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warda

R0· no sign-in

Economic authority for autonomous agents on Kaspa L1. Never holds a key.

v0.4.2 · active · repository · website · descriptor JSON · versions

An agent can connect right now, no human step.Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.
Quality77good
Trust94of 100
Uptime, 30 days100%
Latency p50293 ms

Connect

8 clients · secrets stay placeholders
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "warda": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
claude mcp add --transport http warda https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp
[mcp_servers.warda]
url = "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "warda": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "warda": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=warda&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vbWNwLndhcmRhcHJvdG9jb2wuY29tL21jcCJ9"
}
{
  "servers": {
    "warda": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "warda": {
      "httpUrl": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
extensions:
  "warda":
    enabled: true
    name: "warda"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
    timeout: 300

Quality 77 / 100good

protocol75 · weight 25
  • warn
    protocol.modernnewest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
  • n/a
    protocol.statelessonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers
  • pass
    protocol.transportstreamable HTTP
  • n/a
    protocol.list_ttlonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers
authorizationn/a · weight 15
  • n/a
    auth.prm, auth.as_metadata, auth.cimdno remote uses OAuth
  • n/a
    auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL
tool hygiene71 · weight 30
  • pass
    tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
  • pass
    tools.description_lengthdescriptions are concise
  • pass
    tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
  • fail
    tools.annotationsno tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
  • fail
    tools.directory_hintsno tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: warda_build_spend (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); warda_grant_authority (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); warda_check_spend (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
  • pass
    tools.token_costabout 6,230 tokens to load every tool
  • pass
    tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump
stability100 · weight 15
  • pass
    stability.changesno tool changes in 30 days
  • pass
    stability.rug_pullno tool changed its meaning under the same name
dependencies67 · weight 15
  • pass
    deps.known_vulnsno known advisory in 102 resolved packages
  • fail
    deps.mcp_sdk_version@modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1 has 1 known advisory (GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h); update @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to 1.31.0 or later
  • pass
    deps.resolvable@warda_protocol/[email protected] resolved: 102 packages

11 tools, about 6,230 tokens to load them all · tool set 61a20ffe02c4 · checked 2026-10-20 10:03 UTC

Tool changes

No tool definition changes recorded. A server's first observation is its baseline; later probes record what changes.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 94 / 100

provenance90
liveness100
freshness85
hygiene100

+repository +namespace-matches-repo +website +reachable +uptime-100% ~updated-49d-ago

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Dependencies

@warda_protocol/[email protected] npm101 dependencies, resolved · MCP SDK @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1 · advisories checked 2026-10-19

advisoryseveritypackagefixed in
GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47hMCP TypeScript SDK: OAuth client could send credentials to an authorization server chosen by the MCP serverhigh@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected]MCP SDK, directfixed in 1.31.0

Dependency graphs from deps.dev; advisories from OSV.dev, including the GitHub Advisory Database and the PyPI Advisory Database; all CC BY 4.0. The graph is what a clean install of this version resolves today; nothing was installed or run. How it is checked.

Endpoints

remoteauthreachableuptime 30dp50protocollast ok
https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp streamable-httpnoneyes100%293 ms2025-11-252026-10-20
packageregistryversionruntimesecrets
@warda_protocol/mcpnpm0.4.2–

Tools (11)

warda_build_delegationAssemble an unsigned transaction that subdivides this grant into a child for a sub-agent, and return the digest to sign with the PARENT's agent key. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES YOUR KEY. A child can only ever be more restrictive than its parent, and the parent reserves exactly what the child receives — authority is subdivided, never created. Narrowing the child's allowlist needs the parent's full member list, because the witness is a path through the parent's tree and a root alone cannot produce one.
warda_build_exitAssemble an unsigned transaction that ENDS this grant and sweeps its balance to the principal. 'revoke' is the emergency stop, signed by the revocation key, effective the moment it confirms — the agent cannot stop it and cannot outrun it beyond the limits it already had. 'reclaim' is the same sweep after the window has closed, signed by the principal key; the covenant enforces the timing with a CLTV, so a reclaim built early simply will not run. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES A KEY. This is the tool a monitor calls when a grant is behaving badly and something has to act.
warda_build_settlementAssemble an unsigned transaction that ends a child grant and returns its UNSPENT remainder to the parent's budget, charging the parent only what the child actually spent. This is the other half of delegation: letting a child expire instead returns the money to the PRINCIPAL — to the human — which is no use to an agent mid-task. Returns TWO digests: the parent's half is signed by the parent's agent key, the child's by the revocation key. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES EITHER. prevRoot is the parent's reserve root from before this child was pushed; warda_build_delegation returns it as parentReserveRootBefore. It cannot be derived from anything on chain — a hash chain pops by preimage.
warda_build_spendAssemble an unsigned Kaspa transaction that spends from this grant, and return the digest to sign. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES YOUR KEY and never signs: it hands back bytes, and you sign the digest wherever your key lives. It also returns the advisory verdict, but it builds the transaction either way — a local rule that is too strict must not be able to block a payment the chain would accept. If the verdict says refused, broadcasting will cost a fee and fail.
warda_check_delegationCheck whether a proposed child grant is a legal narrowing of this one. A child may only ever be more restrictive than its parent, and the parent must reserve exactly what the child receives — authority is subdivided, never created. Advisory.
warda_check_spendCheck a proposed payment against every rule the covenant enforces, and return the same verdict the chain would. Builds the recipient proof for you. ADVISORY: a 'permitted' answer is not permission — it means the covenant would accept this transaction. A 'refused' answer means no valid transaction exists, so broadcasting one would only waste a fee.
warda_find_serviceSearch the Warda service registry for endpoints an agent holding a grant can pay. Filters are a conjunction: a service must offer EVERY capability asked for and be at or under maxPrice. WHAT IS VERIFIED: that the operator controls the key the service is paid at, and that the listing was served from the same host as the endpoint it names. WHAT IS NOT: that the price is real, that the service works, or that it is worth paying — those are the operator's claims about themselves and arrive labelled as such. There is no ranking; do not read the order as one. NETWORK: unlike every other tool on this server, this one makes one outbound request, to the registry and to nothing else. It will not fetch a URL you give it. NOT REQUIRED: discovery is never in the payment path. A listing is a signed manifest at /.well-known/warda-service.json on the operator's own domain — if you already know an endpoint, read that directly and pay it without asking anyone.
warda_grant_addressDerive the on-chain address of a grant from its terms and current state. A grant's address is a HASH of its state, so it MOVES after every spend and every delegation — an address that worked yesterday holds nothing today. Use this to know which address to fund, watch, or look up.
warda_grant_authorityThe agent's spending power right now: budget left, epoch headroom, per-transaction cap, and the largest single payment currently permitted. This is what an agent wallet's spending limit would tell you, except that it is not a setting — the covenant enforces these whether or not you ask. Use it before planning a purchase. NOT a chain balance: this server never reads the chain. It reports what the grant you passed says, so a stale descriptor gives a confident wrong number.
warda_recover_grantRead a grant's full state back out of any transaction that spent it, and work out where it went. Use this when a grant's recorded state is stale, wrong, or lost and its address turns up empty. Kaspa's P2SH requires the covenant script to travel in the clear inside every spending transaction, and the grant's state is spliced into that script — so every spend publishes the grant it spent. Pass the transaction as wire JSON, or just the redeem script hex if that is all you have.
warda_walletThe whole wallet view in one call: the grant's current address, its spending limits, the largest payment permitted right now, and every address it is allowed to pay. This is the agent-wallet shape — address, limits, spending power — with one difference worth knowing: the limits are not settings this server or your code applies. They are in the script that unlocks the coin, so a payment outside them is not refused, it is a transaction that does not exist. NO CHAIN READ: this server never connects to a node. Every figure comes from the grant descriptor you passed, so an on-chain balance is deliberately absent — reporting one from a stale record is the failure this whole protocol keeps meeting.

Schemas: list_tools.

Similar MCP servers

Official server.json
{
  "name": "io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda",
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-09-29/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "0.4.2",
  "packages": [
    {
      "version": "0.4.2",
      "transport": {
        "type": "stdio"
      },
      "identifier": "@warda_protocol/mcp",
      "registryType": "npm",
      "registryBaseUrl": "https://registry.npmjs.org",
      "environmentVariables": [
        {
          "name": "WARDA_TEMPLATE",
          "description": "Path to the covenant template a grant was issued under. Only needed for a grant on a covenant version other than the one shipped: a template mismatch does not fail loudly, it derives a plausible address with nothing at it."
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "repository": {
    "url": "https://github.com/ArtyKOMarkets/warda",
    "source": "github",
    "subfolder": "mcp"
  },
  "websiteUrl": "https://wardaprotocol.com",
  "description": "Economic authority for autonomous agents on Kaspa L1. Never holds a key."
}