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Trust Gate

R0· no sign-in

Post-quantum, tamper-evident receipts for agent actions. Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, offline verify.

v0.2.0 · active · repository · website · descriptor JSON · versions

An agent can connect right now, no human step.Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.
Quality63needs work
Trust90of 100
Uptime, 30 days100%
Latency p50341 ms

Connect

8 clients · secrets stay placeholders
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "trust-gate-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
claude mcp add --transport http trust-gate-mcp https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp
[mcp_servers.trust-gate-mcp]
url = "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp"
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "trust-gate-mcp": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "trust-gate-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=trust-gate-mcp&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vdHJ1c3QtZ2F0ZS1tY3Aub25yZW5kZXIuY29tL21jcCJ9"
}
{
  "servers": {
    "trust-gate-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "trust-gate-mcp": {
      "httpUrl": "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
extensions:
  "trust-gate-mcp":
    enabled: true
    name: "trust-gate-mcp"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp"
    timeout: 300

Quality 63 / 100needs work

protocol75 · weight 25
  • warn
    protocol.modernnewest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
  • n/a
    protocol.statelessonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers
  • pass
    protocol.transportstreamable HTTP
  • n/a
    protocol.list_ttlonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers
authorizationn/a · weight 15
  • n/a
    auth.prm, auth.as_metadata, auth.cimdno remote uses OAuth
  • n/a
    auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL
tool hygiene71 · weight 30
  • pass
    tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
  • pass
    tools.description_lengthdescriptions are concise
  • pass
    tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
  • fail
    tools.annotationsno tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
  • fail
    tools.directory_hintsno tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: run_exit_drill (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); mint_receipt_for_record_change (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); audit_my_agent_inventory (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
  • pass
    tools.token_costabout 1,493 tokens to load every tool
  • pass
    tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump
stability25 · weight 15
  • warn
    stability.changes7 tool changes in 30 days
  • fail
    stability.rug_pull2 tools kept their name but changed most of their description in 30 days; review before trusting them
dependenciesn/a · weight 15
  • n/a
    deps.known_vulns, deps.mcp_sdk_version, deps.resolvableno npm or PyPI package

7 tools, about 1,493 tokens to load them all · tool set cb2ff71139cb · tools last changed 2026-10-02 · checked 2026-10-20 04:09 UTC

Tool changes

  • run_exit_drilladded

    Vendor exit readiness drill. Checks local signing key, local model access (Ollama). Returns step-by-step results and a tamper-evident receipt. Informational; it signs one receipt, which creates the signing key on a host that has none yet.

  • check_egressadded

    Egress classification check. Scans a data sample for a finite list of sensitivity markers and classifies as NO_MARKERS_FOUND / INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL / RESTRICTED. RESTRICTED sets blocked=true; this tool cannot block anything itself, and NO_MARKERS_FOUND is not clearance to send. Returns classification, retention info, and a tamper-evident receipt.

  • gate_decisionadded

    Two-phase decision gate with a real verdict. PREVIEW returns ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE with the risk tier and reasons, plus a preview_id, without acting. COMMIT re-evaluates the same inputs and mints a signed receipt for the verdict. Only ALLOW returns a GRANTED permit; DENY returns DENIED; ESCALATE returns WITHHELD_PENDING_HUMAN and a human must decide outside this tool. Applies only to actions the caller routes through it: it does not observe or block what an agent does. Verb-tier heuristic on the action name and resource, not a proof. Stateless. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type, triggered_by_source, decision_model.

  • verify_receiptchangeddescription, input schemameaning changed
    before

    Verify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline). require_pq=True (default via OAO_REQUIRE_PQ) FAILS if the ML-DSA-65 or SLH-DSA legs are missing -- defends against signature-stripping downgrade attacks.

    after · 20% of words in common

    Verify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline). ok=true means unchanged since signing, signed, kid consistent with the embedded key, and (require_pq default on) at least one post-quantum leg verified; unsigned receipts fail. It does not prove who signed: pass expected_kid to pin the signer's Ed25519 key; a pin counts only when that key's own signature verifies (see signer_pinned). The post-quantum keys in a receipt are not covered by the kid.

  • mint_action_receiptchangeddescription, input schemameaning changed
    before

    Mint a post-quantum receipt for an arbitrary consequential agent action.

    after · 20% of words in common

    Mint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for an arbitrary consequential agent action. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type (human/agent/script), triggered_by_source (api/cli/cron), decision_model (the LLM model used). Attestation values are caller claims: allowlisted to safe characters, signed, not verified. Decisions that contain a gate verdict word are reserved for gate_decision.

  • audit_my_agent_inventorychangeddescription
    before

    Rank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act, with a signed receipt. Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in.

    after · 67% of words in common

    Rank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act (a name-based heuristic that weights a name's first word most). Read-only: it mints no receipt. Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in.

  • mint_receipt_for_record_changechangeddescription
    before

    Mint a post-quantum receipt for one CRM record change. Old/new values are carried as SHA-256 hashes. Works with any CRM (Relaticle, hosted CRMs, custom).

    after · 70% of words in common

    Mint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for one CRM record change. Old/new values are carried as SHA-256 hashes. Works with any CRM (Relaticle, hosted CRMs, custom).

Full history: list_changes · trend: quality JSON.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 90 / 100

provenance90
liveness100
freshness65
hygiene100

+repository +namespace-matches-repo +website +reachable +uptime-100% ~updated-116d-ago

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Endpoints

remoteauthreachableuptime 30dp50protocollast ok
https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp streamable-httpnoneyes100%341 ms2025-11-252026-10-20

Tools (7)

audit_my_agent_inventoryRank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act (a name-based heuristic that weights a name's first word most). Read-only: it mints no receipt. Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in.
check_egressEgress classification check. Scans a data sample for a finite list of sensitivity markers and classifies as NO_MARKERS_FOUND / INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL / RESTRICTED. RESTRICTED sets blocked=true; this tool cannot block anything itself, and NO_MARKERS_FOUND is not clearance to send. Returns classification, retention info, and a tamper-evident receipt.
gate_decisionTwo-phase decision gate with a real verdict. PREVIEW returns ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE with the risk tier and reasons, plus a preview_id, without acting. COMMIT re-evaluates the same inputs and mints a signed receipt for the verdict. Only ALLOW returns a GRANTED permit; DENY returns DENIED; ESCALATE returns WITHHELD_PENDING_HUMAN and a human must decide outside this tool. Applies only to actions the caller routes through it: it does not observe or block what an agent does. Verb-tier heuristic on the action name and resource, not a proof. Stateless. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type, triggered_by_source, decision_model.
mint_action_receiptMint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for an arbitrary consequential agent action. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type (human/agent/script), triggered_by_source (api/cli/cron), decision_model (the LLM model used). Attestation values are caller claims: allowlisted to safe characters, signed, not verified. Decisions that contain a gate verdict word are reserved for gate_decision.
mint_receipt_for_record_changeMint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for one CRM record change. Old/new values are carried as SHA-256 hashes. Works with any CRM (Relaticle, hosted CRMs, custom).
run_exit_drillVendor exit readiness drill. Checks local signing key, local model access (Ollama). Returns step-by-step results and a tamper-evident receipt. Informational; it signs one receipt, which creates the signing key on a host that has none yet.
verify_receiptVerify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline). ok=true means unchanged since signing, signed, kid consistent with the embedded key, and (require_pq default on) at least one post-quantum leg verified; unsigned receipts fail. It does not prove who signed: pass expected_kid to pin the signer's Ed25519 key; a pin counts only when that key's own signature verifies (see signer_pinned). The post-quantum keys in a receipt are not covered by the kid.

Schemas: list_tools.

Similar MCP servers

Official server.json
{
  "name": "io.github.CWNApps/trust-gate-mcp",
  "_meta": {
    "io.modelcontextprotocol.registry/publisher-provided": {
      "tool": "mcp-publisher",
      "version": "1.7.9",
      "build_info": {
        "license": "Apache-2.0",
        "transport": "streamable-http",
        "deployed_on": "render.com",
        "tools_count": 4
      }
    }
  },
  "title": "Trust Gate",
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "0.2.0",
  "repository": {
    "url": "https://github.com/CWNApps/trust-gate-mcp",
    "source": "github"
  },
  "websiteUrl": "https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com",
  "description": "Post-quantum, tamper-evident receipts for agent actions. Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, offline verify."
}