# dev.cz-agents/sanctions

> Sanctions screening for KYC/AML — EU FSF + OFAC SDN checks for Czech companies & individuals.

- name: dev.cz-agents/sanctions
- version: 0.1.5
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 84/100 flags: duplicate-repo
- quality: 79/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/dev.cz-agents%2Fsanctions
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/dev.cz-agents%2Fsanctions/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "sanctions": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 80
- liveness: 99
- freshness: 65
- provenance: 85
- drivers: +repository +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-98% ~updated-140d-ago -duplicate-repo(9 names)
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 79/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 86 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 6 of 6 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- fail `tools.directory_hints`: no tool declares all four of readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint; missing: search_entity (destructiveHint, idempotentHint); list_recent_updates (destructiveHint, idempotentHint); search_person (destructiveHint, idempotentHint); …
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 1,111 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: 50 (weight 15)

- warn `deps.known_vulns`: 1 advisory of lower severity or without a published fix: GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7 in hono@4.13.9 (indirect, fixed in 4.13.11)
- fail `deps.mcp_sdk_version`: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1 has 3 known advisories (GHSA-22jm-h49p-29qw, GHSA-6prh-2h8m-c8cw, GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h); update @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to 1.32.0 or later
- pass `deps.resolvable`: @czagents/sanctions@0.1.4 resolved: 142 packages

- tools: 6, about 1,111 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: ffb17edd409b8e89d93a78b849550011
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/dev.cz-agents/sanctions.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/dev.cz-agents/sanctions)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Dependencies

- npm @czagents/sanctions@0.1.4: resolved, 141 dependencies, MCP SDK @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1
  - GHSA-22jm-h49p-29qw (high) in `` @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.30.1 ``, direct, fixed in `` 1.32.0 ``, advisory summary: "MCP TypeScript SDK: Experimental tasks were not tied to the session that created them" https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-22jm-h49p-29qw
  - GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h (high) in `` @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.30.1 ``, direct, fixed in `` 1.31.0 ``, advisory summary: "MCP TypeScript SDK: OAuth client could send credentials to an authorization server chosen by the MCP server" https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h
  - GHSA-6prh-2h8m-c8cw (moderate) in `` @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.30.1 ``, direct, fixed in `` 1.32.0 ``, advisory summary: "MCP TypeScript client SDK: HTTP client transports and OAuth requests followed cross-origin redirects and re-sent custom headers and request bodies" https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6prh-2h8m-c8cw
  - GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7 (moderate) in `` hono@4.13.9 ``, indirect, fixed in `` 4.13.11 ``, advisory summary: "Hono: \`serveStatic\` decodes the request path a second time, leading to bypass of middleware on static paths" https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7

Dependency graphs from deps.dev; advisories from OSV.dev, including the GitHub Advisory Database and the PyPI Advisory Database; all CC BY 4.0.

## Remotes

- https://sanctions.cz-agents.dev/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.9831933)

## Packages

- npm @czagents/sanctions@0.1.4

## Tools (6)

- `check_ico`: Check whether a Czech IČO (or any company by IČO) appears on sanctions lists. Direct exact-ID lookup; pass `name` to also fuzzy-match if no direct hit.
- `get_listing`: Retrieve the full record for a single sanctions listing by its ID (format: `${source}:${source_list_id}`, e.g. "ofac:12345" or "eu:EU.123.789").
- `list_recent_updates`: List sanctions added/removed/modified since a given date. Use for daily monitoring against a watchlist.
- `rescreen_portfolio`: PAID. Re-screen your own list of subjects against sanctions-list changes since a given date. Answers "which of MY clients were affected", which list_recent_updates cannot: that tool returns the global change feed, this one intersects it with your portfolio. Requires payment via x402; call without payment first to receive the terms.
- `search_entity`: Fuzzy-search a sanctioned entity (company, organization) by name. Optional country narrows results.
- `search_person`: Fuzzy-search a sanctioned person by name across all loaded lists. Optional date of birth and nationality narrow results. Returns matches with confidence scores (0-100). 100 = exact ID match, 80+ = strong fuzzy match, lower = review needed.