# Routescore

> Read-only pre-sign evidence for onchain agents: route quality, MEV exposure, clear/caution verdict.

- name: io.routescore/mcp
- version: 0.3.5
- connection class: R1 (autonomous)
- trust: 93/100
- quality: 87/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.routescore%2Fmcp
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.routescore%2Fmcp/tools

**An agent can connect on its own if it already holds `ROUTESCORE_TOKEN`.** Remote endpoint behind a static API key or header. The registry never sees the value; the agent fills the placeholder.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "routescore": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://www.routescore.io/api/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer ${ROUTESCORE_TOKEN}"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

Placeholders to fill: `${ROUTESCORE_TOKEN}`.

## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 99
- freshness: 65
- provenance: 100
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-97% ~updated-93d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 87/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 100 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 11 of 11 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- pass `tools.directory_hints`: every tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 2,980 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: 67 (weight 15)

- pass `deps.known_vulns`: no known advisory in 98 resolved packages
- fail `deps.mcp_sdk_version`: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1 has 1 known advisory (GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h); update @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to 1.31.0 or later
- pass `deps.resolvable`: @routescore/mcp@0.3.5 resolved: 98 packages

- tools: 11, about 2,980 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: b7e58082aa7ba9bbe70be46af74bccf8
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.routescore/mcp.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.routescore/mcp)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Dependencies

- npm @routescore/mcp@0.3.5: resolved, 97 dependencies, MCP SDK @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1
  - GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h (high) in `` @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.30.1 ``, direct, fixed in `` 1.31.0 ``, advisory summary: "MCP TypeScript SDK: OAuth client could send credentials to an authorization server chosen by the MCP server" https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h

Dependency graphs from deps.dev; advisories from OSV.dev, including the GitHub Advisory Database and the PyPI Advisory Database; all CC BY 4.0.

## Remotes

- https://www.routescore.io/api/mcp (streamable-http, auth api_key ${ROUTESCORE_TOKEN}, reachable true, uptime30d 0.974359)

## Packages

- npm @routescore/mcp@0.3.5 secrets: ROUTESCORE_API_KEY

## Tools (11)

- `check_swap`: CALL THIS BEFORE SIGNING AN ONCHAIN SWAP. Read-only pre-sign evidence check: given notional, chain, and an optional route and token, it returns a modeled route-quality grade, price-impact / slippage band, modeled MEV/execution exposure where observable, and a token registry read (recognized vs unverified), composed into a clear / caution / unsupported verdict with machine-readable reasons and caveats. Point-in-time decision support: it does not execute, route funds, sign, or promise an outcome — the agent still decides. Recognition is not safety, sellability, redemption, rights, liquidity, or investment-quality verification; unverified tokens, unknown order flow, and uncalibrated sequencer ordering downgrade the verdict rather than reading as safe. Relay the verdict, reasons, and caveats verbatim.
- `get_detector_manifest`: Fetch the latest public MEV-detector run manifest: the detector version hash and the eligible pool/token universe it was committed to. Use to verify what the detector covers.
- `get_preflight_record`: Retrieve the durable evidence record a prior check_swap call persisted — the "record" leg of plan → preflight → execute → record. Fetch one record by the record_id that check_swap returned. Owner-scoped: the configured key only ever sees records belonging to its own account. The record embeds the evaluated check_swap response payload (including its evidence_bundle_id, before the additive record_id / record_output_hash linkage fields) plus a canonical-JSON SHA-256 integrity hash (record_id and recorded_at excluded) so the evidence can be re-verified offline, and includes the stored evidence bundle. Read-only evidence: record creation rejects known execution-material keys (calldata, transaction payloads, signing material) and drops identity-shaped labels from the actor context.
- `quote_bridge_refund`: Modeled premium estimate for cross-chain bridge execution failure against a modeled SLA expectation. Returns a modeled premium and conditions — not a live cover, refund, or premium-acceptance offer.
- `quote_lrt_slashing`: Modeled premium estimate for slashing risk on a liquid-restaking-token (LRT) position given its AVS exposure. Returns a modeled premium and slashing bounds — not a live cover offer.
- `quote_mev_cover`: Modeled premium estimate for MEV-sandwich exposure on a swap. Returns a modeled premium (bps + USD), expected/CVaR loss, and conditions. Point-in-time decision support before routing a trade — not a live cover, insurance, or premium-acceptance offer.
- `record_execution`: Persist 1-100 already-built execution_record.v1 documents as immutable, personal-account post-trade evidence. Requires a stable idempotency_key; an exact replay returns the original result and reuse with different content fails closed. Pro tier, owner-scoped, and bounded by the MCP transport byte limit. This tool never accepts calldata, signing material, routes funds, executes a transaction, applies reviewer overrides, or exposes another tenant. Invalid rows are recorded only as redacted rejection reasons and are never echoed.
- `review_execution`: Review one stored execution_record.v1 by record_id. Authenticated and personal-account owner-scoped: another account’s id is indistinguishable from a missing id. Returns the deterministic review_execution.v1 evidence coverage, exceptions, unavailable-evidence register, caveats, and canonical hash. Read-only retrospective decision support only: it does not query arbitrary public transactions, accept reviewer overrides, certify best execution or compliance, give advice, or expose admin actions.
- `review_public_transaction`: DEV-ONLY CONTRACT DISCOVERY; DISABLED AGAINST PRODUCTION. On an explicitly enabled non-production server, review one arbitrary public Ethereum transaction by transaction hash. This is separate from review_execution: it does not read an owner-scoped stored execution_record.v1 and never exposes tenant, reviewer, override, or administrative fields. Returns the deterministic tenant-free public_transaction_review.v1 coverage register, conclusions, explicit gap register, source provenance, caveats, and canonical hash. Receipt, block, index, and gas facts are measured; gas cost and point-in-time confirmation depth are calculated. Venue is unavailable in this endpoint until a server-owned verified registry adapter exists. Route, amounts, protocol fee, arrival price, feasible-route benchmark, dropped status, and historical reorg remain unavailable unless the public contract can support them. Read-only retrospective decision support only; it does not certify best execution or compliance and does not give advice.
- `simulate_scenario`: Run a what-if Monte Carlo: model expected premium vs expected refund/loss over a horizon, given assumptions about sandwich frequency, average loss, and deductible. Returns a narrative + distribution.
- `whoami`: Confirm the configured API key works and report which plan tier it carries. Returns the owning account email and tier.