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8 clients · secrets stay placeholders

JSON (mcpServers)Claude CodeCodexOpenCodeCursorVS CodeGemini CLIGoose

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verify": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify"
    }
  }
}

claude mcp add --transport http verify https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify

[mcp_servers.verify]
url = "https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify"

{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "verify": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verify": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=verify&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vYXV0aC54YmFycnkuYWkvYXBpL21jcC92ZXJpZnkifQ%3D%3D"
}

{
  "servers": {
    "verify": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify"
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verify": {
      "httpUrl": "https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify"
    }
  }
}

extensions:
  "verify":
    enabled: true
    name: "verify"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify"
    timeout: 300

Quality 79 / 100good

protocol75 · weight 25

warn
protocol.modernnewest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
n/a
protocol.statelessonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers
pass
protocol.transportstreamable HTTP
n/a
protocol.list_ttlonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers

authorizationn/a · weight 15

n/a
auth.prm, auth.as_metadata, auth.cimdno remote uses OAuth
n/a
auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL

tool hygiene71 · weight 30

pass
tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
pass
tools.description_lengthdescriptions are concise
pass
tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
fail
tools.annotationsno tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
fail
tools.directory_hintsno tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: request_verification_challenge (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); verify_wallet_ownership (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint)
pass
tools.token_costabout 450 tokens to load every tool
pass
tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump

stability100 · weight 15

pass
stability.changesno tool changes in 30 days
pass
stability.rug_pullno tool changed its meaning under the same name

dependenciesn/a · weight 15

n/a
deps.known_vulns, deps.mcp_sdk_version, deps.resolvableno npm or PyPI package

2 tools, about 450 tokens to load them all · tool set f1d17f9816bb · checked 2026-10-20 10:35 UTC

Tool changes

No tool definition changes recorded. A server's first observation is its baseline; later probes record what changes.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 72 / 100

no-repository

provenance45

liveness97

freshness65

hygiene80

+dns-namespace +reachable +uptime-92% ~updated-122d-ago -no-repository

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Endpoints

remote	auth	reachable	uptime 30d	p50	protocol	last ok
`https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify` streamable-http	none	yes	92%	486 ms	2025-11-25	2026-10-20

Tools (2)

request_verification_challenge Step 1 of wallet verification: get a fresh challenge for the user to sign. chain: "evm" or "solana". Pass agent_id (your marketplace identity) so the proof is bound to you. Present `challenge` to the user, have their wallet sign it (EVM personal_sign / Solana signMessage), then call verify_wallet_ownership with the returned `nonce` + signature. The challenge is single-use and expires (~10 min). Returns {challenge, nonce, expires_at}.

verify_wallet_ownership Step 2 of wallet verification: prove control by signing the challenge from step 1. chain: "evm" (secp256k1, 0x-hex signature) or "solana" (ed25519, base58/base64/hex). `nonce` is from request_verification_challenge; the signature must be over that exact challenge text. Pass the same agent_id you requested the challenge with — on success the wallet is linked to you and you get a session_token to pass to Tachyo's other agents (e.g. check_token_safety) to unlock connected/premium tiers. Returns {verified, address, chain, linked, session_token?, session_expires?}. Does not move funds or expose keys.

Schemas: list_tools.

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More from ai.tachyo

Official server.json

{
  "name": "ai.tachyo/verify",
  "_meta": {},
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://auth.xbarry.ai/api/mcp/verify",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "description": "Cryptographic proof of wallet ownership in two steps, with no keys and no custody."
}