# com.zeroheight/zeroheight

> Connect AI assistants to zeroheight styleguides using the Model Context Protocol

- name: com.zeroheight/zeroheight
- version: 2.10.2
- connection class: R2 (oauth_consent_once)
- trust: 76/100 flags: no-repository
- quality: 48/100 (needs work)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.zeroheight%2Fzeroheight
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.zeroheight%2Fzeroheight/tools

**An agent can connect after a one-time OAuth consent by a human.** Remote endpoint behind OAuth 2. Tokens stay with the agent; the registry only exposes the authorization metadata.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "zeroheight": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp.zeroheight.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 80
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 65
- provenance: 55
- drivers: +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-100% ~updated-124d-ago -no-repository
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 48/100 (needs work)

### protocol: n/a (weight 25)

- n/a `protocol.modern`, `protocol.stateless`, `protocol.transport`, `protocol.list_ttl`: no remote answered a protocol handshake (not probed yet, unreachable, or local-only)

### authorization: 63 (weight 15)

- pass `auth.prm`: Protected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728) published
- pass `auth.as_metadata`: authorization server metadata reachable
- warn `auth.cimd`: only Dynamic Client Registration, deprecated in 2026-07-28 in favour of CIMD
- fail `auth.secret_in_url`: secret in the URL (token); URLs end up in logs, use a header

### tool hygiene: n/a (weight 30)

- n/a `tools.descriptions`, `tools.description_length`, `tools.schemas`, `tools.annotations`, `tools.directory_hints`, `tools.token_cost`, `tools.api_dump`: tool list unknown (behind auth, not probed, or empty)

### stability: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `stability.changes`, `stability.rug_pull`: tool list unknown

### dependencies: 33 (weight 15)

- fail `deps.known_vulns`: 1 advisory to act on (malicious, or rated high or critical with a fix available): GHSA-68fv-2mgg-jv7q in source-map-js@1.2.1 (indirect, fixed in 1.2.2)
- fail `deps.mcp_sdk_version`: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1 has 1 known advisory (GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h); update @modelcontextprotocol/sdk to 1.31.0 or later
- pass `deps.resolvable`: @zeroheight/mcp-server@2.10.2 resolved: 192 packages

- tools: unknown
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/com.zeroheight/zeroheight.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/com.zeroheight/zeroheight)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Dependencies

- npm @zeroheight/mcp-server@2.10.2: resolved, 191 dependencies, MCP SDK @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.1
  - GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h (high) in `` @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.30.1 ``, direct, fixed in `` 1.31.0 ``, advisory summary: "MCP TypeScript SDK: OAuth client could send credentials to an authorization server chosen by the MCP server" https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h
  - GHSA-68fv-2mgg-jv7q (high) in `` source-map-js@1.2.1 ``, indirect, fixed in `` 1.2.2 ``, advisory summary: "source-map-js allows event-loop denial of service through indexed source-map section offsets" https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-68fv-2mgg-jv7q

Dependency graphs from deps.dev; advisories from OSV.dev, including the GitHub Advisory Database and the PyPI Advisory Database; all CC BY 4.0.

## Remotes

- https://mcp.zeroheight.com/mcp (streamable-http, auth oauth2, reachable true, uptime30d 1)
- https://mcp.zeroheight.com/mcp/{token} (streamable-http, auth unknown, reachable unknown, uptime30d –)

## Packages

- npm @zeroheight/mcp-server@2.10.2 secrets: ZEROHEIGHT_ACCESS_TOKEN, ZEROHEIGHT_CLIENT_ID

## Tools (0)

_none observed_