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8 clients · secrets stay placeholders

JSON (mcpServers)Claude CodeCodexOpenCodeCursorVS CodeGemini CLIGoose

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "preflight": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

claude mcp add --transport http preflight https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp

[mcp_servers.preflight]
url = "https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp"

{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "preflight": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "preflight": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=preflight&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vcHJlZmxpZ2h0LmFsbHRoZXBvc3NpYmxlcy5jb20vbWNwIn0%3D"
}

{
  "servers": {
    "preflight": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "preflight": {
      "httpUrl": "https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

extensions:
  "preflight":
    enabled: true
    name: "preflight"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp"
    timeout: 300

Quality 89 / 100new

protocol75 · weight 25

warn
protocol.modernnewest supported version is 2025-06-18; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
n/a
protocol.statelessonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers
pass
protocol.transportstreamable HTTP
n/a
protocol.list_ttlonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers

authorizationn/a · weight 15

n/a
auth.prm, auth.as_metadata, auth.cimdno remote uses OAuth
n/a
auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL

tool hygiene100 · weight 30

pass
tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
pass
tools.description_lengthdescriptions are concise
pass
tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
pass
tools.annotations4 of 4 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
pass
tools.directory_hintsevery tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
pass
tools.token_costabout 897 tokens to load every tool
pass
tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump

stabilityn/a · weight 15

n/a
stability.changes, stability.rug_pulltool history recorded for 1 of the 7 days needed

dependenciesn/a · weight 15

n/a
deps.known_vulns, deps.mcp_sdk_version, deps.resolvableno npm or PyPI package

4 tools, about 897 tokens to load them all · tool set a2ac7904ecc6 · tools last changed 2026-10-19 · checked 2026-10-20 18:38 UTC

Tool changes

2026-10-19check_outputchangedtitle, description, input schema, annotations
before
Check a structured output you're about to return or act on for degenerate-answer patterns a schema check can't see: invalid JSON, a placeholder value ('TBD', 'N/A', 'unknown') where a real answer should be, an array of byte-identical items (a common symptom of a loop that never advanced), or an expected field that's missing or empty. Schema validity and answer quality are different guarantees — call this before trusting your own output, not just after validating it parses.
after · 100% of words in common
Check a structured output you're about to return or act on for degenerate-answer patterns a schema check can't see: invalid JSON, a placeholder value ('TBD', 'N/A', 'unknown') where a real answer should be, an array of byte-identical items (a common symptom of a loop that never advanced), or an expected field that's missing or empty. Schema validity and answer quality are different guarantees, call this before trusting your own output, not just after validating it parses.
2026-10-19scan_extensionchangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-19scan_contentchangedtitle, annotations
2026-10-19scan_mcp_serverchangedtitle, description, annotations
before
Check an MCP server for real risk signals before trusting it: unauthenticated transport, capability overreach (filesystem/shell/credential access with no scoping), and known-bad signatures. Pass a live server URL, or a manifest of tool definitions if the server isn't reachable over HTTP. Semantic prompt-injection detection runs too if a Pro API key is sent as an Authorization: Bearer header — see /docs.
after · 100% of words in common
Check an MCP server for real risk signals before trusting it: unauthenticated transport, capability overreach (filesystem/shell/credential access with no scoping), and known-bad signatures. Pass a live server URL, or a manifest of tool definitions if the server isn't reachable over HTTP. Semantic prompt-injection detection runs too if a Pro API key is sent as an Authorization: Bearer header, see /docs.

Full history: list_changes · trend: quality JSON.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 83 / 100

no-repository

provenance55

liveness100

freshness100

hygiene80

+dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-100% +updated-1d-ago -no-repository

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Endpoints

remote	auth	reachable	uptime 30d	p50	protocol	last ok
`https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp` streamable-http	none	yes	100%	160 ms	2025-06-18	2026-10-20

Tools (4)

`check_output`read-only	Check a structured output you're about to return or act on for degenerate-answer patterns a schema check can't see: invalid JSON, a placeholder value ('TBD', 'N/A', 'unknown') where a real answer should be, an array of byte-identical items (a common symptom of a loop that never advanced), or an expected field that's missing or empty. Schema validity and answer quality are different guarantees, call this before trusting your own output, not just after validating it parses.
`scan_content`read-only	Check a document or web page for hidden instructions before an agent reads, summarizes, or acts on it: invisible Unicode, obfuscated payloads, and (on Pro) a semantic pass for prompt-injection phrasing aimed at the model instead of the human reader. Pass either a URL to fetch, or raw text you already have.
`scan_extension`read-only	Check a VS Code extension or a Claude Skill before installing or trusting it. For a VS Code extension (which runs with full Node.js access and no permission model to scope): publisher domain-verification status weighed against install count, and known-bad-signature checks on its description. For a Claude Skill: hidden-instruction and obfuscated-payload detection on the SKILL.md body (the same engine scan_content uses), unscoped or credential-referencing tool grants in its allowed-tools/disallowed-tools frontmatter, inline shell execution baked into the file itself, and pattern matching on any bundled script files for credential-exfiltration signatures. Semantic prompt-injection detection on a skill's body runs too on Pro.
`scan_mcp_server`read-only	Check an MCP server for real risk signals before trusting it: unauthenticated transport, capability overreach (filesystem/shell/credential access with no scoping), and known-bad signatures. Pass a live server URL, or a manifest of tool definitions if the server isn't reachable over HTTP. Semantic prompt-injection detection runs too if a Pro API key is sent as an Authorization: Bearer header, see /docs.

Schemas: list_tools.

Similar MCP servers

More from com.allthepossibles

Official server.json

{
  "name": "com.allthepossibles/preflight",
  "title": "Preflight",
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "websiteUrl": "https://preflight.allthepossibles.com",
  "description": "Scans an MCP server for security gaps before your agent connects. Free tier, no signup."
}