# io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein-mcp

> Verifies Bernstein run receipts and hash chains; lists the shipped presets and adapters. Read-only.

- name: io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein-mcp
- version: 0.2.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 93/100
- quality: 79/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd%2Fbernstein-mcp
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd%2Fbernstein-mcp/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "bernstein-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.bernstein.run/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 98
- freshness: 85
- provenance: 90
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +website +reachable +uptime-96% ~updated-31d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 79/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: server_info (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); verify_receipt (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); explain_receipt (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 2,070 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: 1 tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 11, about 2,070 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: ae3f08bbd9028403c41ec6eea7a3479e
- tools last changed: 2026-09-24T07:55:17.754Z
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein-mcp.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein-mcp)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

- 2026-09-24 `verify_agent_manifest` added
  - Agent Manifest v0.2 conformance checks on one manifest, stateless, no account: schema (vendored agent-manifest.schema.json), profile context, version, canonicalization, COSE envelope signature (Ed25519, key identified by kid in the protected header; ML-DSA-65 is reported unverifiable). Optionally checks that a TRACE Trust Record cites this manifest by digest. Nothing is fetched; resolvers are checked as URIs only. The manifest hash is sha256 over the COSE payload bytes (or RFC 8785 canonical JSON for object input).

Full history: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd%2Fbernstein-mcp/changes

## Remotes

- https://mcp.bernstein.run/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.95614034)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (11)

- `explain_receipt`: Verify a run receipt and narrate the result in plain language: what the run recorded, which chains recomputed, where the first divergence is, and what an auditor can and cannot conclude without the producing install's keys.
- `explain_trace_mapping`: How a bernstein run maps onto a TRACE v0.2 Trust Record: one row per claim with the journal field it is sourced from and the rule that derives it. Pass a run receipt to fill in the rows its embedded journal can answer (subject, iat, model, data_class, policy digest, tool transcript) alongside the receipt's own verdict.
- `get_preset`: Every field of one compliance preset as bernstein v3.19.2 resolves it.
- `list_adapters`: The agent adapters bundled with bernstein v3.19.2: adapter name, the binary it drives, the module that implements it.
- `list_presets`: The compliance presets bernstein v3.19.2 ships, with the switches each one turns on.
- `server_info`: Identity, version, and request limits for this MCP server.
- `verify_agent_manifest`: Agent Manifest v0.2 conformance checks on one manifest, stateless, no account: schema (vendored agent-manifest.schema.json), profile context, version, canonicalization, COSE envelope signature (Ed25519, key identified by kid in the protected header; ML-DSA-65 is reported unverifiable). Optionally checks that a TRACE Trust Record cites this manifest by digest. Nothing is fetched; resolvers are checked as URIs only. The manifest hash is sha256 over the COSE payload bytes (or RFC 8785 canonical JSON for object input).
- `verify_chain`: Walk bernstein chain rows and recompute every link: journal rows (event_hash), lineage spine entries (entry_hash) or audit events (prev_hmac linkage). The row kind is detected from the fields, or pass `kind` explicitly. Reports the first divergent index. Pass `entries` as the file text (a JSON array or one row per line, as journal.jsonl is written) for byte-exact hashing; a parsed array also works, but then a float spelled 1.0 or -0.0 in the file cannot be told apart from an integer.
- `verify_delegation_chain`: TRACE v0.2 delegation-chain conformance, stateless, no account: index every Trust Record by the RFC 8785 digest of its complete form, start at the leaf, follow delegation.parent_record_hash to the root, and check each hop's signature, the root key against `trusted_root_keys`, the depth bound, the link's digest algorithm, the credential (registered, issuer = parent subject, holder = record subject, window at the hop's own iat) and data_class narrowing under `data_class_lattice`. Classification: provenance-invalid outranks authorization-invalid; an unread link is unverifiable, not broken. Pass `records` as a JSON array or as file text (one record per line or a JSON array).
- `verify_receipt`: Recompute every hash chain a bernstein run receipt embeds (journal, lineage spine, optional audit range), rebuild the signed subject from the recomputed heads, and check the Ed25519 signature with the key the receipt carries. Needs no secret and reads nothing but the receipt. Returns the verdict, the first failing check, one line per check, and the same verdict as a DSSE envelope signed by this verifier's Ed25519 key (public key at keys_url) so the outcome can be kept and re-checked offline.
- `verify_trace_record`: TRACE v0.2 conformance checks on one Trust Record, stateless, no account: schema (vendored trace-claim.json), profile, subject URI, software-only runtime rule, policy digest, public-only confirmation key, the embedded signature (EdDSA, ES256 or ES384 with the key in cnf.jwk), appraisal, delegation link shape and references. Nothing is fetched: resolvers are checked as URIs only. `record_sha256` is the RFC 8785 digest of the complete record, signature included — the value a child hop puts in delegation.parent_record_hash.