# drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents

> Block an action a signed mandate does not permit: amount, payee, audience, currency, window, intent.

- name: io.github.mrpkk/drift
- version: 0.1.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 96/100
- quality: 85/100 (new)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.mrpkk%2Fdrift
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.mrpkk%2Fdrift/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "drift": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://drift.rta.lat/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 95
- freshness: 100
- provenance: 90
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +website +reachable +uptime-88% +updated-5d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 85/100 (new)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-06-18; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 93 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- warn `tools.description_length`: 1 tools have descriptions over 1,024 characters, which crowds the context
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 3 of 3 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- pass `tools.directory_hints`: every tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 1,146 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `stability.changes`, `stability.rug_pull`: tool history recorded for 4 of the 7 days needed

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 3, about 1,146 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: d80b463ea2b0f05402e9e8dac493a609
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.mrpkk/drift.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.mrpkk/drift)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://drift.rta.lat/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.875)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (3)

- `drift_check`: Check ONE proposed action against a signed agent mandate BEFORE it happens. Returns {"verdict": "ALLOW"|"DENY", "rule": <name>} plus a report with a ledger fingerprint.

Six rules run in a fixed order, so a refusal names the most important reason rather than an incidental one: amount, payee, audience, currency, window, intent. Anything unclassified is DENY.

Use immediately before any action that spends money, moves a credential or changes state on someone else's behalf.

Do NOT use to: verify mandate signatures (AP2 does that, and this server runs after signature verification), execute the action (it only decides), or certify that an intent is truthful — "intent" arrives from the agent and is untrusted input. An agent that lies within its limits still leaves a ledger entry; proving what really happened is attest's job, not this one's.

Amounts are integer minor units (cents), never floats. Window bounds are inclusive. Fully idempotent: the same inputs always give the same verdict and the mandate is never mutated.
- `drift_explain`: Return the six enforcement rules in the exact order they are applied, each with a plain-language reason it exists. Takes no mandate and no action.

Use when a refusal did not make sense, or before explaining a denial to someone whose mandate was rejected. A refusal you cannot explain is one nobody will trust.

Do NOT use it to check an action — it performs no check, and cannot predict which rule will fire, only the order they are tried in.

Constant output, fully idempotent, opens no files, contacts no host.
- `drift_session`: Check a SEQUENCE of proposed actions against one mandate. Returns {submitted, allowed, denied, breach_by_rule, fingerprint}.

Use for a whole plan or batch, not a single action — use drift_check for that. The fingerprint is the point: rewriting or reordering any earlier decision changes the hash, so tampering with history becomes visible instead of silent.

Do NOT use it to execute the actions, or as evidence of what actually happened. It reports what was PROPOSED against a mandate you supply.

Read-only. Idempotent for a fixed action list. Amounts in integer minor units, as in drift_check.