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8 clients · secrets stay placeholders

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{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dcl-trust-oracle": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

claude mcp add --transport http dcl-trust-oracle https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp

[mcp_servers.dcl-trust-oracle]
url = "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp"

{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "dcl-trust-oracle": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dcl-trust-oracle": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=dcl-trust-oracle&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vbWNwLmZyb25lc2lzbGFicy5jb20vbWNwIn0%3D"
}

{
  "servers": {
    "dcl-trust-oracle": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dcl-trust-oracle": {
      "httpUrl": "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

extensions:
  "dcl-trust-oracle":
    enabled: true
    name: "dcl-trust-oracle"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp"
    timeout: 300

Quality 91 / 100strong

protocol75 · weight 25

warn
protocol.modernnewest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
n/a
protocol.statelessonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers
pass
protocol.transportstreamable HTTP
n/a
protocol.list_ttlonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers

authorizationn/a · weight 15

n/a
auth.prm, auth.as_metadata, auth.cimdno remote uses OAuth
n/a
auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL

tool hygiene100 · weight 30

pass
tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
pass
tools.description_lengthdescriptions are concise
pass
tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
pass
tools.annotations18 of 18 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
pass
tools.directory_hintsevery tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
pass
tools.token_costabout 4,842 tokens to load every tool
pass
tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump

stability100 · weight 15

pass
stability.changesno tool changes in 30 days
pass
stability.rug_pullno tool changed its meaning under the same name

dependenciesn/a · weight 15

n/a
deps.known_vulns, deps.mcp_sdk_version, deps.resolvableno npm or PyPI package

18 tools, about 4,842 tokens to load them all · tool set 44849eceade0 · checked 2026-10-19 10:52 UTC

Tool changes

No tool definition changes recorded. A server's first observation is its baseline; later probes record what changes.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 92 / 100

provenance85

liveness99

freshness85

hygiene100

+repository +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-98% ~updated-67d-ago

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Endpoints

remote	auth	reachable	uptime 30d	p50	protocol	last ok
`https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp` streamable-http	none	yes	98%	512 ms	2025-11-25	2026-10-19

Tools (18)

`dcl_audit_decode`read-only	POST-ACTION Basic Audit ($0.10). Retrieves a record from the tamper-evident chain by tx_hash.
`dcl_audit_decode_deep`read-only	POST-ACTION Deep Forensic Audit ($0.50). Extended output with drift_context and full chain integrity verification.
`dcl_commit`	FINAL-STEP Leibniz Layer Crypto Commit ($0.01). Writes a trading/agent decision to the append-only Leibniz Layer audit chain and returns a Merkle-proof-style receipt: `tx_hash` (proof of this specific commit), `chain_hash` (the previous commit's hash, linking this one into the chain), and `chain_depth` (this commit's position in the chain). Unlike the evaluate_* tools, this call has no pass/fail verdict of its own — it always succeeds and simply seals the decision. Passing `prior_checks` is optional but recommended: it records which earlier pipeline steps (firewall/wallet/trade/MEV) this specific commit is downstream of, in one auditable record. Always run this LAST, after every other crypto-suite check has passed.
`dcl_evaluate_batch`	PRE-ACTION Bulk Processing ($0.10). Evaluates a list of items in one call; each item is a dict shaped {"response": str, "policy"?: str}, where policy defaults to "default" if omitted and may be any built-in policy name (default, strict, anti_jailbreak, safety, content_quality). Each item gets its own independent COMMIT/NO_COMMIT verdict via the same logic as the matching single-item evaluate_* tool; results are returned in input order under `results`, plus a shared `batch_id`. Capped at 200 items per call — oversized batches are rejected. Use this instead of multiple single-item evaluate_* calls when checking several responses — optionally against different policies — in one priced call rather than paying per item separately.
`dcl_evaluate_fast`	FAST Pre-Action Audit ($0.01). Runs the response through the server's "default" policy: a substring check against 3 forbidden phrases ("ignore previous instructions", "jailbreak", "bypass safety") with a 0.7 minimum-confidence threshold. Each forbidden match found costs 0.4 confidence; if confidence falls below 0.7, or any match is found, the verdict is NO_COMMIT and `reason` lists which phrase triggered it. Otherwise COMMIT. Use this as the default low-cost first-pass gate before a risky agent action; switch to dcl_evaluate_strict for a broader, higher-bar check, or to dcl_evaluate_jailbreak / dcl_evaluate_safety / dcl_evaluate_quality for a narrower, single-topic check instead of the general-purpose default policy.
`dcl_evaluate_jailbreak`	PRE-ACTION Instruction Adherence Check ($0.02). Runs the "anti_jailbreak" policy: a substring check against 6 forbidden phrases ("ignore previous instructions", "jailbreak", "bypass safety", "pretend you are", "act as if", "DAN") with a 0.8 minimum-confidence threshold — each match costs 0.4 confidence. Returns COMMIT if no phrase matches and confidence stays at or above 0.8, otherwise NO_COMMIT with `reason` listing the matched phrase(s). Use this as a targeted, cheaper check when the concern is specifically prompt-injection / persona-hijack risk; use dcl_evaluate_strict instead when you also want safety- and default-policy phrases covered in the same call.
`dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_crypto`	PRE-ACTION Crypto Jailbreak & Injection Detection ($0.02). Crypto-specialized instruction-override/jailbreak/injection screen: standard role-switch and instruction-override patterns, plus crypto-specific drain-wallet injection (e.g. "transfer all funds to...", fake "test transaction" requesting full balance) and unlimited-approval injection (e.g. type(uint256).max, "approve unlimited allowance", skip-slippage-confirmation framing). Any match returns NO_COMMIT with `reason` and `findings` naming the matched category/categories; run this FIRST in the DCL crypto pipeline, before wallet/trade/MEV checks, since it screens the input itself rather than a decision built on top of it.
`dcl_evaluate_mev`	POST-ACTION MEV & Market-Abuse Compliance Screen ($0.03). Text-level screen (not a mempool/transaction analyzer) for front-running/sandwich-attack language, wash trading/layering/spoofing, KYC/AML red flags (mixers, structuring, obscuring fund origin), and pump-and-dump/rug-pull language. Any critical-severity finding, or two or more major-severity findings, returns NO_COMMIT; a single major-severity finding is also returned as NO_COMMIT but with a distinctly higher `confidence` (~0.55 vs ~0.05-0.2 for harder violations) so downstream callers can tell a soft single flag apart from a hard multi-finding block. Each finding includes an illustrative `regulatory_reference` tag (MiFID II, FCA, or an EU AI Act article).
`dcl_evaluate_output_sanitizer`	FINAL-GATE Output Sanitizer ($0.02). Post-processing checkpoint that strips secrets/credentials, PII, crypto material (seed phrases, private keys, wallet addresses), internal network details (private IPs, MAC addresses, .internal/.local/.corp hostnames), and unsafe shell/SQL/path-traversal fragments from a raw model response — plus a narrow, high-precision safety net for direct self-harm-instruction-seeking and targeted-harassment phrasing (not a general toxicity classifier). Returns a single `sanitized_output` with every match replaced by `[REDACTED]`; use that instead of the original whenever verdict is NO_COMMIT. Run this as the LAST gate before a response reaches its destination — after `dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_crypto`/other input-side checks have already run, and immediately before `dcl_commit` seals the final decision. Internally re-uses the same detection tables as `dcl_evaluate_secrets`/`dcl_evaluate_pii` for the secrets/PII categories, so results stay consistent with those tools.
`dcl_evaluate_pii`	POST-ACTION PII Detection Scan ($0.02). Regex-based scan across 8 personal-data categories, with a Luhn checksum on card numbers to reduce false positives. Any finding results in NO_COMMIT.
`dcl_evaluate_quality`	PRE-ACTION Content Quality & Drift Check ($0.03). Runs the "content_quality" policy: flags 12 absolutist or unverifiable-claim phrases (e.g. "guaranteed returns", "100% accurate", "studies show", "without a doubt") with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold — the highest bar of any single-policy tool. Returns NO_COMMIT if any phrase matches or confidence falls below 0.85, with `reason` listing the matched phrase(s). Use this to catch overconfident or unsubstantiated claims in generated content — a different concern from jailbreak or safety phrasing — e.g. before publishing agent-written copy or reports.
`dcl_evaluate_safety`	PRE-ACTION Baseline Safety Check ($0.01). Runs the "safety" policy: flags 2 forbidden disclaimers ("I cannot be held responsible", "no guarantees") and additionally REQUIRES the substring "AI" to appear somewhere in the response — missing it costs 0.2 confidence even with no forbidden phrase present. Minimum confidence is 0.75. Returns NO_COMMIT if confidence drops below 0.75, with `reason` naming the forbidden phrase found or the missing required pattern. Use this when you specifically need to confirm an AI-disclosure marker is present and the two disclaimer phrases are absent — not as a general-purpose safety net; for broader coverage use dcl_evaluate_fast or dcl_evaluate_strict instead.
`dcl_evaluate_secrets`	POST-ACTION Secret & Credential Leak Scan ($0.02). Regex-based scan across 8 categories (API keys, cloud credentials, tokens/JWTs, private keys, DB URLs, connection strings, env assignments, webhook secrets, internal endpoints with auth). Any finding results in NO_COMMIT.
`dcl_evaluate_signal`	POST-ACTION Market Signal Fabrication Screen ($0.03). Pattern-based heuristic on the output text alone (no source price feed) — flags guaranteed-price-prediction language ("will definitely hit $X"), absolute-certainty claims ("100% certain", "cannot go down"), a fabricated-price flag when a specific dollar figure co-occurs with a guaranteed-outcome claim, and an invented-token flag when a "$TICKER" cashtag doesn't match a small set of well-known symbols (false positives are possible for legitimate lesser-known tickers — this is a heuristic pre-check, not ground truth). For a full claim-by-claim check against an actual price-feed snapshot, use the local grounding workflow instead of this live tool. Verdict/confidence collapsing follows the same rule as dcl_evaluate_mev: any critical finding or 2+ major findings is a hard NO_COMMIT; exactly one major finding is a softer NO_COMMIT at ~0.55 confidence.
`dcl_evaluate_strict`	STRICT Pre-Action Audit ($0.05). Runs the response against a broader, higher-bar "strict" policy: the union of all forbidden phrases from the default, anti-jailbreak, and safety policies (8 phrases total), with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold instead of the default policy's 0.7. Each matched phrase costs 0.4 confidence; if confidence falls below 0.85, or any phrase matches, the verdict is NO_COMMIT with `reason` listing every match found. Use this instead of dcl_evaluate_fast when the cost of a false COMMIT is high — e.g. before an irreversible or high-stakes agent action — since it catches jailbreak- and safety-adjacent phrasing that the plain default policy would miss.
`dcl_evaluate_trade`	PRE-ACTION Trade Decision Verifier ($0.02). Screens trade-decision language for guaranteed-return claims, zero-risk/"can't lose" framing, and unqualified "buy/sell X now" directives — any match is NO_COMMIT. If no unsafe language is found, COMMIT additionally requires the word "risk" to appear anywhere in the text as a minimum disclosure marker; its absence alone triggers NO_COMMIT with `reason` noting the missing disclosure. Produces an immutable `trade_receipt` (tx_hash/chain_hash/chain_depth) distinct from the top-level audit hash, for downstream systems that specifically need a trade-shaped receipt object.
`dcl_evaluate_wallet`	POST-ACTION Wallet Secret Guardian ($0.02). Scans for BIP-39 seed phrases (12 or 24 consecutive wordlist words), raw hex or WIF-format private keys, Ethereum/Bitcoin wallet addresses, and API keys/bearer tokens appearing near wallet/custody/signing terminology. Any finding results in NO_COMMIT — wallet secrets have no safe threshold, unlike other DCL evaluators. Returns a `sanitized_output` with all matches redacted (null if nothing was found) and a masked `redacted_sample` per finding — the real value is never returned or stored server-side.
`dcl_pipeline_start`	SESSION Management ($0.05). Generates a new `pipeline_id` and returns session metadata (scope, expiry, initial drift_mode) for organizing a series of related checks under one identifier. Note: this call does not currently link the returned pipeline_id to later evaluate_* calls — there is no server-side session state that ties subsequent audits back to it; it is an identifier/timestamp issuer, not an active tracking session. Use this to obtain a shared reference ID for your own client-side grouping of a multi-step audit sequence; do not rely on it to automatically aggregate drift across calls.

Schemas: list_tools.

Similar MCP servers

Official server.json

{
  "name": "com.fronesislabs/dcl-trust-oracle",
  "_meta": {
    "io.modelcontextprotocol.registry/publisher-provided": {
      "tags": [
        "mcp",
        "x402",
        "llm",
        "agents",
        "policy",
        "usdc",
        "base"
      ],
      "tools": [
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_fast",
          "title": "Fast Pre-Action Audit"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_strict",
          "title": "Strict Pre-Action Audit"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_jailbreak",
          "title": "Jailbreak Detection Check"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_safety",
          "title": "Baseline Safety Check"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_quality",
          "title": "Content Quality & Drift Check"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_secrets",
          "title": "Secret & Credential Leak Scan"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_pii",
          "title": "PII Detection Scan"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_batch",
          "title": "Batch Evaluation"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_pipeline_start",
          "title": "Start Pipeline Session"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_audit_decode",
          "title": "Basic Audit Decode"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_audit_decode_deep",
          "title": "Deep Forensic Audit Decode"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_crypto",
          "title": "Crypto Jailbreak & Injection Detection"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_wallet",
          "title": "Wallet Secret Guardian"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_trade",
          "title": "Trade Decision Verifier"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_mev",
          "title": "MEV & Market-Abuse Compliance Screen"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_signal",
          "title": "Market Signal Fabrication Screen"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_evaluate_output_sanitizer",
          "title": "Output Sanitizer — Final Gate"
        },
        {
          "name": "dcl_commit",
          "title": "Leibniz Layer Crypto Commit"
        }
      ],
      "keywords": [
        "AI audit",
        "LLM audit",
        "AI agent audit",
        "LLM evaluation",
        "AI output evaluation",
        "AI safety",
        "MCP audit",
        "x402",
        "policy evaluation",
        "governance",
        "tamper-evident",
        "Base",
        "USDC"
      ],
      "categories": [
        "audit",
        "safety",
        "governance",
        "payments"
      ]
    }
  },
  "title": "DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)",
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://mcp.fronesislabs.com/mcp",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "2.3.1",
  "repository": {
    "url": "https://github.com/Fronesis-Labs/dcl-webhook",
    "source": "github"
  },
  "websiteUrl": "https://fronesislabs.com",
  "description": "AI/LLM agent output audit MCP: policy eval, tamper-evident chain, AI safety, x402 USDC on Base."
}