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8 clients · secrets stay placeholders

JSON (mcpServers)Claude CodeCodexOpenCodeCursorVS CodeGemini CLIGoose

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verify": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://apir.ai/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}

claude mcp add --transport http verify https://apir.ai/api/mcp

[mcp_servers.verify]
url = "https://apir.ai/api/mcp"

{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "verify": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://apir.ai/api/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verify": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://apir.ai/api/mcp"
    }
  },
  "deeplink": "cursor://anysphere.cursor-deeplink/mcp/install?name=verify&config=eyJ0eXBlIjoiaHR0cCIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vYXBpci5haS9hcGkvbWNwIn0%3D"
}

{
  "servers": {
    "verify": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://apir.ai/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verify": {
      "httpUrl": "https://apir.ai/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}

extensions:
  "verify":
    enabled: true
    name: "verify"
    type: streamable_http
    uri: "https://apir.ai/api/mcp"
    timeout: 300

Quality 79 / 100good

protocol75 · weight 25

warn
protocol.modernnewest supported version is 2025-06-18; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
n/a
protocol.statelessonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers
pass
protocol.transportstreamable HTTP
n/a
protocol.list_ttlonly applies to 2026-07-28 servers

authorizationn/a · weight 15

n/a
auth.prm, auth.as_metadata, auth.cimdno remote uses OAuth
n/a
auth.secret_in_urlno templated URL

tool hygiene71 · weight 30

pass
tools.descriptionsevery tool has a description
pass
tools.description_lengthdescriptions are concise
pass
tools.schemasevery tool has an object input schema
fail
tools.annotationsno tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
fail
tools.directory_hintsno tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: check_authority (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); get_verification_keys (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); verify_agent (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint)
pass
tools.token_costabout 538 tokens to load every tool
pass
tools.api_dumptools are not a one-to-one API dump

stability100 · weight 15

pass
stability.changesno tool changes in 30 days
pass
stability.rug_pullno tool changed its meaning under the same name

dependenciesn/a · weight 15

n/a
deps.known_vulns, deps.mcp_sdk_version, deps.resolvableno npm or PyPI package

3 tools, about 538 tokens to load them all · tool set 8061092c50c7 · checked 2026-10-20 11:08 UTC

Tool changes

No tool definition changes recorded. A server's first observation is its baseline; later probes record what changes.

Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. How it is computed.

Trust 83 / 100

no-repository

provenance55

liveness100

freshness100

hygiene80

+dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-100% +updated-7d-ago -no-repository

Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. How it is computed.

Endpoints

remote	auth	reachable	uptime 30d	p50	protocol	last ok
`https://apir.ai/api/mcp` streamable-http	none	yes	100%	1809 ms	2025-06-18	2026-10-20

Tools (3)

`check_authority`	Resolve the human mandate behind an AI agent: which actions a named person actually permitted, any value cap, the expiry, and whether the grant itself is signed. Where authority was delegated agent to agent, the full chain is walked back to the human at the root, and one law is enforced at every hop: authority may only ever narrow. No hop can hold an action, a target or a spending cap wider than the hop above it, and the root must be a human. Use this before letting an agent transact, sign, spend or commit on someone else's behalf. An agent holding a valid credential may still be acting outside its mandate, and those are different questions.
`get_verification_keys`	Return the Ed25519 public keys APIR publishes, so a signature can be recomputed offline without trusting any APIR response, including this one. Keys are published as a JWKS at apir.ai/.well-known/jwks.json and as did:web:apir.ai. Retired keys stay published so older credentials still verify.
`verify_agent`	Check whether an AI agent carries a real, cryptographically signed credential. Accepts an agent name, a credential id (TP-...), an agent UUID, a domain or a DID. Returns one of seven verdicts: VERIFIED, EXPIRED, REVOKED, SUPERSEDED, UNSIGNED, UNCHECKED or NO_RECORD. IMPORTANT for interpreting the answer: VERIFIED means the Ed25519 signature recomputes against the key published at apir.ai and the credential is unexpired and unrevoked. It confirms WHO issued the credential and that its contents are unaltered. It is NOT a guarantee that the agent behaves well. NO_RECORD is an honest, first-class answer: it means nothing is on file, which is not evidence of wrongdoing and not a warning. It means any claim the agent makes about itself is unverified. Free, unauthenticated, and no account is required.

Schemas: list_tools.

Similar MCP servers

Official server.json

{
  "name": "ai.apir/verify",
  "title": "APIR Agent Verification",
  "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-12-11/server.schema.json",
  "remotes": [
    {
      "url": "https://apir.ai/api/mcp",
      "type": "streamable-http"
    }
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "websiteUrl": "https://apir.ai",
  "description": "Check an AI agent you did not build: is it who it claims, inside its mandate, and what's its record"
}