# io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp

> Verify AI-agent revenue: recompute a Merkle proof and check it against an on-chain anchor.

- name: io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp
- version: 0.1.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 94/100
- quality: 85/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.ypratap11%2Fdokimo-mcp
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.ypratap11%2Fdokimo-mcp/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "dokimo-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 99
- freshness: 85
- provenance: 90
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +website +reachable +uptime-97% ~updated-40d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 85/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 86 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 3 of 3 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: dokimo_agent_card (destructiveHint); recompute_merkle_root (destructiveHint); verify_evidence_package (destructiveHint)
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 665 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 3, about 665 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: cadb7cc1f162da5224e87a424f73bb9f
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.974359)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (3)

- `dokimo_agent_card`: Fetch Dokimo's public A2A agent card — the discovery document describing what
    it can verify (skills, endpoints, supported A2A versions).
- `recompute_merkle_root`: Trustlessly recompute a dokimo-merkle-v1 root — LOCAL, no network, no trust.

    Hash ``leaf`` in the leaf domain (H(0x00 ‖ leaf)) and replay ``proof_path`` —
    a list of ``[sibling_hash, side]`` where side is "L" or "R" — hashing internal
    nodes as H(0x01 ‖ left ‖ right). Compare the returned root to the ``root`` in an
    evidence package yourself; if it differs, the package was tampered with.

    Returns ``{recomputed_root, merkle_scheme, steps}``.
    
- `verify_evidence_package`: Fully verify a Dokimo evidence package against the LIVE on-chain anchor.

    Sends the package to Dokimo's public A2A endpoint, which recomputes the Merkle
    proof AND checks the compound commitment (root + rule version) against the
    anchor on Base. ``package`` must contain: ``leaf`` (str), ``root`` (str),
    ``proof_path`` (list of [sibling_hash, "L"|"R"]), and
    ``rule_version_commitment`` (str); ``close_id`` is optional/echoed.

    Returns the verdict: ``{verified, checks:{recompute, onchain_anchor,
    rule_version_bound}, ...}``. ``verified`` is true only if the proof recomputes
    AND the commitment is anchored on-chain.