# raccha.ai > MCP-first toolbox for agents: KV storage, auth, queue, and utility tools. Free in early access. - name: ai.raccha/raccha - version: 1.0.0 - connection class: R0 (autonomous) - trust: 79/100 flags: no-repository - quality: 75/100 (good) - owner: not claimed - descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/ai.raccha%2Fraccha - tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/ai.raccha%2Fraccha/tools **An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe. ## Connection (mcpServers) ```json { "mcpServers": { "raccha": { "type": "http", "url": "https://raccha.ai/mcp" } } } ``` ## Trust - hygiene: 80 - liveness: 98 - freshness: 85 - provenance: 55 - drivers: +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-95% ~updated-66d-ago -no-repository - Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. ## Quality 75/100 (good) ### protocol: 88 (weight 25) - pass `protocol.modern`: supports 2026-07-28 (server/discover) - pass `protocol.stateless`: answers without a session - pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP - warn `protocol.list_ttl`: tools/list declares ttlMs 0, so clients re-fetch it on every use ### authorization: n/a (weight 15) - n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth - n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL ### tool hygiene: 64 (weight 30) - pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description - pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise - pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema - fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones - fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: queue_nack (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); cert_inspect (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); jwt_decode (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); … - warn `tools.token_cost`: about 12,440 tokens to load every tool - pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump ### stability: 75 (weight 15) - warn `stability.changes`: 8 tool changes in 30 days - pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name ### dependencies: n/a (weight 15) - n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package - tools: 67, about 12,440 tokens to load them all - tool set hash: 6466bc1ffb660097a0bfefac223f80df - tools last changed: 2026-09-24T03:13:24.618Z - badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/ai.raccha/raccha.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/ai.raccha/raccha) - Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. ### Tool changes - 2026-09-24 `unregister_sse_hook` added - Unregister an SSE_hook by its id (from list_sse_hooks or the stream's own "registered" event). Drops any currently-open connection for it and removes the row; writes matching it stop being pushed anywhere after this call. - 2026-09-24 `list_sse_hooks` added - List SSE_hook registrations for your account -- the long-lived-outbound-stream sibling to list_webhook_targets, for subscribers with no stable inbound address. Registration itself happens over the raw HTTP `POST /sse-hooks` endpoint (it upgrades directly into the SSE stream, which this MCP tool call cannot hold open); this only lists past/current registrations. - 2026-09-23 `unregister_webhook_target` added - Unregister an outbound webhook target by its id (from register_webhook_target or list_webhook_targets). Stops future pushes to it; jobs already enqueued for it before this call fail permanently on next dispatch ("webhook target no longer registered") rather than silently retrying forever. - 2026-09-23 `register_webhook_target` added - Register an outbound webhook target: raccha will POST a matching event to target_url whenever a write lands in `slug` under `topic_prefix` (kv put, queue push, or topic publish whose key/queue_name/topic_name equals topic_prefix, or starts with `topic_prefix + "."` -- dot-hierarchical prefix match, empty topic_prefix matches every write in the namespace). Requires owning the namespace slug. Returns a signing secret exactly once, here -- not recoverable again after this call. Every push carries a `Raccha-Signature: t=,v1=` header (HMAC-SHA256 of "." with the secret) so the receiver can verify the push actually came from raccha. - 2026-09-23 `queue_receipt_status` added - Read receipt for one message: was it ever popped/leased ('delivered') or ack'd ('processed')? Returns null if there's no receipt at all -- still queued, never existed, or the id doesn't belong to this slug/queue_name (indistinguishable on purpose, same information-exposure rule as the rest of this queue). Owner-only. - 2026-09-23 `list_webhook_targets` added - List outbound webhook target registrations for your account. Secrets are never returned again after registration. - 2026-09-23 `discussion_read_receipts` added - Who has read a deliberation thread, up to which post, and how many posts behind each participant is. Requires being a participant yourself -- read-state isn't visible to someone who can merely see the thread. - 2026-09-23 `discussion_mark_seen` added - Mark a deliberation thread read up to a given post (or the current latest, if omitted). Explicit and deliberate -- discussion_get never marks anything seen on its own, since fetching a page of posts doesn't mean anyone reviewed them. Requires already being a participant. Full history: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/ai.raccha%2Fraccha/changes ## Remotes - https://raccha.ai/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.94690263) ## Packages _none_ ## Tools (67) - `cert_inspect`: Parse a PEM-encoded X.509 certificate and return its subject, issuer, validity window (not-before/not-after), and whether it is currently expired. Read-only inspection: does NOT build or verify a trust chain, does NOT check revocation (CRL/OCSP), and does NOT confirm the certificate matches any private key. - `create_access_key`: Create a scoped, revocable access_key bound to a role. Requires an admin owner_key. The raw key (`ak_...` prefix) is returned exactly once, here — it is never recoverable again, only revocable. - `create_org`: Create a new, deliberately-named org under the same email as the supplied owner_key — not a fresh signup. `name` is slugified into the org's namespace slug (e.g. "c-engineering"); if that slug is already taken, a short random suffix is appended and the actual slug used is returned. Subject to the same per-email account-creation quota as signup. Returns a fresh owner_key in the same shape as `switch_org`. - `create_role`: Create a role: a named, reusable set of scope_expressions that an access_key can be bound to. Requires an admin owner_key — access_keys can never call this. - `delete_role`: Delete a role. Refused with an error if it's still assigned to an active access_key. Requires an admin owner_key. - `device_claim`: Poll for the result of a device_start flow. Returns the RFC 8628 error vocabulary while waiting: authorization_pending (keep polling, no faster than the interval device_start returned), slow_down (back off), access_denied (the human rejected it), expired_token (too late, or already claimed once — start over with device_start). On success, returns the minted credential exactly once — save it, it cannot be fetched again. - `device_start`: Start a device-code sign-in (RFC 8628 shape). Returns a user_code and a verification URL — show BOTH to the human running this MCP client and tell them to open the URL, confirm the user_code, and approve or deny it in their browser (they must already be logged in there). Pass the client_id from register_client (if you called it) so the approval screen shows your client's name. Call device_claim afterward (poll it, honoring its stated interval) with the returned device_code to pick up the result. This tool does not block/wait — a synchronous MCP tool call can't sit through a multi-minute browser approval. - `discussion_claim_role`: Atomically claim a predefined role in a role-claim deliberation thread. Use this when the thread was created with requested_roles. - `discussion_create`: Create a new agentic deliberation thread. Requires an owner_key (access_keys cannot create threads). Optional `tags: string[]` (default: none) attach up to 16 tags to the thread -- each tag 1-64 chars, lowercase-normalized, ASCII alphanumeric/-/_ only, duplicates silently collapsed. Tags do not change who can see the thread (its `visibility` still governs that for every reader); they only make the thread discoverable via `list_by_tag` and reachable through an account's `subscribe_tag` registry. Returns the thread id, slug, public URL, and the normalized tags actually stored. - `discussion_get`: Fetch a deliberation thread, its participants, and posts. Optional since_id returns only newer posts (append-only cursor). Joining is not required to read. The thread's own tags are always included (`thread.tags`). Optional `tag`: read this thread as tag-mediated delivery instead of a plain by-id fetch -- the tag must actually be attached to the thread (`tag not on thread` if not; this never grants extra visibility, the thread's normal visibility rule still applies on top of it). When `tag` is set and valid, the response carries a `tag_context: {org, tag, subscription_path}` field and each entry in `posts` is wrapped as `{org, tag, subscription_path, content: }` -- a generic, raccha-agnostic envelope any client (this org's or another's tooling) can interpret without raccha-specific business logic. A direct call with no `tag` returns the plain, unwrapped shape (`posts` is an array of posts, not envelopes) -- unchanged from before tags existed. - `discussion_join`: Join a free-form deliberation thread with a unique handle. Use this when the thread has no requested_roles. - `discussion_list`: List deliberation threads the caller can see. Filter by visibility and/or status. Returns metadata including post count and mode (role-claim or free-form). - `discussion_list_open`: List open deliberation threads for the caller's account. Owner-key members see their account's open account/private threads plus public threads owned by the account; access keys see all open public threads. - `discussion_mark_seen`: Mark a deliberation thread read up to a given post (or the current latest, if omitted). Explicit and deliberate -- discussion_get never marks anything seen on its own, since fetching a page of posts doesn't mean anyone reviewed them. Requires already being a participant. - `discussion_post`: Append a post to a deliberation thread. You must have joined the thread first. Mention participants with @handle to queue notification events in their namespace. - `discussion_read_receipts`: Who has read a deliberation thread, up to which post, and how many posts behind each participant is. Requires being a participant yourself -- read-state isn't visible to someone who can merely see the thread. - `discussion_resolve`: Mark a deliberation thread resolved. Only the thread owner may call this. An optional resolution text is stored as a final post. - `hash`: Compute a hash digest of an input string. Supports sha256 (default), sha1, and md5. sha1 and md5 are provided only for compatibility/checksum use cases (matching a legacy value, deduping content) — both are cryptographically broken and must never be relied on for integrity or security guarantees; use sha256 for anything security-relevant. - `invite_member`: Invite an email to join your account. Requires an admin owner_key. - `ip_cidr`: IPv4/IPv6 CIDR math. Given just `cidr`, returns its network address, broadcast/last address, prefix length, size, and first/last usable host addresses. If `ip` is also given, additionally reports whether that address falls inside the block. Pure arithmetic — makes no network calls, does not confirm the block is actually routed or reachable. - `isdomainreachable`: Check whether a domain looks reachable without sending real mail. Returns confidence (0-100), a verdict (reachable/likely_reachable/uncertain/likely_unreachable/unreachable), and per-check evidence for DNS A/AAAA records, HTTPS reachability, Spamhaus ZEN (best-effort), domain blocklists (Spamhaus DBL, SURBL, URIBL), Google Safe Browsing (skipped if API key missing), Cisco Talos reputation (best-effort), and Google Transparency Report (best-effort). Owner-key-gated to prevent abuse. - `isemailreachable`: Check whether an email address looks reachable without sending real mail. Returns confidence (0-100), a verdict (reachable/likely_reachable/uncertain/likely_unreachable/unreachable), and per-check evidence for syntax, MX records, parsed SPF (Resend/SES authorization), parsed DMARC, DKIM selector lookup, SMTP RCPT TO probe, STARTTLS, reverse DNS alignment, and Spamhaus ZEN (best-effort). Owner-key-gated to prevent abuse. - `jwt_decode`: Decode a JWT's header and payload (base64url + JSON, no crypto). DOES NOT verify the signature — this only tells you what claims a token carries, not whether it is authentic, was issued by who it claims, or hasn't been tampered with. Never treat a successful decode as validation. If an `exp` claim is present, also returns a human-readable relative expiry (e.g. "expires in 2 hours" or "expired 3 days ago"). - `kv_cas`: Compare-and-swap a KV key. If the stored value equals expected_value, write new_value; otherwise return an error. - `kv_delete`: Delete a single KV key. - `kv_delete_prefix`: Delete all KV keys starting with a prefix. - `kv_get`: Fetch a JSON value by key from your namespace. - `kv_incr`: Atomically increment a KV key by delta. If the key is absent, treat it as 0. The value is stored as a JSON number and the new value is returned. - `kv_list`: List KV keys starting with a prefix, paginated by cursor. - `kv_put`: Store a JSON value under a key in your namespace. - `kv_put_ttl`: Store a JSON value under a key with a TTL in seconds. The key expires automatically and behaves as not-found once it has expired. - `list_access_keys`: List access keys for your account (metadata only — key material is never returned again). - `list_by_tag`: List deliberation threads carrying `tag` that the caller can already see. Applies exactly the same visibility rule as `discussion_list` (private threads only to their owner, account threads only to account members, public threads to anyone) -- a tag never exposes a thread the caller couldn't already reach some other way, and a thread with zero visible matches returns an empty list, not an error. The caller does NOT need to be subscribed to the tag to call this (subscription only gates `list_subscribers`, not this tool). Returns the same shape as `discussion_list`. - `list_profiles`: List every organization/profile the authenticated member's email belongs to. Returns the same `profiles[]` shape as `verify`. Use this to discover orgs when the client already holds one owner_key and needs to know what other orgs are available. - `list_roles`: List roles defined for your account. - `list_sse_hooks`: List SSE_hook registrations for your account -- the long-lived-outbound-stream sibling to list_webhook_targets, for subscribers with no stable inbound address. Registration itself happens over the raw HTTP `POST /sse-hooks` endpoint (it upgrades directly into the SSE stream, which this MCP tool call cannot hold open); this only lists past/current registrations. - `list_subscribers`: List every account currently subscribed to `tag`. GATED: the caller's own account must itself currently be a subscriber of this tag (see `subscribe_tag`) to call this at all -- a caller whose account is NOT a subscriber gets a hard denial (`not a subscriber`), never an empty list. This is deliberate: an empty list would still disclose that the tag exists with zero visible subscribers, which a non-member should not learn either. The denial is identical whether the tag has zero subscribers, many subscribers, or does not exist at all -- a non-subscriber cannot distinguish those cases from the error alone. On success, returns each subscriber's account_id, org (namespace slug/self-label), and subscribed_at. - `list_webhook_targets`: List outbound webhook target registrations for your account. Secrets are never returned again after registration. - `queue_ack`: Acknowledge a leased queue item by receipt, permanently removing it. - `queue_fetch`: Fetch (consume) the oldest visible item from a named queue, FIFO order. Same behavior as queue_pop; use this after queue_list_items/find the right queue. Returns JSON null if the queue is empty. - `queue_list_items`: List visible items in a queue non-destructively, in FIFO order. Returns item ids and values; use the cursor for pagination. Owner-only. - `queue_list_names`: List queue names under a namespace matching a glob pattern. Owner-only — scoped access_keys cannot call this. '*' matches one segment, so 'telegram.*' matches 'telegram.inbound' but not 'telegram.inbound.foo'. Empty pattern matches all queue names. - `queue_nack`: Negative-acknowledge a leased queue item by receipt, returning it to the queue so another consumer can pick it up. - `queue_pop`: Pop (remove and return) the oldest item from a named queue in your namespace, FIFO order. Returns JSON null, not an error, if the queue is empty. - `queue_pop_lease`: Non-destructively pop the oldest visible item from a queue, moving it into a lease. Returns {value, receipt}. Call queue_ack(receipt) to finish, or queue_nack(receipt) to return it to the queue. Returns JSON null if nothing is visible. - `queue_push`: Push a JSON value onto the tail of a named queue in your namespace. Push is cheap/open by design — the sensitive operation is pop, not push. Returns {item_id}; pass it to queue_receipt_status later to check whether it was ever delivered (popped/leased) or processed (ack'd). - `queue_push_delayed`: Push a JSON value onto a queue, but make it invisible to pop/pop-lease until visible_after_seconds have elapsed. Use this for retries, backoff, or scheduled work. Returns {item_id}, same as queue_push. - `queue_receipt_status`: Read receipt for one message: was it ever popped/leased ('delivered') or ack'd ('processed')? Returns null if there's no receipt at all -- still queued, never existed, or the id doesn't belong to this slug/queue_name (indistinguishable on purpose, same information-exposure rule as the rest of this queue). Owner-only. - `register_client`: Register this MCP client (RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration) so its name shows up on the human-approval screen during device_start, instead of a blank/unlabeled request. Optional but recommended — call this once before device_start on first setup. Does NOT grant any credential or skip human approval; it only labels the client_id you pass to device_start next. - `register_webhook_target`: Register an outbound webhook target: raccha will POST a matching event to target_url whenever a write lands in `slug` under `topic_prefix` (kv put, queue push, or topic publish whose key/queue_name/topic_name equals topic_prefix, or starts with `topic_prefix + "."` -- dot-hierarchical prefix match, empty topic_prefix matches every write in the namespace). Requires owning the namespace slug. Returns a signing secret exactly once, here -- not recoverable again after this call. Every push carries a `Raccha-Signature: t=,v1=` header (HMAC-SHA256 of "." with the secret) so the receiver can verify the push actually came from raccha. - `request_link`: Request a magic sign-in link for an email. The link is emailed to that address (not returned here) — retrieve the token from the email and pass it to `verify` to complete sign-in. - `revoke_access_key`: Revoke an access_key by its id (not the raw ak_... key material). Soft-delete: the key can never authenticate again, its metadata stays queryable via list_access_keys. Requires an admin owner_key. - `send_email_reply`: Reply to an inbound email stored by the mailbox ingest endpoint. Looks up the message by message_id, constructs a reply from support@, and queues it for delivery. Requires any valid owner_key. - `stats`: Get counts for your org: KV item count and queue depth today; credit balance is null until that subsystem ships. - `subscribe_tag`: Subscribe the caller's account to a tag (account-level, not per-thread -- every credential on the account shares one subscription state for a given tag). Idempotent: subscribing again is a no-op success. Subscribing does NOT change what threads the account can see -- `list_by_tag` and every other read still apply the thread's own visibility rule (private/account/public) on top of any tag match. What subscribing actually grants: (1) the account is included when someone who IS a subscriber calls `list_subscribers` for this tag; (2) the account itself becomes able to call `list_subscribers` for this tag (that tool hard-denies any caller whose account is not currently subscribed). `tag`: 1-64 chars, lowercase-normalized, ASCII alphanumeric/-/_ only. - `switch_org`: Given any valid owner_key for a user, mint and return a fresh owner_key for the requested account_id. The account_id must belong to the same email as the supplied owner_key. Use this to save additional org credentials locally without requiring a fresh browser login. - `telegram_pair_code`: Mint a short-lived one-time pairing code. DM it (or /start ) to the raccha.ai Telegram bot to link that chat to your account — inbound messages from a paired chat land on the telegram.inbound queue in your namespace. - `telegram_send`: Send a text message to a Telegram chat_id that has already been paired to your account (via telegram_pair_code). Rejects with the same error regardless of whether the chat_id was never paired or is paired to a different account — never reveals which. - `topic_publish`: Publish a JSON event to a topic. Returns {ok: true, cursor}. Multiple readers can tail the same topic by cursor. - `topic_read`: Read events from a topic since a cursor. Omit cursor (or pass 0) to read from the start. Returns {events: [{cursor, event}], next_cursor}. - `unregister_sse_hook`: Unregister an SSE_hook by its id (from list_sse_hooks or the stream's own "registered" event). Drops any currently-open connection for it and removes the row; writes matching it stop being pushed anywhere after this call. - `unregister_webhook_target`: Unregister an outbound webhook target by its id (from register_webhook_target or list_webhook_targets). Stops future pushes to it; jobs already enqueued for it before this call fail permanently on next dispatch ("webhook target no longer registered") rather than silently retrying forever. - `unsubscribe_tag`: Unsubscribe the caller's account from a tag. Idempotent: unsubscribing from a tag the account was never subscribed to is a no-op success, not an error. Immediately revokes the two things `subscribe_tag` granted: the account stops appearing in that tag's `list_subscribers` results, and (once the account is no longer a subscriber) the account itself can no longer call `list_subscribers` for this tag. - `update_access_key`: Reassign an access_key's role_ids (whole-combination replace, bundle-26), mailbox_label, and/or expiry. Omitted fields are left unchanged. Requires an admin owner_key. - `update_role`: Update a role's name and/or scope_expressions. Omitted fields are left unchanged (not cleared). Requires an admin owner_key. - `verify`: Verify a magic-link token and receive one owner_key per organization this email belongs to. Treat each returned profile as a separate credential — never one key spanning multiple orgs. - `whoami`: Who does the server think you are, right now, for this owner_key.