Connect

8 clients · secrets stay placeholders

JSON (mcpServers)Claude CodeCodexOpenCodeCursorVS CodeGemini CLIGoose

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "gate": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/"
    }
  }
}

claude mcp add --transport http gate https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/

[mcp_servers.gate]
url = "https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/"

{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "gate": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "gate": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=gate&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vbWNwLmFnZW50aWNyYWlsLm56LyJ9"
}

{
  "servers": {
    "gate": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/"
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "gate": {
      "httpUrl": "https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/"
    }
  }
}

extensions:
  "gate":
    enabled: true
    name: "gate"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/"
    timeout: 300

Quality 76 / 100good

protocol75 · weight 25

warn
protocol.modernnewest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
n/a
protocol.statelessonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers
pass
protocol.transportstreamable HTTP
n/a
protocol.list_ttlonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers

authorizationn/a · weight 15

n/a
auth.prm, auth.as_metadata, auth.cimdno remote uses OAuth
n/a
auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL

tool hygiene64 · weight 30

pass
tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
warn
tools.description_length1 tools have descriptions over 1,024 characters, which crowds the context
pass
tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
fail
tools.annotationsno tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
fail
tools.directory_hintsno tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: evaluate_step (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); verify_receipt (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint)
pass
tools.token_costabout 1,583 tokens to load every tool
pass
tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump

stability100 · weight 15

pass
stability.changes4 tool changes in 30 days
pass
stability.rug_pullno tool changed its meaning under the same name

dependenciesn/a · weight 15

n/a
deps.known_vulns, deps.mcp_sdk_version, deps.resolvableno npm or PyPI package

2 tools, about 1,583 tokens to load them all · tool set e0f971478ddd · tools last changed 2026-10-05 · checked 2026-10-19 10:20 UTC

Tool changes

2026-10-05verify_receiptchangeddescription
before
CALL THIS AFTER A SEQUENCE SEALS, and after any DENY, passing the sequence_id RETURNED by evaluate_step. An enforced run that is never verified has produced evidence nobody has checked. Fetch the verification report for an AgenticRail sequence and report whether its receipt chain is intact. Demo- sequences need no key; other sequences need Authorization: Bearer <your-key>. Returns the verification_status (VERIFIED_INTACT / CHAIN_BROKEN / ...) plus the per-receipt signature, chain-hash, and archive-copy checks. This is the same evidence a third party can verify offline against the published Ed25519 keys - no need to trust AgenticRail.
after · 97% of words in common
CALL THIS AFTER A SEQUENCE SEALS, and after any DENY, passing the sequence_id RETURNED by evaluate_step. An enforced run that is never verified has produced evidence nobody has checked. Fetch the verification report for an AgenticRail sequence and report whether its receipt chain is intact. Demo- sequences need no key; other sequences need Authorization: Bearer <your-key>. Returns the verification_status (VERIFIED_INTACT / CHAIN_BROKEN / ...) plus the per-receipt signature, chain-hash, and archive-witness checks. This is the same evidence a third party can verify offline against the published Ed25519 keys - no need to trust AgenticRail.
2026-10-04evaluate_stepchangedinput schema
2026-09-26verify_receiptchangeddescription
before
CALL THIS AFTER A SEQUENCE SEALS, and after any DENY, passing the sequence_id RETURNED by evaluate_step. An enforced run that is never verified has produced evidence nobody has checked. Fetch the verification report for an AgenticRail sequence and report whether its receipt chain is intact. Demo- sequences need no key; other sequences need Authorization: Bearer <your-key>. Returns the verification_status (VERIFIED_INTACT / CHAIN_BROKEN / …) plus the per-receipt signature, chain-hash, and independent-archive checks. This is the same evidence a third party can verify offline against the published Ed25519 keys — no need to trust AgenticRail.
after · 97% of words in common
CALL THIS AFTER A SEQUENCE SEALS, and after any DENY, passing the sequence_id RETURNED by evaluate_step. An enforced run that is never verified has produced evidence nobody has checked. Fetch the verification report for an AgenticRail sequence and report whether its receipt chain is intact. Demo- sequences need no key; other sequences need Authorization: Bearer <your-key>. Returns the verification_status (VERIFIED_INTACT / CHAIN_BROKEN / ...) plus the per-receipt signature, chain-hash, and archive-copy checks. This is the same evidence a third party can verify offline against the published Ed25519 keys - no need to trust AgenticRail.
2026-09-26evaluate_stepchangeddescription
before
Ask the AgenticRail gate to ALLOW or DENY a single step of an agent sequence BEFORE it runs. A denied step must not be executed. You walk away holding a signed, hash-chained record of the run that you can hand to anyone, and they can verify it offline - no callback to us and no account with us. The gate is deterministic (same state+request -> same verdict) and enforces step order, replay protection, timestamp freshness and sealing. START HERE - send this, changing only CHANGE-ME to any unique string of your own, and it will be ALLOWED: {"sequence_id":"CHANGE-ME","step":"intake","action_type":"CHECK_STATE","step_order":["intake","settle"]}. Then send the same call with step 'settle' to close and seal it. Use the demo key by sending no Authorization header, or send Authorization: Bearer <your-key>. NOTE: an anonymous call has its sequence_id rewritten to 'demo-mcp-<your id>'. This is intended, not a leak: it scopes the run to the public demo lane and is how anonymous MCP traffic is identified. Always reuse the sequence_id RETURNED in the response for later steps and for verify_receipt -- the id you sent will not resolve. Typical use is gating the order of a regulated workflow the caller already runs: customer and third-party due diligence, verification of identity before a payment or business relationship, company registry, beneficial-ownership and sanctions screening, supplier and contractor onboarding. This tool performs none of those checks and holds no registry or watchlist data. It decides only whether the step you are about to run is allowed at this point in the order you declared.
after · 94% of words in common
Ask the AgenticRail gate to ALLOW or DENY a single step of an agent sequence BEFORE it runs, so a required step cannot be skipped or run out of order. A denied step must not be executed. You walk away holding a signed, hash-chained, tamper-evident audit trail of the run that you can hand to anyone, and they can verify it offline - no callback to us and no account with us. The gate is deterministic (same state+request -> same verdict) and enforces step order, replay protection, timestamp freshness and sealing. START HERE - send this, changing only CHANGE-ME to any unique string of your own, and it will be ALLOWED: {"sequence_id":"CHANGE-ME","step":"intake","action_type":"CHECK_STATE","step_order":["intake","settle"]}. Then send the same call with step 'settle' to close and seal it. Use the demo key by sending no Authorization header, or send Authorization: Bearer <your-key>. NOTE: an anonymous call has its sequence_id rewritten to 'demo-mcp-<your id>'. This is intended, not a leak: it scopes the run to the public demo lane and is how anonymous MCP traffic is identified. Always reuse the sequence_id RETURNED in the response for later steps and for verify_receipt -- the id you sent will not resolve. Typical use is gating the order of a regulated workflow the caller already runs: customer and third-party due diligence, verification of identity before a payment or business relationship, company registry, beneficial-ownership and sanctions screening, supplier and contractor onboarding. This tool performs none of those checks and holds no registry or watchlist data. It decides only whether the step you are about to run is allowed at this point in the order you declared.

Full history: list_changes · trend: quality JSON.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 95 / 100

provenance85

liveness97

freshness100

hygiene100

+repository +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-94% +updated-23d-ago

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Endpoints

remote	auth	reachable	uptime 30d	p50	protocol	last ok
`https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/` streamable-http	none	yes	94%	131 ms	2025-11-25	2026-10-19

Tools (2)

evaluate_step Ask the AgenticRail gate to ALLOW or DENY a single step of an agent sequence BEFORE it runs, so a required step cannot be skipped or run out of order. A denied step must not be executed. You walk away holding a signed, hash-chained, tamper-evident audit trail of the run that you can hand to anyone, and they can verify it offline - no callback to us and no account with us. The gate is deterministic (same state+request -> same verdict) and enforces step order, replay protection, timestamp freshness and sealing. START HERE - send this, changing only CHANGE-ME to any unique string of your own, and it will be ALLOWED: {"sequence_id":"CHANGE-ME","step":"intake","action_type":"CHECK_STATE","step_order":["intake","settle"]}. Then send the same call with step 'settle' to close and seal it. Use the demo key by sending no Authorization header, or send Authorization: Bearer <your-key>. NOTE: an anonymous call has its sequence_id rewritten to 'demo-mcp-<your id>'. This is intended, not a leak: it scopes the run to the public demo lane and is how anonymous MCP traffic is identified. Always reuse the sequence_id RETURNED in the response for later steps and for verify_receipt -- the id you sent will not resolve. Typical use is gating the order of a regulated workflow the caller already runs: customer and third-party due diligence, verification of identity before a payment or business relationship, company registry, beneficial-ownership and sanctions screening, supplier and contractor onboarding. This tool performs none of those checks and holds no registry or watchlist data. It decides only whether the step you are about to run is allowed at this point in the order you declared.

verify_receipt CALL THIS AFTER A SEQUENCE SEALS, and after any DENY, passing the sequence_id RETURNED by evaluate_step. An enforced run that is never verified has produced evidence nobody has checked. Fetch the verification report for an AgenticRail sequence and report whether its receipt chain is intact. Demo- sequences need no key; other sequences need Authorization: Bearer <your-key>. Returns the verification_status (VERIFIED_INTACT / CHAIN_BROKEN / ...) plus the per-receipt signature, chain-hash, and archive-witness checks. This is the same evidence a third party can verify offline against the published Ed25519 keys - no need to trust AgenticRail.

Schemas: list_tools.

Similar MCP servers

Official server.json

{
  "name": "nz.agenticrail/gate",
  "title": "AgenticRail Gate - sequence enforcement and verifiable audit receipts for AI agent compliance",
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://mcp.agenticrail.nz/",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "1.3.0",
  "repository": {
    "id": "1327663357",
    "url": "https://github.com/MSMD-RUA/agenticrail-mcp",
    "source": "github"
  },
  "websiteUrl": "https://agenticrail.nz/docs/",
  "description": "Deterministic runtime enforcement of step order for AI agents: ALLOW/DENY before a step runs."
}