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8 clients · secrets stay placeholders

JSON (mcpServers)Claude CodeCodexOpenCodeCursorVS CodeGemini CLIGoose

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "handover": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://handover.tools/mcp"
    }
  }
}

claude mcp add --transport http handover https://handover.tools/mcp

[mcp_servers.handover]
url = "https://handover.tools/mcp"

{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "handover": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://handover.tools/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "handover": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://handover.tools/mcp"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=handover&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaGFuZG92ZXIudG9vbHMvbWNwIn0%3D"
}

{
  "servers": {
    "handover": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://handover.tools/mcp"
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "handover": {
      "httpUrl": "https://handover.tools/mcp"
    }
  }
}

extensions:
  "handover":
    enabled: true
    name: "handover"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://handover.tools/mcp"
    timeout: 300

Quality 88 / 100good

protocol100 · weight 25

pass
protocol.modernsupports 2026-07-28 (server/discover)
pass
protocol.statelessanswers without a session
pass
protocol.transportstreamable HTTP
pass
protocol.list_ttltool list is cacheable (ttlMs 3600000)

authorizationn/a · weight 15

n/a
auth.prm, auth.as_metadata, auth.cimdno remote uses OAuth
n/a
auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL

tool hygiene71 · weight 30

pass
tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
pass
tools.description_lengthdescriptions are concise
pass
tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
fail
tools.annotationsno tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
fail
tools.directory_hintsno tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: channel_ack (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); channel_open (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); handoff_get (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
pass
tools.token_costabout 1,769 tokens to load every tool
pass
tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump

stability100 · weight 15

pass
stability.changes4 tool changes in 30 days
pass
stability.rug_pullno tool changed its meaning under the same name

dependenciesn/a · weight 15

n/a
deps.known_vulns, deps.mcp_sdk_version, deps.resolvableno npm or PyPI package

9 tools, about 1,769 tokens to load them all · tool set 10c1c6f930fd · tools last changed 2026-10-19 · checked 2026-10-20 20:46 UTC

Tool changes

2026-10-19channel_ackadded
Use the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py rather than calling this by hand. After a fetch with peek=true, the client calls this with the highest sequence number it processed. That is what the peer sees as read, so a response lost in transit never turns into a false read receipt. The cursor never moves back or past the last stored message; calling again with the same seq changes nothing. Slides the channel's expiry.
2026-10-19channel_fetchchangeddescription
before
Use the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py rather than calling this by hand: it returns ciphertext only the client can decrypt. Returns the peer's messages this side has not fetched yet, and marks them read so the peer can see they arrived. Call only when the person asks. peek=true reads without marking; after=N re-reads from sequence N (recovery). Side A also receives the peer's SPAKE2 message here to finish pairing. Large backlogs are paged: more=true means fetch again.
after · 69% of words in common
Use the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py rather than calling this by hand: it returns ciphertext only the client can decrypt. Returns the peer's messages this side has not fetched yet. Call only when the person asks. Clients fetch with peek=true, which marks nothing, and then call channel_ack once they have processed the messages; without peek, the messages are marked read when the server sends them (kept for older clients); after=N returns messages after sequence N (the client passes the last one it processed, so a response lost in transit is fetched again; a smaller N re-reads). Side A also receives the peer's SPAKE2 message here to finish pairing. Large backlogs are paged: more=true means fetch again.
2026-10-19handoff_getchangeddescription
before
Fetch content stored by handoff_put using its 8-character code. The code is case-insensitive and hyphens are ignored, so 'kvmtrhxp' and 'KVMT-RHXP' are the same; the person may give it as a link like handover.tools/kvmtrhxp, and passing that is fine too. Return the content to the person verbatim and complete: it can be fetched only once. If the code is unknown, already fetched, or expired, content is null with a reason — these cases are deliberately indistinguishable.
after · 82% of words in common
Fetch content stored by handoff_put using its 8-character code. The code is case-insensitive and hyphens are ignored, so 'kvmtrhxp' and 'KVMT-RHXP' are the same; the person may give it as a link like handover.tools/kvmtrhxp, and passing that is fine too. Return the content to the person verbatim and complete: it can be fetched only once. If the code is unknown, already fetched, or expired, content is null with a reason — these cases are deliberately indistinguishable. A channel link (handover.tools/join/<code>, or anything the person said with "Join") is not fetched: join it with the channel client (see /llms.txt). Passed here, it returns reason channel_code with the steps.
2026-10-15handoff_putchangeddescription
before
Store a piece of context and get back a short code. The person gives the link handover.tools/<code> to an agent on another device and it can fetch the content — no copy-paste of long text. The code is 8 letters, easy to type on a phone. NOT ENCRYPTED: the server can read what you store, so never put credentials, tokens, or private data in it. Content becomes unreadable after the TTL expires, and by default it can only be fetched once. The response also returns a revoke_key — keep it for the rest of this session so you can destroy the content immediately with handoff_revoke if the person changes their mind. Writes are limited to a small number per day; reads are not.
after · 86% of words in common
Store a piece of context and get back a short code. The person gives the link handover.tools/<code> to an agent on another device and it can fetch the content — no copy-paste of long text. The code is 8 letters, easy to type on a phone. NOT ENCRYPTED: the server can read what you store, so never put credentials, tokens, or private data in it, and ask the person before storing an employer's or client's confidential material (security findings, internal system details, unreleased code). Content becomes unreadable after the TTL expires, and by default it can only be fetched once. The response also returns a revoke_key — keep it for the rest of this session so you can destroy the content immediately with handoff_revoke if the person changes their mind. Writes are limited to a small number per day; reads are not.

Full history: list_changes · trend: quality JSON.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 95 / 100

provenance85

liveness99

freshness100

hygiene100

+repository +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-98% +updated-2d-ago

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Endpoints

remote	auth	reachable	uptime 30d	p50	protocol	last ok
`https://handover.tools/mcp` streamable-http	none	yes	98%	3271 ms	2026-07-28, 2025-11-25, 2025-06-18, 2025-03-26, 2024-11-05, 2024-10-07	2026-10-20

Tools (9)

`channel_ack`	Use the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py rather than calling this by hand. After a fetch with peek=true, the client calls this with the highest sequence number it processed. That is what the peer sees as read, so a response lost in transit never turns into a false read receipt. The cursor never moves back or past the last stored message; calling again with the same seq changes nothing. Slides the channel's expiry.
`channel_close`	Either side can close. Deletes the channel, both keys, and every stored message immediately. The other side's next fetch reports not_found_or_closed.
`channel_fetch`	Use the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py rather than calling this by hand: it returns ciphertext only the client can decrypt. Returns the peer's messages this side has not fetched yet. Call only when the person asks. Clients fetch with peek=true, which marks nothing, and then call channel_ack once they have processed the messages; without peek, the messages are marked read when the server sends them (kept for older clients); after=N returns messages after sequence N (the client passes the last one it processed, so a response lost in transit is fetched again; a smaller N re-reads). Side A also receives the peer's SPAKE2 message here to finish pairing. Large backlogs are paged: more=true means fetch again.
`channel_join`	Second half of pairing, run by the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py. Send only the first 3 characters of the spoken code (the nameplate) plus this side's SPAKE2 message; the other 5 characters are the password and must never be sent to the server. The nameplate is consumed on success. Returns this side's key and the peer's SPAKE2 message. Unknown, used, or expired nameplates are deliberately indistinguishable.
`channel_open`	Start pairing two agents on different machines for a multi-round exchange (e.g. one explores, the other studies and asks follow-up questions). Use the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py — do not call this by hand. The client generates a secret password locally, and this call returns only a 3-character nameplate; the person gives nameplate + password (8 letters) to the other machine. The server never sees the password, so it cannot impersonate either side (SPAKE2). The person stays in the loop: send only after they approve, fetch only when they ask. Counts as one write against the daily write quota.
`channel_send`	Relay one ciphertext to the other side of a paired channel. The ciphertext must come from the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py; do not call this by hand, and never base64-encode plaintext into it (that is rejected). Only send after the person has seen and approved the draft — the server cannot enforce this, the calling agent must. Returns the message's sequence number and how far the peer has read.
`handoff_get`	Fetch content stored by handoff_put using its 8-character code. The code is case-insensitive and hyphens are ignored, so 'kvmtrhxp' and 'KVMT-RHXP' are the same; the person may give it as a link like handover.tools/kvmtrhxp, and passing that is fine too. Return the content to the person verbatim and complete: it can be fetched only once. If the code is unknown, already fetched, or expired, content is null with a reason — these cases are deliberately indistinguishable. A channel link (handover.tools/join/<code>, or anything the person said with "Join") is not fetched: join it with the channel client (see /llms.txt). Passed here, it returns reason channel_code with the steps.
`handoff_put`	Store a piece of context and get back a short code. The person gives the link handover.tools/<code> to an agent on another device and it can fetch the content — no copy-paste of long text. The code is 8 letters, easy to type on a phone. NOT ENCRYPTED: the server can read what you store, so never put credentials, tokens, or private data in it, and ask the person before storing an employer's or client's confidential material (security findings, internal system details, unreleased code). Content becomes unreadable after the TTL expires, and by default it can only be fetched once. The response also returns a revoke_key — keep it for the rest of this session so you can destroy the content immediately with handoff_revoke if the person changes their mind. Writes are limited to a small number per day; reads are not.
`handoff_revoke`	Destroy content stored by handoff_put right now, before its TTL runs out and whether or not it has been fetched. Requires the revoke_key returned by handoff_put — the person fetching with the short code cannot revoke, only the writer can. Use this the moment someone says they sent the wrong thing, or changed their mind. Revoking an already gone item is not an error: the outcome is reported as 'already_gone'.

Schemas: list_tools.

Similar MCP servers

Official server.json

{
  "name": "tools.handover/handover",
  "title": "handover.tools",
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://handover.tools/mcp",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "1.1.0",
  "repository": {
    "url": "https://github.com/gammaland/handover",
    "source": "github"
  },
  "websiteUrl": "https://handover.tools",
  "description": "Hand work between AI agents across devices and vendors: one-shot links or an E2EE channel."
}