# Automaton Token Safety

> Base L2 token safety for AI agents: honeypot scans, swap simulation, approval and liquidity risk.

- name: io.github.baianomarceloeduardo-jpg/automaton-token-safety-mcp
- version: 2.0.2
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 97/100
- quality: 83/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.baianomarceloeduardo-jpg%2Fautomaton-token-safety-mcp
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.baianomarceloeduardo-jpg%2Fautomaton-token-safety-mcp/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "automaton-token-safety-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.automaton-sovereign.workers.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 99
- freshness: 100
- provenance: 90
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +website +reachable +uptime-97% +updated-22d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 83/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-06-18; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: verify_attestation (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); x402_conformance_check (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); approval_risk (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 2,038 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `deps.known_vulns`: no known advisory in 1 resolved packages
- n/a `deps.mcp_sdk_version`: the official MCP SDK is not in the dependency graph
- pass `deps.resolvable`: @celorodrigues/token-safety-mcp@2.0.2 resolved: 1 packages

- tools: 20, about 2,038 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: ee340209cbcc21ce73bb40ce381548cc
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.baianomarceloeduardo-jpg/automaton-token-safety-mcp.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.baianomarceloeduardo-jpg/automaton-token-safety-mcp)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Dependencies

- npm @celorodrigues/token-safety-mcp@2.0.2: resolved, 0 dependencies

Dependency graphs from deps.dev; advisories from OSV.dev, including the GitHub Advisory Database and the PyPI Advisory Database; all CC BY 4.0.

## Remotes

- https://api.automaton-sovereign.workers.dev/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.96703297)

## Packages

- npm @celorodrigues/token-safety-mcp@2.0.2 secrets: AUTOMATON_MCP_PAYER_KEY

## Tools (20)

- `approval_risk`: PAID 0.01 USDC/call, or free trial (3/day/IP). Read-only audit of the ERC-20 approvals an owner granted for a token: spender, allowance, contract vs EOA, verified flag, drainable amount and a drain-risk verdict. On 402, pay the accepts[] terms then retry with the payment tx hash.
- `attest`: Create a SIGNED, hash-chained, append-only attestation (verifiable proof-of-existence) for a payload. PAID: 0.05 USDC/call, or free trial (3/day/IP). On 402, pay the accepts[] terms then retry with the payment tx hash.
- `attestation_pubkey`: FREE. Get the ECDSA P-256 public key (PEM) and keyId used to sign ledger entries.
- `hash_sha256`: PAID 0.001 USDC/call. SHA-256 hex of a string.
- `health`: FREE. Service liveness and version.
- `liquidity_risk`: PAID 0.01 USDC/call, or free trial (3/day/IP). One-block liquidity audit of a Base token: Uniswap V3 / Aerodrome pools, the USD needed to move the price 1/2/5/10%, holder concentration, LP burn evidence and explicit coverage gaps. On 402, pay the accepts[] terms then retry with the payment tx hash.
- `merkle_prove`: PAID 0.001 USDC/call. Generate a cryptographic Merkle inclusion proof for a list of items and target element.
- `merkle_verify`: FREE. Verify a cryptographic Merkle inclusion proof against a root.
- `oracle_base`: PAID 0.001 USDC/call. Get real-time Base L2 gas estimates and asset prices (ETH, USDC, cbBTC, AERO, VIRTUAL) with an ECDSA P-256 digital signature from the sovereign agent.
- `pricing`: FREE. Full pricing terms, endpoints, and payment mechanics.
- `read_ledger`: FREE. Read the attestation ledger (paginated).
- `security_scan`: LEGACY NAME of token_scan — same route, same arguments, kept so clients written against this server keep working. PAID 0.001 USDC/call, or free trial (3/day/IP). Base token safety analysis: honeypot detection, mint traps, selfdestruct/delegatecall, proxy and tax risks from contract bytecode, with a risk score and signed verdict. On 402, pay the accepts[] terms then retry with the payment tx hash.
- `sentiment_analysis`: PAID 0.001 USDC/call. Web3 token risk, security checks, and sentiment scoring with signed verdict.
- `sentinel_latest`: PAID 0.001 USDC/call, or free trial (3/day/IP). Newest liquidity pools created on Base (Uniswap v3/v4, Aerodrome) with a bytecode risk score per new token. Filters are optional. On 402, pay the accepts[] terms then retry with the payment tx hash.
- `simulate_base_transaction`: FREE, runs locally against Base Mainnet RPC. Dry-run a transaction before sending it: eth_call + eth_estimateGas at the latest block. Predicts whether it will revert and decodes the reason (Error(string), Panic(uint256) codes, custom-error selector, or node rejection such as insufficient funds). Returns { ok, willRevert, revertReason, estimatedGas, returnData }.
- `token_scan`: PAID 0.001 USDC/call, or free trial (3/day/IP). Bytecode security scan of a Base token contract: honeypot opcodes, mint/blacklist/pause/tax capabilities, a risk score and a verdict. Read-only — no transaction is sent. On 402, pay the accepts[] terms then retry with the payment tx hash. (Exposed as `security_scan` on older clients.)
- `tx_simulate`: PAID 0.01 USDC/call, or free trial (3/day/IP). Read-only buy/sell simulation of a Base token through the Uniswap V2 WETH pool: returns reverts, the MEASURED transfer tax and a honeypot verdict. No transaction is sent. On 402, pay the accepts[] terms then retry with the payment tx hash. (Not the same tool as simulate_base_transaction, which dry-runs arbitrary calldata for free.)
- `uuid`: PAID 0.001 USDC/call. Generate a UUIDv4.
- `verify_attestation`: FREE. Verify a ledger entry by index or by data hash: recomputes hash, checks ECDSA signature and chain link.
- `x402_conformance_check`: FREE, runs locally. Lint any x402 paid endpoint for protocol conformance: HTTP 402 challenge, x402Version, accepts[] (exact scheme), Base network and addresses, EIP-712 domain, and rejection of malformed, forged, expired, underpaid and wrong-recipient EIP-3009 payments. Returns verdict, grade and per-check results.