# MANDATE Credential Broker

> MCP server for mandates, delegation, policy-gated execution, credential grants, and audit.

- name: io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate
- version: 0.1.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 94/100
- quality: 79/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.projetnanocorp%2Fmandate
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.projetnanocorp%2Fmandate/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mandate": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 99
- freshness: 85
- provenance: 90
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +website +reachable +uptime-97% ~updated-45d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 79/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-06-18; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: mandate.mint (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); mandate.authorize-action (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); broker.request-access (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 637 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 11, about 637 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: bb8d61c6ef971ff1fd1b933c047e7f79
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.973913)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (11)

- `broker.introspect-grant`: Validates a grant token seal, reports active/revoked/expired state, and records introspection to the ledger.
- `broker.register-credential`: Registers an opaque vault handle/reference only; plaintext secret fields are rejected and never ledgered.
- `broker.request-access`: Asks the canonical Policy Engine for an ALLOW decision before issuing a short-lived HMAC-sealed grant bound to credential, mandate, agent, scope, and expiry.
- `broker.revoke-grant`: Revokes a broker grant by id and records the revocation to the ledger.
- `broker.use`: Redeems a sealed grant for the bound acting agent and executes the bound action through the Gateway and Policy Engine; does not expose plaintext secrets.
- `mandate.authorize-action`: Submits an action through the Gateway and canonical Policy Engine; returns ALLOW, DENY, or REQUIRE_APPROVAL with ledger proof.
- `mandate.delegate`: Creates a child mandate only when it is a no-escalation subset of the parent mandate.
- `mandate.discover`: Returns this self-describing tool manifest.
- `mandate.mint`: Creates an active human-granted mandate for an agent and records it to the hash-chained ledger.
- `mandate.revoke`: Revokes a mandate subtree and records the revocation to the hash-chained ledger.
- `mandate.verify-proof`: Records a proof payload hash and appends proof evidence to the hash-chained ledger.