# Redeal

> Neutral fairness computation for agents: fair division, verifiable random, Shapley shares.

- name: dev.redeal/redeal
- version: 0.7.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 93/100
- quality: 79/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/dev.redeal%2Fredeal
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/dev.redeal%2Fredeal/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "redeal": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.redeal.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 100
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 85
- provenance: 85
- drivers: +repository +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-100% ~updated-62d-ago
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 79/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 71 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- fail `tools.annotations`: no tool declares readOnlyHint or destructiveHint, so clients cannot tell safe calls from risky ones
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: get_deal (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); compute_commitment_tool (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); commit_input (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 2,412 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 12, about 2,412 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 8027e8f92c988d4d9f43526413dbcc66
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/dev.redeal/redeal.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/dev.redeal/redeal)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://api.redeal.dev/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 1)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (12)

- `commit_input`: Commit your sealed input as a hash (sealed mode). Nobody — including redeal — can see your input until all parties have committed. After the last commitment the deal opens for reveals immediately.
- `compute_commitment_tool`: Compute a commitment string for (input, salt): sha256(JCS(input) ++ salt_bytes), prefixed 'sha256:'. Convenience only — the rule is public and you can compute it yourself.
- `create_deal`: Create a fairness deal. You are party 0 (initiator). Returns a deal id and one invite token per party — give each counterparty their own token. Sealed mode: everyone commits a hash, then reveals; certificate is issued automatically when the deal computes or goes VOID.
- `create_key`: Get a free redeal API key. No signup, no email — this is the entire onboarding. The key is shown once; store it. Use it as api_key in create_deal.
- `get_certificate`: Fetch the signed fairness certificate for a finished deal (state CERTIFIED). Includes the labelled signature (es256 or ed25519) and transparency-log inclusion proof. Verify it with verify_certificate.
- `get_deal`: Read a deal's public state: protocol state (OPEN/COMMITTING/REVEALING/CERTIFIED/VOID/EXPIRED), who has committed/revealed, deadlines, result, and certificate_id once issued. Inputs of other parties are never exposed.
- `get_entropy`: Finish a random.v1 deal once every party has revealed: redeal fetches the deal's pre-declared drand round from the public League of Entropy beacon (fixed at creation, publicly cross-checkable), computes the draw, and issues the certificate. Call this after the last reveal_input; the deal rests in REVEALING until you do. Idempotent — safe to retry.
- `get_public_certificate`: Fetch a certificate's full JSON (outcome included) by id. Works for public deals (the default). Parties-only deals and unknown ids both return NOT_FOUND. To re-verify the computation itself, use verify_certificate (checks) or the CLI re-runner with the parties' inputs.
- `list_algorithms`: List redeal's algorithms (split.v1 fixed-budget fair division, random.v1 verifiable random selection, shapley.v1 Shapley shares, auction.v1 sealed-bid second-price auctions) with their input contracts and the published test vectors (served inline — the same fixtures the engine test suite runs). Read this before creating a deal.
- `reveal_input`: Reveal your committed input. It must hash to your earlier commitment. When the last party reveals, the deal computes and the fairness certificate is issued automatically — fetch it with get_certificate.
- `validate_input`: Validate your algorithm input against the deal's contract BEFORE you commit. A commitment binds the exact input bytes — a contract-violating input (e.g. split.v1 valuations not summing to exactly 1000) can never be corrected afterwards and the deal will VOID at the reveal deadline. Always validate first, then compute_commitment_tool, then commit_input. Read-only: nothing is stored or changed.
- `verify_certificate`: Verify a redeal certificate by id: signature check (current or published legacy key) + transparency-log inclusion check, reported per check. Free, no credential required, always.