# kr.ai.vdb/vdb

> Check packages for CVEs, slopsquatting, and CISA KEV before your AI agent installs them.

- name: kr.ai.vdb/vdb
- version: 0.2.6
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 96/100
- quality: 79/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/kr.ai.vdb%2Fvdb
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/kr.ai.vdb%2Fvdb/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vdb": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://vdb.ai.kr/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 100
- provenance: 85
- drivers: +repository +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-100% +updated-18d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 79/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: vdb_lookup (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); vdb_search (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); vdb_check_packages (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 726 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: deps.dev does not know vdb-mcp@0.2.6

- tools: 7, about 726 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: d8873ecf7df4892699650ad8cb0621a7
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/kr.ai.vdb/vdb.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/kr.ai.vdb/vdb)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Dependencies

- pypi vdb-mcp@0.2.6: unknown

Dependency graphs from deps.dev; advisories from OSV.dev, including the GitHub Advisory Database and the PyPI Advisory Database; all CC BY 4.0.

## Remotes

- https://vdb.ai.kr/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 1)

## Packages

- pypi vdb-mcp@0.2.6 secrets: VDB_API_TOKEN

## Tools (7)

- `vdb_check_mcp_server`: BEFORE recommending a community/unofficial MCP server, check it here. Scope risk is evaluated independently of advisory risk — an unvetted publisher asking for shell or filesystem access is refused even with a clean record. Follow the returned `agent_action`.
- `vdb_check_package`: BEFORE recommending or installing any package, check it here. The response carries `agent_action`: REFUSE (do not add it — relay the `because` text to the user), CONFIRM (ask the user first), or PROCEED. A failed or rate-limited call also answers REFUSE; never proceed unchecked. Also returns the underlying advisories, slop risk, and KEV status as supporting data.
- `vdb_check_packages`: Bulk-check several packages in one call — always prefer this over repeated vdb_check_package. Each result carries its own `agent_action` (REFUSE / CONFIRM / PROCEED) plus a top-level `agent_action` for the batch. Follow them; relay `because` when refusing. Send names EXACTLY as written — do not correct a typo first, the call is the typo test.
- `vdb_list_slopsquatting`: List packages currently flagged as slopsquatting candidates in a given ecosystem.
- `vdb_lookup`: Fetch a single vulnerability by ID or alias (e.g. CVE-2024-1234, GHSA-xxxx-yyyy-zzzz, VDB-SLOP-…).
- `vdb_scan_lockfile`: BEFORE merging, scan the resolved lockfile. Checking the packages someone chose misses the transitive ones nobody did — which is usually where the risk is. Pass the file contents (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, uv.lock, go.sum, Cargo.lock, a CycloneDX SBOM, …). Returns `agent_action`: REFUSE means do not merge.
- `vdb_search`: Free-text search over the VDB vulnerability corpus.