# presign-guard

> Safe to sign? EVM/Solana/XRPL/Algorand txs, permits, EIP-7702, tokens; OFAC screen: green/orange/red

- name: io.github.Fizzl13/presign-guard
- version: 1.6.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 97/100
- quality: 77/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.Fizzl13%2Fpresign-guard
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.Fizzl13%2Fpresign-guard/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "presign-guard": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://presign-guard.fizzl.eu/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 100
- provenance: 90
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +website +reachable +uptime-100% +updated-1d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 77/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 79 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- warn `tools.description_length`: 1 tools have descriptions over 1,024 characters, which crowds the context
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 8 of 8 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: presign_quick_check (destructiveHint, idempotentHint); presign_check (destructiveHint, idempotentHint); screen_wallet (destructiveHint, idempotentHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 5,501 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 75 (weight 15)

- warn `stability.changes`: 62 tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 8, about 5,501 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: be0516d06075b25759aa9c781ce128cc
- tools last changed: 2026-10-20T09:04:12.260Z
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.Fizzl13/presign-guard.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.Fizzl13/presign-guard)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

- 2026-10-20 `presign_check_explain` changed (inputSchema)
- 2026-10-20 `presign_check` changed (inputSchema)
- 2026-10-20 `presign_quick_check` changed (inputSchema)
- 2026-10-19 `presign_check_explain` changed (inputSchema)
- 2026-10-19 `presign_check` changed (inputSchema)
- 2026-10-19 `presign_quick_check` changed (inputSchema)
- 2026-10-19 `presign_check_explain` changed (inputSchema)
- 2026-10-19 `presign_check` changed (description, inputSchema)
  - before: Paid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before you sign. Send the transaction, token approval or EIP-712 signature (Permit, Permit2, EIP-3009 x402 payment, Seaport) your agent is about to sign; get back green, orange or red with reason codes: who gets access, whether the spender or recipient is flagged, sanctioned (OFAC SDN) or unverified, unlimited allowances, and the token itself (honeypot, fake look-alike, high tax). On Solana (type solana, the base64 wire transaction): every instruction decoded and the transaction simulated (token account takeovers, System Assign, unlimited delegates, durable nonces, hidden owner or delegate changes). On the XRP Ledger (type xrpl, the unsigned tx JSON): account takeovers (SetRegularKey, SignerListSet, disabling the master key), fake RLUSD, partial payments, missing destination tags, trust-line and issuer risks, and DEX offers far below market. On Algorand (type algorand, base64 msgpack transaction or group in transactions): rekeys, closing the account or an asset to someone else, clawbacks, fake USDC, app update/delete/clear, simulated. Only proceed on green; on orange ask your user; never sign on red. Same as POST /v1/check. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.
  - after: Paid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before you sign. Send the transaction, token approval, EIP-712 signature (Permit, Permit2, EIP-3009 x402 payment, Seaport) or EIP-7702 authorization (type authorization: delegating the wallet to a contract, the sweeper trap) your agent is about to sign; get back green, orange or red with reason codes: who gets access, whether the spender or recipient is flagged, sanctioned (OFAC SDN) or unverified, unlimited allowances, and the token itself (honeypot, fake look-alike, high tax). On Solana (type solana, the base64 wire transaction): every instruction decoded and the transaction simulated (token account takeovers, System Assign, unlimited delegates, durable nonces, hidden owner or delegate changes). On the XRP Ledger (type xrpl, the unsigned tx JSON): account takeovers (SetRegularKey, SignerListSet, disabling the master key), fake RLUSD, partial payments, missing destination tags, trust-line and issuer risks, and DEX offers far below market. On Algorand (type algorand, base64 msgpack transaction or group in transactions): rekeys, closing the account or an asset to someone else, clawbacks, fake USDC, app update/delete/clear, simulated. Only proceed on green; on orange ask your user; never sign on red. Same as POST /v1/check. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.
- 2026-10-19 `presign_quick_check` changed (inputSchema)
- 2026-10-18 `screen_wallet` changed (description)
  - before: Paid ($0.01 USDC via x402 on Base or Solana): call this before your agent pays an address, or before accepting money from one. Send any chain's wallet address (EVM 0x..., Solana, Tron, Bitcoin, XRP Ledger, Algorand, or another currency OFAC lists). Get back green/orange/red: red SANCTIONED_ADDRESS with the SDN entry (name, programs, currency) when the address is on the OFAC SDN list, red or orange when GoPlus reports theft, phishing, laundering or mixer use (EVM). Never pay or accept funds on red. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.
  - after: Paid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before your agent pays an address, or before accepting money from one. Send any chain's wallet address (EVM 0x..., Solana, Tron, Bitcoin, XRP Ledger, Algorand, or another currency OFAC lists). Get back green/orange/red: red SANCTIONED_ADDRESS with the SDN entry (name, programs, currency) when the address is on the OFAC SDN list, red or orange when GoPlus reports theft, phishing, laundering or mixer use (EVM). Never pay or accept funds on red. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.

Full history: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.Fizzl13%2Fpresign-guard/changes

## Remotes

- https://presign-guard.fizzl.eu/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 1)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (8)

- `feedback`: Report a bug, a missing feature or anything else about this service, in a structured way. Free. A person reads every report; nothing is run or changed automatically.
- `presign_check`: Paid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before you sign. Send the transaction, token approval, EIP-712 signature (Permit, Permit2, EIP-3009 x402 payment, Seaport) or EIP-7702 authorization (type authorization: delegating the wallet to a contract, the sweeper trap) your agent is about to sign; get back green, orange or red with reason codes: who gets access, whether the spender or recipient is flagged, sanctioned (OFAC SDN) or unverified, unlimited allowances, and the token itself (honeypot, fake look-alike, high tax). On Solana (type solana, the base64 wire transaction): every instruction decoded and the transaction simulated (token account takeovers, System Assign, unlimited delegates, durable nonces, hidden owner or delegate changes). On the XRP Ledger (type xrpl, the unsigned tx JSON): account takeovers (SetRegularKey, SignerListSet, disabling the master key), fake RLUSD, partial payments, missing destination tags, trust-line and issuer risks, and DEX offers far below market. On Algorand (type algorand, base64 msgpack transaction or group in transactions): rekeys, closing the account or an asset to someone else, clawbacks, fake USDC, app update/delete/clear, simulated. Only proceed on green; on orange ask your user; never sign on red. Same as POST /v1/check. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.
- `presign_check_explain`: Paid ($0.03 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): the same verdict and reason codes as presign_check, plus a 3 to 5 sentence plain-language explanation a person can read before approving (lang en or nl). Same as POST /v1/check/explain. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.
- `presign_quick_check`: Free: the green/orange/red verdict only, for a transaction, token approval, EIP-712 signature, XRP Ledger transaction (type xrpl) or Algorand transaction (type algorand) your agent is about to sign. Limited to 10 calls per hour. For the reason codes and details use presign_check ($0.01); for a plain-language explanation presign_check_explain ($0.03).
- `screen_wallet`: Paid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before your agent pays an address, or before accepting money from one. Send any chain's wallet address (EVM 0x..., Solana, Tron, Bitcoin, XRP Ledger, Algorand, or another currency OFAC lists). Get back green/orange/red: red SANCTIONED_ADDRESS with the SDN entry (name, programs, currency) when the address is on the OFAC SDN list, red or orange when GoPlus reports theft, phishing, laundering or mixer use (EVM). Never pay or accept funds on red. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.
- `token_quick_verdict`: Free: the green/orange/red verdict and grade only, for a Solana or EVM token your agent is about to buy, hold or accept. Limited to 10 free calls per hour (shared with presign_quick_check). For the reasons, one-line summary and market data use token_verdict ($0.01).
- `token_verdict`: Paid ($0.01 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): call this before your agent buys, holds or accepts a token. Send the chain (solana, base, ethereum, arbitrum, optimism, polygon, bsc, xrpl, algorand) and the token address, mint, CURRENCY.rIssuer or Algorand asset id; get back green/orange/red, a grade (SAFE, CAUTION, RISKY, AVOID), reason codes (mint or freeze authority still active, honeypot, tax or transfer fee, LP not locked, low liquidity, new token, concentrated holders, rugged), a one-line summary, and market data (price, liquidity, market cap, 24h volume, age). Same as GET /v1/token. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.
- `wallet_approvals`: Paid ($0.02 via x402 in USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand or Stellar, or in RLUSD on the XRP Ledger): audit the open token approvals of a wallet on an EVM chain (base, ethereum, arbitrum, optimism, polygon, bsc) or on Solana, for example your agent's own wallet as a periodic check. Get back green/orange/red, a grade, a one-line summary and every approval with its spender. EVM, every ERC-20 allowance: flagged malicious (red), a plain wallet, on a doubt list, an unverified contract or an unlimited allowance to a spender not on the GoPlus trust list (orange), with a revoke.cash link. Solana, every SPL token delegation (Approve): a delegate on the OFAC SDN list (red), a delegate that is a plain wallet or an unlimited delegation (orange), with the token account to revoke on; Token-2022 tokens with a permanent delegate are listed too. NFT approvals are not covered. Same as GET /v1/approvals. The answer carries a signed receipt (EIP-191, bound to your arguments) that proves later which verdict you got.