# io.github.LiquiHog/hogswap-mcp

> Pay any Algorand x402 invoice with any asset, plus DEX swap quotes and unsigned builds.

- name: io.github.LiquiHog/hogswap-mcp
- version: 0.4.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 90/100
- quality: 80/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.LiquiHog%2Fhogswap-mcp
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.LiquiHog%2Fhogswap-mcp/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "hogswap-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://hogswap-v1.liquihog.dev/mcp/"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 98
- freshness: 85
- provenance: 80
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +reachable +uptime-96% ~updated-70d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 80/100 (good)

### protocol: 88 (weight 25)

- pass `protocol.modern`: supports 2026-07-28 (server/discover)
- pass `protocol.stateless`: answers without a session
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- warn `protocol.list_ttl`: tools/list declares ttlMs 0, so clients re-fetch it on every use

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: build_swap (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); pay_x402_invoice (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); verify_registration (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 2,025 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: 67 (weight 15)

- pass `deps.known_vulns`: no known advisory in 98 resolved packages
- fail `deps.mcp_sdk_version`: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1 has 1 known advisory (GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h); update @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to 1.31.0 or later
- pass `deps.resolvable`: hogswap-mcp@0.4.0 resolved: 98 packages

- tools: 12, about 2,025 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 9e3cf42815f647df28c6152bd4087e6c
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.LiquiHog/hogswap-mcp.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.LiquiHog/hogswap-mcp)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Dependencies

- npm hogswap-mcp@0.4.0: resolved, 97 dependencies, MCP SDK @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1
  - GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h (high) in `` @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.30.1 ``, direct, fixed in `` 1.31.0 ``, advisory summary: "MCP TypeScript SDK: OAuth client could send credentials to an authorization server chosen by the MCP server" https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h

Dependency graphs from deps.dev; advisories from OSV.dev, including the GitHub Advisory Database and the PyPI Advisory Database; all CC BY 4.0.

## Remotes

- https://hogswap-v1.liquihog.dev/mcp/ (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.95689654)

## Packages

- npm hogswap-mcp@0.4.0 secrets: HOGSWAP_API_KEY

## Tools (12)

- `build_swap`: Unsigned transaction group for a get_quote quote_id. Sign every txn with your own wallet and submit as one group. NEVER pass mnemonics or private keys to any tool — signing happens in YOUR wallet, never here.
- `delete_watch`: Delete one of your watches by its client_key.
- `get_balance`: Current HOGSWAP credit balance for your API key.
- `get_credit_offer`: Create a credit top-up and get the x402 offer (HTTP 402 IS the payment instruction, not an error). Feed accepts[0] straight into pay_x402_invoice (keep the note nonce) to pay with any asset. Credits land ~1 block after payment.
- `get_quote`: HOGSWAP swap quote across every Algorand DEX. Give amount (exact input) OR amount_out (exact output — minimum input is solved). Base units (µ); asset 0 = ALGO. Returns expected_out, route legs, and a quote_id for build_swap. expected_out is NET of the 5 bps routing fee; passing sender also returns router_fee_* fields and the wallet's HOG discount (hog_discount_pct, 100 = fully waived at 100 HOG). Optional sender enables HOG-holding fee discounts. Optional max_legs (1-16) caps TOTAL route legs, splits included — slightly worse price at size, 404 if nothing fits; forward (amount) quotes only.
- `list_payable_assets`: Assets accepted as payment inputs for pay_x402_invoice and credit top-ups (price-confidence gated; ALGO and USDC always included).
- `list_watches`: List your key's active watches (spec + arming/fired state), quota, and latest event seq. Poll this from MCP to see fires; SSE at GET /watches/stream is the push alternative outside MCP.
- `pay_x402_invoice`: Pay ANY Algorand-settled x402 invoice with any 1-4 routable assets you hold, even holding none of the demanded asset. Pass the `accepts` entry you picked as `invoice` (keep its note!) plus your inputs (single input with no amount = minimum solved). Returns UNSIGNED groups — sign all in one pass, submit IN ORDER (swap first; its on-chain floor guarantees the payment is funded; holding the asset already = one direct payment). HOGSWAP credit top-up offers feed this verbatim. EVM invoices unsupported (no bridge). NEVER pass mnemonics or private keys to any tool — signing happens in YOUR wallet, never here.
- `register_agent`: Self-service HOGSWAP API key, step 1 of 2 — zero human. Returns a challenge; sign its exact bytes with the address's key in YOUR wallet tooling, then call verify_registration. NEVER pass mnemonics or private keys to any tool — signing happens in YOUR wallet, never here.
- `set_watch`: Register a standing server-side watch (FREE, needs a key; idempotent upsert by client_key — re-registering replaces the watch and resets arming). kind='price': advisory µUSD threshold (asset_id, op gte/lte, threshold_usd_micro). kind='target': size-aware surrogate — would swapping amount_in of asset_in→asset_out deliver ≥ min_out? (margin_bps haircut, default 30; NO quote is run). Edge-triggered one-shot; re-arms after rearm_bps retreat + cooldown_s; ttl_s auto-expiry (default 86400) — refresh by re-upserting. Fires are numbers-only HINTS: re-quote with get_quote. Events push over SSE at GET /watches/stream (outside MCP); from MCP, poll list_watches.
- `value_lp_token`: Value a liquidity-provider position. Give the LP token's asset id (free, no key) and optionally `amount` in LP BASE units — what the wallet holds — for its USD value and the redeemable amount of each underlying. Also identifies the issuing pool/DEX (and STAMM tier). Per-unit figures are per WHOLE LP token. Values are a proportional-share redemption at analytics prices: no slippage, no exit fee, NOT a market quote — fields are null rather than guessed when supply or a price is missing, so check before reporting a number.
- `verify_registration`: Self-service key issuance, step 2 of 2. Returns your hsk_ key ONCE — store it yourself; it is not recoverable and this server does not keep it. Send it on later calls as Authorization: Bearer, X-API-Key, or the api_key argument.