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8 clients · secrets stay placeholders

JSON (mcpServers)Claude CodeCodexOpenCodeCursorVS CodeGemini CLIGoose

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "tollbooth-authority": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}

claude mcp add --transport http tollbooth-authority https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp

[mcp_servers.tollbooth-authority]
url = "https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp"

{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "tollbooth-authority": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "tollbooth-authority": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=tollbooth-authority&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vdG9sbGJvb3RoLWF1dGhvcml0eS5mYXN0bWNwLmFwcC9tY3AifQ%3D%3D"
}

{
  "servers": {
    "tollbooth-authority": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "tollbooth-authority": {
      "httpUrl": "https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}

extensions:
  "tollbooth-authority":
    enabled: true
    name: "tollbooth-authority"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp"
    timeout: 300

Quality 70 / 100needs work

protocoln/a · weight 25

n/a
protocol.modern, protocol.stateless, protocol.transport, protocol.list_ttlno remote answered a protocol handshake (not probed yet, unreachable, or local-only)

authorization83 · weight 15

pass
auth.prmProtected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728) published
pass
auth.as_metadataauthorization server metadata reachable
warn
auth.cimdonly Dynamic Client Registration, deprecated in 2026-07-28 in favour of CIMD
n/a
auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL

tool hygiene86 · weight 30

pass
tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
warn
tools.description_length4 tools have descriptions over 1,024 characters, which crowds the context
pass
tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
pass
tools.annotations70 of 70 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
pass
tools.directory_hintsevery tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
warn
tools.token_costabout 15,552 tokens to load every tool
pass
tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump

stability25 · weight 15

warn
stability.changes79 tool changes in 30 days
fail
stability.rug_pull2 tools kept their name but changed most of their description in 30 days; review before trusting them

dependenciesn/a · weight 15

n/a
deps.known_vulns, deps.mcp_sdk_version, deps.resolvableno npm or PyPI package

70 tools, about 15,552 tokens to load them all · tool set fb2745baea1d · tools last changed 2026-10-15 · checked 2026-10-20 21:18 UTC

Tool changes

2026-10-15authority_check_authority_approvalchangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-15authority_confirm_authority_claimchangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-15authority_register_authority_npubchangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-15authority_get_adoption_statuschangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-15authority_repair_operator_schemachangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-15authority_reject_adoptionchangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-15authority_approve_adoptionchangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-15authority_network_persistence_healthchangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-15authority_list_neon_alertschangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-15authority_receive_neon_402_alertchangedtitle, annotations

Showing the latest 10. Full history: list_changes · trend: quality JSON.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 91 / 100

provenance80

liveness100

freshness85

hygiene100

+repository +namespace-matches-repo +reachable +uptime-100% ~updated-57d-ago

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Endpoints

remote	auth	reachable	uptime 30d	p50	protocol	last ok
`https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp` streamable-http	oauth2 AS: https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/	yes	100%	403 ms	–	2026-10-20

Tools (70)

`authority_account_statement`read-only	Generate a patron's account statement at this operator. Returns the patron's purchase history, active credit tranches, per-tool usage breakdown, and recent daily usage logs. This is the patron's spending account — not the operator's Authority tax balance. Free — no credits consumed. Proof of npub ownership is required to prevent statement-scraping of arbitrary patrons.
`authority_account_statement_infographic`read-only	Generate a visual SVG infographic of your account statement. Returns the same data as account_statement, rendered as a dark-themed SVG graphic with balance hero, metrics cards, health gauge, tranche table, and tool usage breakdown. Costs 1 api_sat per call. Proof is verified by ``debit_or_deny`` before any cost is incurred.
`authority_adoption_status`read-only	Check this operator's adoption-request status at a chosen Authority. Free. Polls the Authority MCP-to-MCP for the status of this operator's request (pending / approved / rejected / provisioned).
`authority_approve_adoption`	Approve a pending request and provision the operator. The deferred-courtship counterpart to register_operator: same ``authority_proof`` consent, same provisioning effect (``_provision_operator``) — just supplied later, after review.
`authority_audit_bootstrap_configs`	Audit every operator's bootstrap config on the relays, and republish what needs it. Republishes a config when fewer than three relays hold it, or when it was last sent more than six days ago; then measures again. A GitHub Action runs this weekly. Free and unauthenticated: it reveals only relay counts anyone can take, and re-sending the Authority's own config is idempotent.
`authority_certify_credits`	Certify a purchase order: return a Schnorr-signed Nostr event certificate. The paid_tool decorator handles the ad valorem fee debit and stores the cost in runtime._last_debit_cost. No recomputation needed. Called by operator MCP servers (not end users) when a patron purchases credits.
`authority_check_authority_approval`read-only	Step 3/3 of Authority onboarding — check parent approval, activate Authority.
`authority_check_authority_balance`read-only	Check this operator's tax balance at the Authority. Returns the sats available for certifying patron credit purchases. When this balance reaches zero, patron top-ups cannot be certified and the operator must call purchase_credits on the Authority. This is the operator's own funding — not a patron balance. Free.
`authority_check_balance`read-only	Check a patron's credit balance at this operator. This is the patron's spending balance — credits purchased via Lightning for tool calls at this operator. For the operator's own balance at the Authority (needed to certify patron purchases), use authority_check_balance instead. Free — no credits required. Proof of npub ownership is required to prevent anyone-with-the-registry from enumerating balances.
`authority_check_dpyc_membership`read-only	Look up an npub in the DPYC community registry.
`authority_check_payment`	Check the payment status of a Lightning invoice. Call after paying the invoice from purchase_credits. Free — no credits required. Proof of npub ownership is required to prevent credit-grant front-running by an observer of the invoice ID.
`authority_check_price`read-only	Preview the effective cost of a tool call. Shows the base cost and any constraint effects (discounts, free trials, surge pricing). Free — no credits required.
`authority_check_proof_status`read-only	Check whether a proof grant is still valid. Mirrors ``check_oauth_status`` for the npub-proof flow: a calling agent can ask "will my next paid call accept this dpop_token?" before burning credits on a guaranteed failure. Expiry is read from the grant itself; the only store consulted is the patron's revocation watermark. Free, no side effects — touches no relay.
`authority_confirm_authority_claim`destructive	Step 2/3 of Authority onboarding — verify candidate DM, escalate to parent Authority. The parent Authority is resolved from THIS Authority's own entry in dpyc-community: whatever its ``upstream_authority_npub`` names. For Lonnie-Authority and NorthAmerica that's Prime; for NewEngland it's NorthAmerica; chain depth is transparent.
`authority_delete_coupon`destructive	Delete a coupon. Cascades to all patron redemptions. Any chain step referencing the deleted coupon_id becomes a no-op (the constraint returns neutral on unknown ids) — the Studio surfaces orphan references as warnings. RESTRICTED to operator — requires proof.
`authority_delete_operator_credential`destructive	Remove a single operator secret field. Deletes one key from the operator's encrypted credential blob without touching the others — the field-level counterpart to ``forget_credentials``, which wipes the whole row. Use it to retire a leftover after an SDK cutover (a Prefect key after Modal, or a stored but untemplated orphan like ``anthropic_api_key``) without taking the operator down for a full re-delivery. Stored-but-untemplated fields are first-class: the delete is keyed on what is vaulted, not on what the current template declares. Idempotent — already-absent fields report ``removed: false`` without rewriting the vault. RESTRICTED to the operator — requires the operator's proof (a kind-27235 event or a proof grant); patron proofs are rejected. A deletion is as destructive as a write.
`authority_delete_patron_credential`destructive	Remove a single patron credential field. Deletes one field from stored credentials without affecting other fields. Free. Proof of npub ownership is required — this is a write to the patron's sensitive credential vault.
`authority_deregister_operator`destructive	Remove an Operator from the DPYC community registry. Requires the same two proofs as ``register_operator``: - ``proof`` proves the caller controls the Operator's ``npub``. - ``authority_proof`` proves the Authority's human admin consents to the removal. Without the Authority proof, anyone who knew an Operator's public npub and held its nsec could remove themselves from this Authority's roster without the Authority noticing.
`authority_forget_coupon`destructive	Remove a coupon from this patron's redemption list. Cosmetic only — the coupon itself still exists at the operator, and the patron can re-redeem the same code later while the window allows. Free — requires proof of ``npub``.
`authority_forget_credentials`destructive	Delete vaulted credentials for a specific service and npub. For operator credentials, pass the operator's own npub. For patron credentials, pass the patron's npub. Always requires proof of npub ownership — a deletion is as destructive as a write.
`authority_get_adoption_status`read-only	Read an operator's adoption-request status (free, no proof). Status (pending/approved/rejected/provisioned) isn't sensitive — it's the operator's own request — so the operator can poll it openly via its ``adoption_status`` tool.
`authority_get_nostr_profile`read-only	Read an npub's public Nostr profile (NIP-01 kind-0 metadata). Free, no proof — the data is already public on relays. Returns the latest metadata fields (name, display_name, about, picture, banner, nip05, website, lud16) or an empty profile if none is published.
`authority_get_notarization_proof`read-only	Generate a Merkle inclusion proof that a patron's balance was included in a Bitcoin-notarized snapshot.
`authority_get_operator_config`read-only	Retrieve operator bootstrap configuration (Neon URL, schema). Gated by Schnorr signature proving ownership of the requested npub.
`authority_get_operator_onboarding_status`read-only	Report this operator's configuration readiness. Shows which operator settings are configured, which are missing, and how to deliver each missing value. For patron-level credential status, use get_patron_onboarding_status instead. Free.
`authority_get_patron_credential_fields`read-only	List stored patron credential field names (not values). Returns the names of fields stored for a patron, plus each field's ``delivered_at`` ISO-8601 timestamp when known (null for secrets vaulted before timestamps were recorded). Values are never exposed — use this to verify which fields are configured and how old each one is. Free. Proof of npub ownership is required: the list of configured fields is itself sensitive (reveals which integrations a patron has set up).
`authority_get_patron_onboarding_status`read-only	Report a patron's credential readiness for this operator. For set-once services (eXcalibur, TheBrain), shows which patron secrets are configured and which are missing. For dynamic/OAuth2 services (Schwab), reports that no patron credentials are needed. Free. Proof of npub ownership is required because credential presence is sensitive information about the patron's setup.
`authority_get_pricing_model`read-only	Get the active pricing model for this operator. Free. If no model exists, self-initializes a scaffold with all registered tools at 0 sats. No economic data from code.
`authority_list_adoption_requests`read-only	Owner queue: list pending operator-adoption requests. Restricted to the Authority owner (consent proof). This is the review-on-your-own-time surface the Pricing Studio renders.
`authority_list_canonical_identities`read-only	Return canonical (tool_id, mcp_name, …) for every tool the wheel exposes. The authoritative source for any client (Studio, agents, FE) that needs to know how this MCP identifies its tools. Reconcile uses this output to UUID-join against the stored pricing model — no name-based UUID derivation, no guessing. Includes both ToolIdentity-seeded tools and any UUID recorded by ``@paid_tool`` that is missing from the registry. The latter appear with ``registered: false`` (and in the top-level ``unregistered`` array) so Reconcile can flag deploy drift instead of silently reporting clean when a live tool was never seeded (#174). If the operator renames a function or rebrands a slug, the mcp_name in this output changes but tool_id stays. That's the whole point of the canonical-UUID design. Also diffs the live FastMCP wire surface against the registry. Tools exposed on the wire but absent from the registry appear in ``unregistered`` so Reconcile can flag deploy drift instead of silently under-reporting (issue #175). Free, no side effects.
`authority_list_constraint_types`read-only	List all available constraint types and their parameter schemas. Returns the type, category, description, and parameter specs for every constraint that can be used in a pricing pipeline. Free — no credits required.
`authority_list_coupons`read-only	List every coupon this operator has minted (newest first). Each row carries the current ``times_redeemed`` counter — the Studio renders a progress bar from this against ``total_uses``. RESTRICTED to operator — requires proof.
`authority_list_my_coupons`read-only	List the coupons this patron has redeemed on this operator. Returns both active and exhausted redemptions with a per-row ``status`` (``active`` / ``window_closed`` / ``patron_limit`` / ``total_limit``). Free — requires proof of ``npub``.
`authority_list_neon_alerts`read-only	Owner queue: operators that reported a Neon-402 (store locked). Restricted to the Authority owner. A companion to network_persistence_health: this is the reactive list (operators that already went dark); the health tool adds the proactive per-project compute posture.
`authority_list_notarizations`read-only	List recent Bitcoin notarization records.
`authority_mint_coupon`	Create a new operator-owned discount coupon. The coupon owns its binding: ``tool_ids`` names the tools it discounts, and re-pricing a tool never touches it. A coupon bound to no tool discounts nothing, however many patrons redeem it.
`authority_network_persistence_health`read-only	Owner view: the health of the DPYC economy's accounting store (Neon). Restricted to the Authority owner. Three layers, from most to least proactive: 1. ``projects`` — if a Neon API key is configured (NEON_API_KEY), the per-project compute-quota posture across the org: hours used, %, reset date, and a status ladder (ok/warning/critical/exhausted) so a project can be topped up BEFORE it 402s. ``configured=false`` when no key is present (deliver one to enable the proactive watch). 2. ``own_store`` — reactive self-detection: whether the Authority's OWN database answers, or is itself 402-locked. Always available. 3. ``operator_alerts`` — operators that reported a 402 (from receive_neon_402_alert). Reactive, but immediate.
`authority_notarize_ledger`	Build a Merkle tree of all patron balances and submit the root to Bitcoin via OpenTimestamps. Operator-only background task. Bitcoin confirmation takes 1-6 hours. Free — no credits required.
`authority_operator_status`read-only	View registration status, balance summary, and the Authority's Nostr npub. When an explicit ``npub`` is provided, requires a Schnorr proof of ownership — without it, anyone could enumerate balances by walking the community registry. When ``npub`` is empty, falls back to the Authority's own operator identity and skips the proof check (self- inspection is always allowed).
`authority_oracle_about`read-only	Describe the DPYC ecosystem via the Oracle. Free.
`authority_oracle_get_tax_rate`read-only	Get the current DPYC certification tax rate. Free.
`authority_oracle_how_to_join`read-only	Get DPYC onboarding instructions from the Oracle. Free.
`authority_oracle_lookup_member`read-only	Look up a DPYC community member by npub. Free.
`authority_oracle_network_advisory`read-only	Get active network advisories from the Oracle. Free.
`authority_publish_nostr_profile`destructive	Publish a CLIENT-SIGNED kind-0 profile to relays for an npub. The wheel never holds a patron nsec. The frontend signs the kind-0 metadata event with the patron's session key or a NIP-07 extension and passes the signed event (JSON) here; the wheel verifies the signature matches the npub, then relays it to public relays. The signature is the authorization — no proof token, no key custody. Free.
`authority_purchase_credits`	Buy credits via Bitcoin Lightning. Creates a Lightning invoice. Pay it with any Lightning wallet, then call check_payment to confirm. Proof of npub ownership is required so credits land in the correct ledger. Free — no credits required to call.
`authority_receive_adoption_request`	Inbound: record an operator's request to be adopted by this Authority. Called MCP-to-MCP by the operator's ``request_adoption``. Verifies the operator controls ``operator_npub`` (inline Schnorr bound to the adoption sentinel — no relay round-trip), records a durable ``pending`` row, and fires a best-effort owner-notification DM. Does NOT provision — provisioning waits for the owner's ``approve_adoption``.
`authority_receive_credentials`destructive	Pick up credentials from the Secure Courier. Completes the CREDENTIAL-DELIVERY flow (the ownership-proof counterpart is ``receive_npub_proof``). Call this only after the user confirms they have replied. Deterministic, one-shot retrieval: name the response you want with ``(sender_npub, service, dpop_token)`` and the tool drains ONLY the rendezvous relay that channel was pinned to. Every popped DM with the wrong session phrase is deleted and its sender is NACK'd; the first DM with the matching phrase is accepted (ACK'd) and the scan stops. If none match, the queue is drained and a ``courier_not_found`` result is returned. Do NOT poll, loop, or retry. If a credential_card (ncred1...) is provided, it is redeemed directly without any relay access (dpop_token not required for that path). On success, the payment processor client is reinitialized from the new credentials — no server restart needed.
`authority_receive_neon_402_alert`	Inbound: an operator reports its Neon store is 402-locked. Called MCP-to-MCP by the operator's runtime the instant it catches a Neon HTTP 402 on its own database. Verifies the operator controls ``npub`` (inline Schnorr bound to this tool's wire name), records a durable latest-state row, and fires a best-effort owner-notification DM. This is how the Authority learns the store is dark BEFORE a patron files a complaint.
`authority_receive_npub_proof`destructive	Receive npub ownership confirmation from a patron. Completes the npub-OWNERSHIP-PROOF flow (the credential-delivery counterpart is ``receive_credentials``). Call this only after the user confirms they have replied. Deterministic, one-shot retrieval: name the response with ``(patron_npub, dpop_token)`` — the ``dpop_token`` being the value returned by ``request_npub_proof``. The tool drains ONLY the pinned rendezvous relay that challenge was published on, stopping at the DM whose phrase matches. Mismatched DMs are deleted and NACK'd (without revealing the expected phrase). If called before the user replies, their message will never be found. Do NOT poll, loop, or retry. The signed DM itself proves npub ownership (the patron's nsec signed it). On success, returns a new ``dpop_token``: an Operator-signed proof grant envelope ``{"grant": …, "nonce": …}`` bound to the patron, this challenge, and the duration the patron named. The calling application MUST remember that whole string and pass it as ``dpop_token`` on every subsequent paid tool call. The grant is self-verifying; nothing about it is stored here. Free.
`authority_redeem_coupon`	Claim a coupon by its name (the code the operator shared). Looks up the operator's coupon by ``code``, validates the window and total cap, and records a per-patron redemption row. Subsequent paid tool calls on this MCP auto-apply the discount until ``uses_per_patron`` is exhausted. Free — no credits required. Requires proof of ``npub``. Idempotent: redeeming the same code twice returns the existing redemption.
`authority_register_authority_npub`	Step 1/3 of Authority onboarding — send a Nostr DM challenge to the candidate.
`authority_register_operator`	Provision an operator in the Authority ledger. Creates a ledger entry so the operator can purchase credits and certify purchase orders. Idempotent — safe to call again. Requires TWO independent identity proofs: 1. ``proof`` — Schnorr proof signed by the candidate operator's ``npub``. Proves the requester really controls that npub. The operator typically calls ``request_npub_proof`` / ``receive_npub_proof`` against this Authority first to get a proof grant. 2. ``authority_proof`` — Schnorr proof signed by the Authority's own npub. This is the Authority's human consent — only an agent with the Authority's nsec on hand can produce it. Apps generate this inline when the human admin clicks 'adopt'; otherwise an Authority-side proof can be minted the same way an operator-side one is. Next step: Call purchase_credits to fund your credit balance.
`authority_reject_adoption`	Reject a pending operator-adoption request (owner consent).
`authority_repair_operator_schema`	Owner repair: reassign every table in an operator's tenant schema to the operator's own role, then re-grant DML. For tenants whose tables were created/owned by the provisioning role — the operator role then cannot CREATE INDEX on them ("must be owner"), which aborts the whole vault bootstrap. Unlike register_operator this does NOT rotate the operator's DB password or re-send the bootstrap DM; it only fixes ownership + grants in place. Idempotent.
`authority_report_issue`	File a field report about this service as a GitHub issue on the operator's repo. Found a tool's metadata or response wrong or confusing? Report it where the tool lives. The author of record is your npub — no npub / no proof, no issue — and it is stamped into the issue so the report is attributed to you, not the operator. Costs a small fee (a free write to an issue tracker would be abused). The report is PUBLIC and goes to the maintainers' normal triage; nothing is verified here. Returns the filed issue's repo, number, and url. If this operator has not enabled field reports, returns an "issue reporting not configured" situation and you are not charged.
`authority_request_adoption`	Ask a chosen Authority to adopt this operator (deferred courtship). RESTRICTED to the operator — requires proof the caller controls this operator's npub. Resolves the Authority's MCP endpoint from the community registry, mints an inline ownership proof with this operator's nsec, and delivers the request MCP-to-MCP. The Authority records it as pending; its owner approves on their own time. Poll ``adoption_status`` for progress; the operator flips to ``ready`` once the Authority provisions it.
`authority_request_credential_channel`	Open a Secure Courier channel for credential delivery. This is the CREDENTIAL-DELIVERY flow — use it to hand over a service secret (API keys, tokens). To merely prove you control an npub (the usual answer to a ``proof_required`` error), use ``request_npub_proof`` instead. Note: dynamic/OAuth2 services (e.g. Schwab) need NO couriered secret — check ``service_status`` first. Sends a welcome DM with a credential template. The recipient must read the DM in their Nostr client, fill in the fields, and reply manually. This is a human-in-the-loop flow. After calling this tool, STOP and tell the user what to do. Wait for the user to confirm they have replied before calling ``receive_credentials``. Do NOT poll or retry — each ``receive_credentials`` call destructively drains the relay mailbox.
`authority_request_echo`read-only	Echo what the client sent with this request. Free. Reports the URL path and query, the headers, the cookies and the MCP request ``_meta``. Values are SHA-256 fingerprints, so nothing a client sends is repeated back; equal fingerprints mean equal values. Call it from two conversations and compare: a value that stays the same within one and changes between them identifies the conversation.
`authority_request_npub_proof`	Request npub ownership proof from a patron via Nostr DM. This is the npub-OWNERSHIP-PROOF flow — use it when a call returns ``proof_required``. It proves the caller controls an npub; it does NOT deliver any service secret. To hand an operator its API keys or OAuth secrets, use ``request_credential_channel`` instead. Sends a challenge DM that the patron must sign and reply to using their Nostr client. This is a human-in-the-loop flow. After calling this tool, STOP and tell the user to check their Nostr client and reply to the challenge. Wait for the user to confirm they have replied before calling ``receive_npub_proof``. Do NOT poll or retry — each ``receive_npub_proof`` call destructively drains the relay mailbox. Returns a ``dpop_token`` — the one-time challenge nonce shown in the DM. Pass it to ``receive_npub_proof`` to collect the reply. It is a matching token, not a credential: on its own it authorizes nothing. Lifecycle: ``receive_npub_proof`` returns the proof grant, which expires after the duration the patron named in their reply. When it expires, call ``request_npub_proof`` again for a fresh challenge, then wait for the user, then call ``receive_npub_proof``. Free.
`authority_reset_pricing_model`destructive	Erase all pricing models and restore a viable default. Deletes every stored model, then self-initializes a fresh one from the tool registry — all tools at 0 sats with proper UUIDs. Returns the new model. RESTRICTED to operator — requires proof (nsec-signed).
`authority_restore_credits`	Credit a patron's ledger from a BTCPay-settled invoice. RESTRICTED to the operator — the operator owns the books and is the only party who can issue a manual credit grant. Patrons who believe they paid but never got credits must escalate to the operator's support, who then invokes this tool on their behalf. Use cases: cold-start vault races during check_payment, ncred delivery hiccups, patrons closing Top-Off sheets before settle, any infrastructure incident that left an invoice settled at BTCPay but uncredited on the operator's ledger. Idempotent — if the invoice is already credited (in the patron's ``credited_invoices``), returns success with credits_granted=0.
`authority_restore_neon_schema`	Prepare this operator's database schema again, ignoring the breadcrumb. Diagnostic / recovery tool for when Neon keeps answering 4xx and the operator suspects a table or grant is missing. Every statement is idempotent, so a clean re-run is harmless; the breadcrumb is rewritten at the end. Returns one step per concern, with Neon's own error text inline for any that failed. RESTRICTED to operator — requires proof (nsec-signed).
`authority_service_status`read-only	Check the health and configuration of this service. Free.
`authority_session_status`read-only	Check operator readiness. Returns the operator lifecycle state and clear guidance on what to do next. Free. Lifecycle states: - ready: Vault AND pricing model verified on this call. Proceed with tool calls — this is the answer the moment the vault is up. - warming_up: Persistence could not be reached on this call (a transient failure, seen, not assumed). Retry; the next call completes the bootstrap. Never reported on a clock. - misconfigured: Persistence rejected a query with a permanent SQL error (permission denied, missing relation). Paid tools will fail until the operator repairs the database — retrying does not help. - quota_exceeded: The persistence provider (Neon) answered HTTP 402 — the operator's database has exhausted its compute/storage quota, so the books are locked for billing. Paid tools fail; retrying does NOT help. The operator's Authority must restore capacity (upgrade the plan or wait for the quota reset). Free tools remain available. - not_registered: Operator has no Authority relationship yet. Call register_operator first. - no_identity: Operator nsec is not configured. Deployment issue.
`authority_set_pricing_model`destructive	Set the active pricing model. RESTRICTED to operator. Requires a valid proof (Schnorr-signed kind-27235 event) proving the caller holds the operator's nsec.
`authority_update_coupon`	Patch a coupon's editable fields. Pass only the fields you want to change. To set a cap to unlimited (NULL in the schema), pass ``clear_uses_per_patron=true`` or ``clear_total_uses=true``. Renaming the code is allowed — existing patron redemption rows survive (they key on coupon id). ``tool_ids`` replaces the coupon's binding — tool ids or MCP tool names, ``["*"]`` for every paid tool, ``[]`` to unbind it. RESTRICTED to operator — requires proof.
`authority_update_operator`	Update an existing Operator's community registry entry. Requires the same two proofs as ``register_operator``: - ``proof`` proves the caller controls the Operator's ``npub``. - ``authority_proof`` proves the Authority's human admin consents to the change. Without the Authority proof, anyone with the Operator's nsec could redirect their own ``service_url`` under this Authority's signature without the Authority's awareness.
`authority_update_operator_credential`	Add or update a single operator secret field. Merges into the operator's stored credentials without touching the others — the field-level counterpart to re-delivering the whole bundle over Secure Courier. Use it to rotate one secret (a reissued ``btcpay_api_key``, say) without restating the six you did not change, where any field omitted from a courier reply is destroyed. The value is never echoed back. RESTRICTED to the operator — requires the operator's proof (a kind-27235 event or a proof grant); patron proofs are rejected.
`authority_update_patron_credential`	Add or update a single patron credential field. Merges into existing stored credentials without affecting other fields. Useful for setting an account identifier after OAuth, changing a default brain, etc. Free. Proof of npub ownership is required — this is a write to the patron's sensitive credential vault.

Schemas: list_tools.

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Official server.json

{
  "name": "io.github.lonniev/tollbooth-authority",
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://tollbooth-authority.fastmcp.app/mcp",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "0.11.9",
  "repository": {
    "url": "https://github.com/lonniev/tollbooth-authority",
    "source": "github"
  },
  "description": "Tollbooth Authority — Certified Purchase Order Service for DPYC operators"
}