# Collar Guardrail — Pre-Trade Risk Layer

> Deterministic pre-trade risk checks for AI agents on Robinhood Chain. Returns allow/warn/deny.

- name: io.github.aiguardrail/backend
- version: 1.0.5
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 97/100
- quality: 75/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.aiguardrail%2Fbackend
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.aiguardrail%2Fbackend/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "backend": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 100
- provenance: 90
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +website +reachable +uptime-100% +updated-14d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 75/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 100 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 6 of 6 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- pass `tools.directory_hints`: every tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 1,359 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 25 (weight 15)

- warn `stability.changes`: 19 tool changes in 30 days
- fail `stability.rug_pull`: 1 tools kept their name but changed most of their description in 30 days; review before trusting them

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 6, about 1,359 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: e7987f5cf6af4b027de9725c23d15f87
- tools last changed: 2026-10-14T17:57:03.645Z
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.aiguardrail/backend.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.aiguardrail/backend)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

- 2026-10-14 `verify_audit_trail` added
  - Verify the tamper-evident audit trail for a wallet's past guardrail decisions.
- 2026-10-14 `get_supported_assets` added
  - List every asset in the guardrail's official Robinhood Chain registry, with its canonical contract address.
- 2026-10-14 `simulate_balance` added
  - Simulate a wallet's ERC-20 balance after a hypothetical trade using eth_call state override. Read-only: no transaction is ever sent.
- 2026-10-14 `check_token_safety` added
  - Honeypot / contract safety check for any ERC-20 token. Returns a severity classification (safe / warn / danger), the specific risk factors detected, and the result of a simulated sell. When severity=danger, the next `evaluate_trade` for the same contract is automatically denied regardless of any other checks. This is a heuristic bytecode + simulation check, not a formal audit. Use it before trading unknown tokens, memecoins, or any contract that is absent from the official Robinhood Chain registry. It is safe to call repeatedly; no transaction is ever sent.
- 2026-10-14 `evaluate_trade_paid` added
  - Pre-trade risk check gated by an x402 payment. Evaluated as COLR Tier 2: $25,000 notional ceiling, 10/25 per-minute rate limits. No COLR holdings are required — the on-chain payment is the credential. FLOW ---- 1. Call WITHOUT payment_proof → the tool returns a `PaymentRequiredOutput` describing the on-chain payment (network, asset, amount, payTo, resource). 2. Settle the payment on-chain using an x402-capable client. The facilitator returns a proof string. 3. Call again with `payment_proof=<proof>` → the tool forwards the proof to the guardrail's x402-paid endpoint and returns a full `EvaluateTradeOutput` with `tier=2`.
- 2026-10-14 `evaluate_trade` added
  - Pre-trade risk check for a proposed trade. Call this BEFORE executing any trade and treat a "deny" decision as a hard stop. Evaluated at a fixed Tier 1 ceiling ($5,000 notional). For higher limits, use `evaluate_trade_paid` (Tier 2, $25,000) which settles an x402 payment on-chain.
- 2026-10-14 `simulate_balance` removed
  - Simulate a wallet's ERC-20 balance after a hypothetical trade using eth_call state override. Read-only: no transaction is ever sent.
- 2026-10-14 `check_token_safety` removed
  - Honeypot / contract safety check for any ERC-20 token. Returns a severity classification (safe / warn / danger), the specific risk factors detected, and the result of a simulated sell. When severity=danger, the next `evaluate_trade` for the same contract is automatically denied regardless of any other checks. This is a heuristic bytecode + simulation check, not a formal audit. Use it before trading unknown tokens, memecoins, or any contract that is absent from the official Robinhood Chain registry. It is safe to call repeatedly; no transaction is ever sent.
- 2026-10-14 `verify_audit_trail` removed
  - Verify the tamper-evident audit trail for a wallet's past guardrail decisions.
- 2026-10-14 `get_supported_assets` removed
  - List every asset in the guardrail's official Robinhood Chain registry, with its canonical contract address.

Full history: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.aiguardrail%2Fbackend/changes

## Remotes

- https://api.collarguardrail.com/mcp-http/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 1)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (6)

- `check_token_safety`: Honeypot / contract safety check for any ERC-20 token.

Returns a severity classification (safe / warn / danger), the specific
risk factors detected, and the result of a simulated sell. When
severity=danger, the next `evaluate_trade` for the same contract is
automatically denied regardless of any other checks.

This is a heuristic bytecode + simulation check, not a formal audit.
Use it before trading unknown tokens, memecoins, or any contract that
is absent from the official Robinhood Chain registry. It is safe to
call repeatedly; no transaction is ever sent.
- `evaluate_trade`: Pre-trade risk check for a proposed trade. Call this BEFORE executing
any trade and treat a "deny" decision as a hard stop.

Evaluated at a fixed Tier 1 ceiling ($5,000 notional). For higher
limits, use `evaluate_trade_paid` (Tier 2, $25,000) which settles an
x402 payment on-chain.
- `evaluate_trade_paid`: Pre-trade risk check gated by an x402 payment. Evaluated as COLR
Tier 2: $25,000 notional ceiling, 10/25 per-minute rate limits.
No COLR holdings are required — the on-chain payment is the
credential.

FLOW
----
1. Call WITHOUT payment_proof → the tool returns a
   `PaymentRequiredOutput` describing the on-chain payment
   (network, asset, amount, payTo, resource).
2. Settle the payment on-chain using an x402-capable client. The
   facilitator returns a proof string.
3. Call again with `payment_proof=<proof>` → the tool forwards the
   proof to the guardrail's x402-paid endpoint and returns a full
   `EvaluateTradeOutput` with `tier=2`.
- `get_supported_assets`: List every asset in the guardrail's official Robinhood Chain registry,
with its canonical contract address.
- `simulate_balance`: Simulate a wallet's ERC-20 balance after a hypothetical trade using
eth_call state override. Read-only: no transaction is ever sent.
- `verify_audit_trail`: Verify the tamper-evident audit trail for a wallet's past guardrail
decisions.