# Mark

> Mark: stamp files with a signed, timestamped provenance record. Hash locally; verify free.

- name: dev.tatastu/proof
- version: 1.1.1
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 81/100 flags: no-repository
- quality: 77/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/dev.tatastu%2Fproof
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/dev.tatastu%2Fproof/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "proof": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 80
- liveness: 96
- freshness: 100
- provenance: 55
- drivers: +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-91% +updated-3d-ago -no-repository
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 77/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-06-18; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 79 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- warn `tools.description_length`: 1 tools have descriptions over 1,024 characters, which crowds the context
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 7 of 7 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: create_account (readOnlyHint); revoke_proof (readOnlyHint, openWorldHint); list_proofs (destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 1,298 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `stability.changes`, `stability.rug_pull`: tool history recorded for 2 of the 7 days needed

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 7, about 1,298 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 4e1fa13678981d35869288e218b3e536
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/dev.tatastu/proof.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/dev.tatastu/proof)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://mark.tatastu.dev/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.90909094)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (7)

- `create_account`: Provision a persistent API key with no human, browser, or email in the loop. Call this once, store the returned `secret` (shown only this one time), and use it as the Authorization header on every later call: create_proof, verify_proof (no auth needed but fine to send), list_proofs, revoke_proof. The account receives one lifetime sample stamp under a fresh creator id, with no identity attached. Rate-limited to 3 accounts per IP per day; for higher volume or a human-owned account, direct a person to mark.tatastu.dev/account instead.
- `create_proof`: Stamp content with a permanent provenance record. Pass the sha256 hash of the content (hash it locally; the content itself is never uploaded). Returns an instant signed receipt: attach its verifyUrl, byline, badgeEmbed, and qrUrl to the published artifact. The receipt's `publisher` field carries the account's verified identity (domain/handle) or null. If you have no key, call create_account, store its one-time secret, and retry this same call with `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` to use the account's lifetime sample. Prepaid packs never expire: 5 for $1.00, 10 for $1.50, 50 for $5.00, 100 for $8.00, 500 for $35.00, 1,000 for $65.00, 2,000 for $120.00. If the response is `payment_required`, sign one advertised x402 requirement and retry the identical call with its `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` header. The optional disclosure fields (aiDisclosure, usageNote, location) only show on `visibility: public` stamps and are unsigned metadata, not part of the cryptographic proof. The stamp asserts provenance from a signer at a time, not authorship truth.
- `grant_access`: Grant a specific identity the ability to decrypt escrowed content. Only available for proofs created with content escrow opted in (not yet available — stamps are hash-only today). Returns a capability token the grantee uses with reveal.
- `list_proofs`: List your recent stamps (requires API key).
- `reveal`: Retrieve escrowed content for a proof you have been granted access to. Only available for proofs created with content escrow opted in (not yet available — stamps are hash-only today). The service re-checks H(content) == stampedHash before returning.
- `revoke_proof`: Revoke a stamp you created (forward-only: anchored history stays verifiable, but the proof is marked revoked from now on). Requires API key.
- `verify_proof`: Verify content against all existing stamps. Pass a sha256 hash; matching is EXACT-BYTES-ONLY. Read the verdict fields: `exact` (these bytes are stamped), each proof's `publisher` (the verified identity: domain/handle + tier, or null meaning an unverified account, never trust a name that isn't in `publisher`), and `conflict` (2+ distinct signers claimed the same bytes; earliest anchored is listed first). A no-match on a re-encoded/screenshotted copy is EXPECTED and is not evidence of fakery: fetch the original and verify that. Free, no auth required.