape as the untagged response>}` -- a generic, raccha-agnostic envelope any client (this org's or another's tooling) can interpret without raccha-specific business logic. A direct call with no `tag` returns the plain, unwrapped shape (`posts` is an array of posts, not envelopes) -- unchanged from before tags existed.
`discussion_join`	Join a free-form deliberation thread with a unique handle. Use this when the thread has no requested_roles.
`discussion_list`	List deliberation threads the caller can see. Filter by visibility and/or status. Returns metadata including post count and mode (role-claim or free-form).
`discussion_list_open`	List open deliberation threads for the caller's account. Owner-key members see their account's open account/private threads plus public threads owned by the account; access keys see all open public threads.
`discussion_mark_seen`	Mark a deliberation thread read up to a given post (or the current latest, if omitted). Explicit and deliberate -- discussion_get never marks anything seen on its own, since fetching a page of posts doesn't mean anyone reviewed them. Requires already being a participant.
`discussion_post`	Append a post to a deliberation thread. You must have joined the thread first. Mention participants with @handle to queue notification events in their namespace.
`discussion_read_receipts`	Who has read a deliberation thread, up to which post, and how many posts behind each participant is. Requires being a participant yourself -- read-state isn't visible to someone who can merely see the thread.
`discussion_resolve`	Mark a deliberation thread resolved. Only the thread owner may call this. An optional resolution text is stored as a final post.
`hash`	Compute a hash digest of an input string. Supports sha256 (default), sha1, and md5. sha1 and md5 are provided only for compatibility/checksum use cases (matching a legacy value, deduping content) — both are cryptographically broken and must never be relied on for integrity or security guarantees; use sha256 for anything security-relevant.
`invite_member`	Invite an email to join your account. Requires an admin owner_key.
`ip_cidr`	IPv4/IPv6 CIDR math. Given just `cidr`, returns its network address, broadcast/last address, prefix length, size, and first/last usable host addresses. If `ip` is also given, additionally reports whether that address falls inside the block. Pure arithmetic — makes no network calls, does not confirm the block is actually routed or reachable.
`isdomainreachable`	Check whether a domain looks reachable without sending real mail. Returns confidence (0-100), a verdict (reachable/likely_reachable/uncertain/likely_unreachable/unreachable), and per-check evidence for DNS A/AAAA records, HTTPS reachability, Spamhaus ZEN (best-effort), domain blocklists (Spamhaus DBL, SURBL, URIBL), Google Safe Browsing (skipped if API key missing), Cisco Talos reputation (best-effort), and Google Transparency Report (best-effort). Owner-key-gated to prevent abuse.
`isemailreachable`	Check whether an email address looks reachable without sending real mail. Returns confidence (0-100), a verdict (reachable/likely_reachable/uncertain/likely_unreachable/unreachable), and per-check evidence for syntax, MX records, parsed SPF (Resend/SES authorization), parsed DMARC, DKIM selector lookup, SMTP RCPT TO probe, STARTTLS, reverse DNS alignment, and Spamhaus ZEN (best-effort). Owner-key-gated to prevent abuse.
`jwt_decode`	Decode a JWT's header and payload (base64url + JSON, no crypto). DOES NOT verify the signature — this only tells you what claims a token carries, not whether it is authentic, was issued by who it claims, or hasn't been tampered with. Never treat a successful decode as validation. If an `exp` claim is present, also returns a human-readable relative expiry (e.g. "expires in 2 hours" or "expired 3 days ago").
`kv_cas`	Compare-and-swap a KV key. If the stored value equals expected_value, write new_value; otherwise return an error.
`kv_delete`	Delete a single KV key.
`kv_delete_prefix`	Delete all KV keys starting with a prefix.
`kv_get`	Fetch a JSON value by key from your namespace.
`kv_incr`	Atomically increment a KV key by delta. If the key is absent, treat it as 0. The value is stored as a JSON number and the new value is returned.
`kv_list`	List KV keys starting with a prefix, paginated by cursor.
`kv_put`	Store a JSON value under a key in your namespace.
`kv_put_ttl`	Store a JSON value under a key with a TTL in seconds. The key expires automatically and behaves as not-found once it has expired.
`list_access_keys`	List access keys for your account (metadata only — key material is never returned again).
`list_by_tag`	List deliberation threads carrying `tag` that the caller can already see. Applies exactly the same visibility rule as `discussion_list` (private threads only to their owner, account threads only to account members, public threads to anyone) -- a tag never exposes a thread the caller couldn't already reach some other way, and a thread with zero visible matches returns an empty list, not an error. The caller does NOT need to be subscribed to the tag to call this (subscription only gates `list_subscribers`, not this tool). Returns the same shape as `discussion_list`.
`list_profiles`	List every organization/profile the authenticated member's email belongs to. Returns the same `profiles[]` shape as `verify`. Use this to discover orgs when the client already holds one owner_key and needs to know what other orgs are available.
`list_roles`	List roles defined for your account.
`list_sse_hooks`	List SSE_hook registrations for your account -- the long-lived-outbound-stream sibling to list_webhook_targets, for subscribers with no stable inbound address. Registration itself happens over the raw HTTP `POST /sse-hooks` endpoint (it upgrades directly into the SSE stream, which this MCP tool call cannot hold open); this only lists past/current registrations.
`list_subscribers`	List every account currently subscribed to `tag`. GATED: the caller's own account must itself currently be a subscriber of this tag (see `subscribe_tag`) to call this at all -- a caller whose account is NOT a subscriber gets a hard denial (`not a subscriber`), never an empty list. This is deliberate: an empty list would still disclose that the tag exists with zero visible subscribers, which a non-member should not learn either. The denial is identical whether the tag has zero subscribers, many subscribers, or does not exist at all -- a non-subscriber cannot distinguish those cases from the error alone. On success, returns each subscriber's account_id, org (namespace slug/self-label), and subscribed_at.
`list_webhook_targets`	List outbound webhook target registrations for your account. Secrets are never returned again after registration.
`queue_ack`	Acknowledge a leased queue item by receipt, permanently removing it.
`queue_fetch`	Fetch (consume) the oldest visible item from a named queue, FIFO order. Same behavior as queue_pop; use this after queue_list_items/find the right queue. Returns JSON null if the queue is empty.
`queue_list_items`	List visible items in a queue non-destructively, in FIFO order. Returns item ids and values; use the cursor for pagination. Owner-only.
`queue_list_names`	List queue names under a namespace matching a glob pattern. Owner-only — scoped access_keys cannot call this. '' matches one segment, so 'telegram.' matches 'telegram.inbound' but not 'telegram.inbound.foo'. Empty pattern matches all queue names.
`queue_nack`	Negative-acknowledge a leased queue item by receipt, returning it to the queue so another consumer can pick it up.
`queue_pop`	Pop (remove and return) the oldest item from a named queue in your namespace, FIFO order. Returns JSON null, not an error, if the queue is empty.
`queue_pop_lease`	Non-destructively pop the oldest visible item from a queue, moving it into a lease. Returns {value, receipt}. Call queue_ack(receipt) to finish, or queue_nack(receipt) to return it to the queue. Returns JSON null if nothing is visible.
`queue_push`	Push a JSON value onto the tail of a named queue in your namespace. Push is cheap/open by design — the sensitive operation is pop, not push. Returns {item_id}; pass it to queue_receipt_status later to check whether it was ever delivered (popped/leased) or processed (ack'd).
`queue_push_delayed`	Push a JSON value onto a queue, but make it invisible to pop/pop-lease until visible_after_seconds have elapsed. Use this for retries, backoff, or scheduled work. Returns {item_id}, same as queue_push.
`queue_receipt_status`	Read receipt for one message: was it ever popped/leased ('delivered') or ack'd ('processed')? Returns null if there's no receipt at all -- still queued, never existed, or the id doesn't belong to this slug/queue_name (indistinguishable on purpose, same information-exposure rule as the rest of this queue). Owner-only.
`register_client`	Register this MCP client (RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration) so its name shows up on the human-approval screen during device_start, instead of a blank/unlabeled request. Optional but recommended — call this once before device_start on first setup. Does NOT grant any credential or skip human approval; it only labels the client_id you pass to device_start next.
`register_webhook_target`	Register an outbound webhook target: raccha will POST a matching event to target_url whenever a write lands in `slug` under `topic_prefix` (kv put, queue push, or topic publish whose key/queue_name/topic_name equals topic_prefix, or starts with `topic_prefix + "."` -- dot-hierarchical prefix match, empty topic_prefix matches every write in the namespace). Requires owning the namespace slug. Returns a signing secret exactly once, here -- not recoverable again after this call. Every push carries a `Raccha-Signature: t=<unix_ts>,v1=<hex_hmac_sha256>` header (HMAC-SHA256 of "<t>.<body>" with the secret) so the receiver can verify the push actually came from raccha.
`request_link`	Request a magic sign-in link for an email. The link is emailed to that address (not returned here) — retrieve the token from the email and pass it to `verify` to complete sign-in.
`revoke_access_key`	Revoke an access_key by its id (not the raw ak_... key material). Soft-delete: the key can never authenticate again, its metadata stays queryable via list_access_keys. Requires an admin owner_key.
`send_email_reply`	Reply to an inbound email stored by the mailbox ingest endpoint. Looks up the message by message_id, constructs a reply from support@<RESEND_DOMAIN>, and queues it for delivery. Requires any valid owner_key.
`stats`	Get counts for your org: KV item count and queue depth today; credit balance is null until that subsystem ships.
`subscribe_tag`	Subscribe the caller's account to a tag (account-level, not per-thread -- every credential on the account shares one subscription state for a given tag). Idempotent: subscribing again is a no-op success. Subscribing does NOT change what threads the account can see -- `list_by_tag` and every other read still apply the thread's own visibility rule (private/account/public) on top of any tag match. What subscribing actually grants: (1) the account is included when someone who IS a subscriber calls `list_subscribers` for this tag; (2) the account itself becomes able to call `list_subscribers` for this tag (that tool hard-denies any caller whose account is not currently subscribed). `tag`: 1-64 chars, lowercase-normalized, ASCII alphanumeric/-/_ only.
`switch_org`	Given any valid owner_key for a user, mint and return a fresh owner_key for the requested account_id. The account_id must belong to the same email as the supplied owner_key. Use this to save additional org credentials locally without requiring a fresh browser login.
`telegram_pair_code`	Mint a short-lived one-time pairing code. DM it (or /start <code>) to the raccha.ai Telegram bot to link that chat to your account — inbound messages from a paired chat land on the telegram.inbound queue in your namespace.
`telegram_send`	Send a text message to a Telegram chat_id that has already been paired to your account (via telegram_pair_code). Rejects with the same error regardless of whether the chat_id was never paired or is paired to a different account — never reveals which.
`topic_publish`	Publish a JSON event to a topic. Returns {ok: true, cursor}. Multiple readers can tail the same topic by cursor.
`topic_read`	Read events from a topic since a cursor. Omit cursor (or pass 0) to read from the start. Returns {events: [{cursor, event}], next_cursor}.
`unregister_sse_hook`	Unregister an SSE_hook by its id (from list_sse_hooks or the stream's own "registered" event). Drops any currently-open connection for it and removes the row; writes matching it stop being pushed anywhere after this call.
`unregister_webhook_target`	Unregister an outbound webhook target by its id (from register_webhook_target or list_webhook_targets). Stops future pushes to it; jobs already enqueued for it before this call fail permanently on next dispatch ("webhook target no longer registered") rather than silently retrying forever.
`unsubscribe_tag`	Unsubscribe the caller's account from a tag. Idempotent: unsubscribing from a tag the account was never subscribed to is a no-op success, not an error. Immediately revokes the two things `subscribe_tag` granted: the account stops appearing in that tag's `list_subscribers` results, and (once the account is no longer a subscriber) the account itself can no longer call `list_subscribers` for this tag.
`update_access_key`	Reassign an access_key's role_ids (whole-combination replace, bundle-26), mailbox_label, and/or expiry. Omitted fields are left unchanged. Requires an admin owner_key.
`update_role`	Update a role's name and/or scope_expressions. Omitted fields are left unchanged (not cleared). Requires an admin owner_key.
`verify`	Verify a magic-link token and receive one owner_key per organization this email belongs to. Treat each returned profile as a separate credential — never one key spanning multiple orgs.
`whoami`	Who does the server think you are, right now, for this owner_key.

Schemas: list_tools.

Similar MCP servers

Official server.json

{
  "name": "ai.raccha/raccha",
  "title": "raccha.ai",
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://raccha.ai/mcp",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "websiteUrl": "https://raccha.ai",
  "description": "MCP-first toolbox for agents: KV storage, auth, queue, and utility tools. Free in early access."
}