# io.github.viridis-security/injection-detector

> Formally-verified injection/exfiltration detector for AI agents (MCP-02).

- name: io.github.viridis-security/injection-detector
- version: 0.1.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 87/100
- quality: 79/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.viridis-security%2Finjection-detector
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.viridis-security%2Finjection-detector/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "injection-detector": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 65
- provenance: 80
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +reachable +uptime-100% ~updated-143d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 79/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: detect_injection (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); detect_trace_tool_policy (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint)
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 418 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 2, about 418 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 2bf726e5c981f65fb66ba52499ccef52
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.viridis-security/injection-detector.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.viridis-security/injection-detector)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://mcp.viridis-security.com/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 1)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (2)

- `detect_injection`: Screen untrusted input for prompt/tool injection, exfiltration, and obfuscation before an agent consumes it. Returns a verdict (clean|suspicious|attack), probability, bits-at-risk (upper bound on adversarial capture per the Adversarial Landauer bound), matched canon patterns, and a recommended action (allow|sanitize|reject|escalate). Backed by Aristotle-verified theorems T-IB-02/T-IB-06/T-IB-01.
- `detect_trace_tool_policy`: Analyze an agent trace for the Gray Swan Wave 16 class: untrusted retrieved/tool output causing a tool call outside the user-declared per-turn allowlist. Returns trace counts, unauthorized tool-call evidence, canon mapping VC-AI-TOOL-0001, and claim-boundary guardrails. Backed by T-IB-25/T-IB-29/T-IB-36.