# io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridge

> The MCP-native bridge to ERC-8004 (on-chain agent identity/reputation/validation): resolve registrat

- name: io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridge
- version: 0.2.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 86/100 flags: duplicate-repo
- quality: 79/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.jdhart81%2Fagent-erc8004-bridge
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.jdhart81%2Fagent-erc8004-bridge/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "agent-erc8004-bridge": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.viridisconservation.com/erc8004/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 60
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 100
- provenance: 80
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +reachable +uptime-100% +updated-24d-ago -duplicate-repo(32 names)
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 79/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: describe_agent (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); import_registration (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); resolve_agent (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 1,076 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: 1 tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 10, about 1,076 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 17c180980ca1388e198ca48330184765
- tools last changed: 2026-09-26T13:16:39.054Z
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridge.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridge)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

- 2026-09-26 `export_validation_response` added
  - Build UNSIGNED ERC-8004 Validation Registry validationResponse args from an Outcome Receipt (ORC v0.1): responseHash = receipt commitment, tag "orc/0.1", response 100 only if the bridge re-verifies the receipt AND your replay succeeded. Sign and submit with your own signer; this bridge holds no keys and writes to no chain.

Full history: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.jdhart81%2Fagent-erc8004-bridge/changes

## Remotes

- https://mcp.viridisconservation.com/erc8004/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 1)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (10)

- `bind_identity`: Bind a fleet DID to an ERC-8004 identity. Produces an order-independent,
    content-addressed (unsigned) binding attestation.
- `describe_agent`: Return the bridge's capabilities and input contract.
- `export_attestation`: Export the agent's current trust score as an UNSIGNED
    ERC-8004 Validation Registry-shaped payload, content-addressed and ready
    for YOUR OWN signer to anchor on-chain.
- `export_validation_response`: Build UNSIGNED ERC-8004 Validation Registry validationResponse args
    from an Outcome Receipt (ORC v0.1): responseHash = receipt commitment,
    tag "orc/0.1", response 100 only if the bridge re-verifies the receipt
    AND your replay succeeded. Sign and submit with your own signer; this
    bridge holds no keys and writes to no chain.
- `import_feedback`: Import ERC-8004 Reputation Registry feedback records for an agent.
    Each item: {value: bool|0..1, at: ISO-8601, source?, weight?, feedback_id?}.
    Idempotent per feedback_id.
- `import_registration`: Import an ERC-8004 Identity Registry record (chain_id + ERC-721
    token_id + agentURI + owner). Idempotent: re-import updates in place.
    Returns the canonical record with its deterministic bridge DID
    (did:viridis:erc8004:<chain>:<token>).
- `list_registrations`: List all imported ERC-8004 registrations.
- `resolve_agent`: Resolve an imported ERC-8004 registration by bridge DID or by
    (chain_id, token_id).
- `score_agent`: Decay-weighted trust score in [0,1] + tier over the agent's imported
    ERC-8004 feedback — recent behavior outweighs old; no feedback scores a
    neutral 0.5 prior (no blind trust, no unfair zero).
- `verify_attestation`: Recompute a payload's content hash and report whether it is intact.