# FaultKey · CausalLayer

> Deterministic AI-liability attribution: signed, Bitcoin-anchored vendor/deployer/user fault split.

- name: io.github.smq9sn5jck-cloud/causallayer-mcp
- version: 0.2.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 85/100
- quality: 79/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.smq9sn5jck-cloud%2Fcausallayer-mcp
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.smq9sn5jck-cloud%2Fcausallayer-mcp/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "causallayer-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://causallayer-mcp-demo.zykm9qkk7j.workers.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 97
- freshness: 65
- provenance: 75
- drivers: +repository +website +reachable +uptime-92% ~updated-156d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 79/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: submit_otel_trace (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); evaluate_prospective_response (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); query_issuer_registry (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 4,140 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 10, about 4,140 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 277cd09aea6ba0bf36bec4a7649c5de1
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.smq9sn5jck-cloud/causallayer-mcp.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.smq9sn5jck-cloud/causallayer-mcp)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://causallayer-mcp-demo.zykm9qkk7j.workers.dev/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.9238095)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (10)

- `evaluate_prospective_response`: Deterministic prospective-evaluation gate (FK-METHOD-2026-006). Pass a ProposedAction BEFORE the agent delivers a response; receive one of three verdicts: 'allow', 'require_revision' (with specific factor-keyed directives), or 'block'. Uses the same four-factor engine that issues post-hoc certificates, so a single incident chains: prospective_pre_image -> response -> certificate -> anchor. This is a policy gate on structured action metadata, NOT a content safety classifier on raw prose. Thresholds are per-jurisdiction (EU strictest, US most permissive); read via GET /api/v2/gate/thresholds. Overrides are allowed but REQUIRE a governance rationale so the audit trail is complete. Cost: 1 credit. Pure deterministic.
- `extract_incident`: Claude-powered structured extractor. Parses unstructured text (news articles, court filings, emails, PDFs, incident reports, logs) into the typed JSON schema required by submit_incident. Returns a ready-to-submit incident object with extracted agents, events, severity, jurisdiction, and financial impact. NOTE: This is a pre-processing convenience tool — the deterministic scoring engine itself remains LLM-free. Cost: 10 credits.
- `get_anchor_status`: Return the index of all CausalLayer Tessera anchor batches, or one batch's full JSON (signed Merkle root, leaves, OpenTimestamps proof reference). FREE.
- `query_issuer_registry`: Return the CausalLayer issuer registry, or one issuer record. The registry lists all trusted public-key fingerprints, key algorithms, validity windows, and the anchor-log repo for each active issuer. FREE — no API key required.
- `query_jurisdiction_overlay`: Multi-jurisdiction overlay (FK-METHOD-2026-004). Given a canonical attributable apportionment (party-id -> share), the union of all jurisdiction role tags on each actor, and the union of jurisdiction-specific flags, return side-by-side post-overlay shares for AU, EU, US, UK, CA (or a chosen subset) with the specific rules that fired in each, citation URLs, and a parties × jurisdictions matrix. v1 ships full implementations for AU and EU; US/UK/CA are research stubs marked `is_stub: true`. Use GET /api/v2/jurisdiction/catalog to discover support and stub status. Cost: 1 credit. Pure deterministic.
- `simulate_remediation`: Counterfactual remediation simulator. Given a certificate's verdict + fourFactorScoring + agents and a list of remediation IDs from the FK-METHOD-2026-003 catalog, return the apportioned shares each remediation would have produced (in isolation) and the composite shares if they all stack. Every remediation cites a specific statute or standard. GET /api/v2/remediation/catalog for the list of IDs. Cost: 1 credit (same price as verify_certificate). Pure deterministic; same inputs produce a byte-identical result.
- `submit_incident`: Submit an AI incident for deterministic causal liability attribution. Returns a signed CausalCertificate, per-agent liability allocation, evidence-chain completeness, regulatory mapping, and (where keys are configured) a Bitcoin-anchored proof. Cost: 50 credits. Three guardrails apply: PII scan, deterministic-only acknowledgement, and minimum evidence.
- `submit_otel_trace`: Convert an OpenTelemetry OTLP JSON trace into a FaultKey incident and return the same deterministic CausalCertificate as submit_incident. Each span becomes an event; service.name groups spans into agents; W3C trace_id and span_id propagate as evidence pointers on the causal graph edges. Cost: 50 credits (same as submit_incident). Three guardrails apply: PII scan, deterministic-only acknowledgement, and minimum evidence (auto-satisfied when the trace has at least 1 span).
- `verify_certificate`: Independently verify a CausalCertificate end-to-end (signature, Merkle integrity, issuer status against the registry). Cost: 1 credit. In production env, certificates from non-active issuers are rejected.
- `verify_certificate_recompute`: Independently re-derive a CausalCertificate from its canonical input and compare byte-for-byte against the claimed certificate. This is the strongest verification path: it requires no trust in the issuer or signing key. Cost: 1 credit (same price as verify_certificate). Returns PASS only if every checked field (certificateId, request_hash, merkleRoot, verdict, causalGraph, fourFactorScoring, deviationTaxonomy, euRuleOverlay, cascadeAttenuation, damages, underwriting) matches identically.