# Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents

> Agent leases, signed receipts, watchdogs, and optional paid source-verification evidence.

- name: com.vigilnotary/vigil
- version: 0.1.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 80/100 flags: no-repository
- quality: 96/100 (strong)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.vigilnotary%2Fvigil
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.vigilnotary%2Fvigil/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "vigil": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://vigilnotary.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 80
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 85
- provenance: 55
- drivers: +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-99% ~updated-45d-ago -no-repository
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 96/100 (strong)

### protocol: 88 (weight 25)

- pass `protocol.modern`: supports 2026-07-28 (server/discover)
- pass `protocol.stateless`: answers without a session
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- warn `protocol.list_ttl`: tools/list declares ttlMs 0, so clients re-fetch it on every use

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 100 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 26 of 26 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- pass `tools.directory_hints`: every tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 5,305 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 26, about 5,305 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 38a0798beaa8bfe63658720c0a6e9ead
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/com.vigilnotary/vigil.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/com.vigilnotary/vigil)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://vigilnotary.com/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.99159664)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (26)

- `vigil_anchor`: PRO: anchor the current chain head to OpenTimestamps on demand (the chain is auto-anchored every few hours regardless). Sends the public chain-head digest to external OpenTimestamps calendars; submission is not verified Bitcoin confirmation.
- `vigil_anchors`: Public timestamp submissions to OpenTimestamps calendars. A submission is pending, not an independently verified Bitcoin confirmation. No key required.
- `vigil_chain`: Read a range of receipts to audit chain continuity. Max 1000 per call.
- `vigil_delete_watchdog`: Remove a watchdog. Destructive: deletes its configuration and stops future alerts. No undo or restoration of the previous timer is provided.
- `vigil_get_receipt`: Fetch a receipt by serial number. Public — anyone can read any receipt.
- `vigil_grant_lease`: Grant a short-lived, Ed25519-signed LEASE authorizing an agent to perform an action until it expires. A customer-run gateway verifies the lease offline (fail-closed) before letting the action through. This is the guard on a money/data-moving action. Free tier: 1 active lease (guarded agent). Security-sensitive: grants authority. Keep this account key outside the controlled agent. A signed lim string is enforced only by the customer's gateway.
- `vigil_heartbeat`: 'Still alive.' Reset a watchdog's timer. Call this at least once per interval. Resets the deadline and delivery state, potentially suppressing an overdue alert or rearming delivery.
- `vigil_info`: Service description, the Ed25519 signing pubkey to verify receipts against, current chain head, and free-tier limits. No key required.
- `vigil_journal_delete`: Delete a journal slot. Destructive: removes stored bytes with no undo through the API.
- `vigil_journal_get`: Fetch a journal blob by slug. Returns base64 (decrypt client-side).
- `vigil_journal_list`: List your journal slots (slug, size, last-updated).
- `vigil_journal_put`: Store an opaque blob under a slug (overwrites). Encrypt client-side: the server stores exactly the bytes supplied and cannot enforce client encryption. Send bytes as base64. Free tier: 4 slots, 64KB each. Destructive when the slug exists: previous bytes are replaced with no version history or undo.
- `vigil_leases`: List your leases and their states.
- `vigil_lease_status`: Public status of a lease (active / expired / revoked). What a gateway polls for revocation. No key required.
- `vigil_notarize`: Notarize work: POST the sha256 (64 hex chars) of anything and get back an Ed25519-signed, timestamped, hash-chained, serial-numbered receipt. Chain position orders submitted records; the timestamp is a signed assertion of Vigil's clock. Free tier: 10/day. Irreversibly publishes the digest, label and account handle in the public chain; no deletion tool exists. It proves signed-data integrity, not that an action happened or a claim is true.
- `vigil_pricing`: The plans and per-tier limits (free, dev, pro). No key required.
- `vigil_register`: Create a key. Returns a bearer key shown ONCE — store it; it is your only identity. No email, no account. Starts on the free tier. Creates a persistent identity. The returned key grants full account control; provision it in a trusted client, not a model transcript.
- `vigil_renew_lease`: Extend a lease with a fresh signed token and new expiry. Renewing is how a healthy agent keeps acting; stop renewing (or revoke) and it lapses. Security-sensitive: extends authority and refreshes the offline recheck window. Keep renewal credentials outside the controlled agent.
- `vigil_revoke_key`: Revoke your own key. It stops authenticating immediately. Irreversible. Irreversible: also revokes the account's leases and deletes its watchdogs. Private journal access is lost; public receipts remain. It does not cancel a Stripe subscription.
- `vigil_revoke_lease`: Revoke a lease. A compliant v2 gateway refuses the old offline token at recheck_by_ms (at most 30 seconds after issue/renewal), or earlier if it polls revocation. Revocation is not instantaneous. Irreversible for this lease ID; it cannot be renewed again. Already admitted actions are not undone.
- `vigil_set_watchdog`: Arm a dead-man switch. Register an interval and an https webhook; then call vigil_heartbeat before each interval elapses. Miss one and Vigil attempts a signed 'absence' payload to your webhook, retrying failed delivery. Free tier: 1 watchdog. Overwrites an existing watchdog and resets its timer and delivery state. A missed heartbeat sends the supplied message to an external HTTPS recipient; failed delivery is capped at five attempts per armed interval.
- `vigil_usage`: Your current tier, its limits, and how much you've used today. Requires your key.
- `vigil_verify_lease`: Offline, FAIL-CLOSED check of a lease token against a mandatory, independently pinned Ed25519 public key. Returns allow=true only for a valid signature before expiry and recheck_by_ms. It does not authenticate the calling agent, enforce action/amount policy, or query live revocation; a customer gateway must do those checks before every provider action. Checks signature, expiry and the signed recheck deadline only. It does not check live revocation, agent identity, action, amount or gateway policy; those checks are mandatory at the gateway.
- `vigil_verify_receipt`: Verify a receipt's hash and Ed25519 signature against a mandatory, independently pinned Ed25519 public key. The key must not come from the receipt being checked. Returns valid=false for tampering, forgery, a wrong signer, or malformed input. Read-only and local to Vigil.
- `vigil_verify_source`: Paid source-local verification with exact evidence and signed receipt. Does not establish absolute truth. Read price and payment requirements before authorizing; settlement spends USDC irreversibly and there is no automatic refund. Identical tool arguments alone are NOT idempotent: retry with the identical arguments, same vigil/idempotency-key metadata and original payment proof.
- `vigil_watchdog_status`: Read a watchdog's state: interval, last beat, whether it is overdue, fired, or exhausted.