# io.github.AlexanderLawson17/revettr-mcp

> Counterparty risk scoring for agentic commerce via x402 micropayments.

- name: io.github.AlexanderLawson17/revettr-mcp
- version: 0.2.3
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 83/100
- quality: 83/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.AlexanderLawson17%2Frevettr-mcp
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/io.github.AlexanderLawson17%2Frevettr-mcp/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "revettr-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://revettr.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 45
- provenance: 80
- drivers: +repository +namespace-matches-repo +reachable +uptime-100% -stale-205d
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 83/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: export_audit_bundle (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); score_counterparty (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); verify_issuer (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint)
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 543 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `deps.known_vulns`: no known advisory in 8 resolved packages
- n/a `deps.mcp_sdk_version`: the official MCP SDK is not in the dependency graph
- pass `deps.resolvable`: revettr@0.2.3 resolved: 8 packages

- tools: 3, about 543 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 45ffd1748f8188459c7e2c49f2e81fb6
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/io.github.AlexanderLawson17/revettr-mcp.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/io.github.AlexanderLawson17/revettr-mcp)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Dependencies

- pypi revettr@0.2.3: resolved, 7 dependencies

Dependency graphs from deps.dev; advisories from OSV.dev, including the GitHub Advisory Database and the PyPI Advisory Database; all CC BY 4.0.

## Remotes

- https://revettr.com/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 1)

## Packages

- pypi revettr@0.2.3

## Tools (3)

- `export_audit_bundle`: Export a JWS-signed audit-trail bundle of scoring decisions for a wallet.

MCP equivalent of GET /v1/audit/export. Compliance artifact for EU AI Act
Article 12 logging / NYDFS certification / debanking-defense. Because audit
data covers arbitrary wallets, this tool is operator-gated: pass the
operator's ``admin_token`` (checked against ``REVETTR_ADMIN_TOKEN``).
Disabled when that env var is unset. Note: ``admin_token`` travels in the
MCP request payload, so operators should treat MCP transcripts/logs as
sensitive. Verify the returned ``bundle_jws``
against /.well-known/jwks.json; the schema is in docs/audit-trail-export.md.
- `score_counterparty`: Score a counterparty before sending money. Returns risk score 0-100.

Accepts EVM wallets (0x...), Stellar wallets (G...), domains, IPs, and company names.
- `verify_issuer`: Get an advisory risk verdict for a validated MCP issuer (iss).

Attach this at your MCP `iss` validation step: identity is your job, this
adds risk. Returns the same signed RiskCheckResult as POST /v1/iss-verdict.
Advisory and non-blocking — you decide based on the tier.