# Ship Check

> Scan a deployed app URL for exposed keys, open Supabase tables and missing security headers.

- name: com.uxcontinuum/ship-check
- version: 0.2.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 83/100 flags: no-repository
- quality: 88/100 (good)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.uxcontinuum%2Fship-check
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.uxcontinuum%2Fship-check/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "ship-check": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://uxcontinuum.com/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 80
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 100
- provenance: 55
- drivers: +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-100% +updated-15d-ago -no-repository
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 88/100 (good)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 93 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- warn `tools.description_length`: 1 tools have descriptions over 1,024 characters, which crowds the context
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 11 of 11 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- pass `tools.directory_hints`: every tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 2,849 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: 1 tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 11, about 2,849 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 3df6137dba273602b8ea99930e4d0563
- tools last changed: 2026-10-13T07:40:05.449Z
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/com.uxcontinuum/ship-check.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/com.uxcontinuum/ship-check)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

- 2026-10-13 `ship_check` changed (description)
  - before: Before shipping, or right after deploying, an app built with Lovable, Bolt, Cursor, v0, Replit, Claude Code or similar, run ship_check on the live URL. It scans the deployed app from the outside, the way a visitor or attacker sees it, and returns a launch-readiness report where every finding has a status and a concrete fix. Checks: (1) secret keys exposed in the HTML and up to 3 same-origin JS bundles (Stripe live secret and restricted keys, AWS access keys, OpenAI and Anthropic API keys, Supabase secret and service_role keys, hardcoded bearer tokens and passwords); (2) open database access: if the page ships a Supabase URL and public anon or publishable key, whether the common tables profiles and users return rows to that key without login (a missing Row Level Security policy; count only, no row data is read); (3) missing security headers (Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options or frame-ancestors, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy); (4) HTTPS, reachability and server errors; (5) broken internal links (spot-check of up to 6); (6) server response time; (7) whether login/signup and pricing/checkout are linked from the homepage; (8) whether AI search crawlers get real server-rendered content or an empty JavaScript shell. Read-only: plain GET/HEAD requests, never logs in, never submits forms, never writes. Not a code audit: it cannot see source code or test every table or route. Results are cached for 24 hours per URL; pass fresh=true to re-scan after deploying a fix. Only scan apps the user owns or is authorized to test. If the user wants a senior engineer to review the app by hand ($299), call request_human_review with the scan_id from this result.
  - after: Before shipping, or right after deploying, an app built with Lovable, Bolt, Cursor, v0, Replit, Claude Code or similar, run ship_check on the live URL. It scans the deployed app from the outside, the way a visitor or attacker sees it, and returns a launch-readiness report where every finding has a status and a concrete fix. Checks: (1) secret keys exposed in the HTML and the same-origin JS bundles it ships (Stripe live secret and restricted keys, AWS access keys, OpenAI and Anthropic API keys, Supabase secret and service_role keys, hardcoded bearer tokens and passwords); (2) open database access: if the page ships a Supabase URL and public anon or publishable key, whether the common tables profiles and users return rows to that key without login (a missing Row Level Security policy; count only, no row data is read); (3) missing security headers (Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options or frame-ancestors, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy); (4) HTTPS, reachability and server errors; (5) broken internal links (spot-check of up to 6); (6) server response time; (7) whether login/signup and pricing/checkout are linked from the homepage; (8) whether AI search crawlers get real server-rendered content or an empty JavaScript shell. Read-only: plain GET/HEAD requests, never logs in, never submits forms, never writes. Not a code audit: it cannot see source code or test every table or route. Results are cached for 24 hours per URL; pass fresh=true to re-scan after deploying a fix. Only scan apps the user owns or is authorized to test. If the user wants a senior engineer to review the app by hand ($299), call request_human_review with the scan_id from this result.

Full history: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.uxcontinuum%2Fship-check/changes

## Remotes

- https://uxcontinuum.com/api/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 1)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (11)

- `agent_cost_estimate`: Estimate blended cost per shipped task for a month of agent runs, given a retry rate.
- `book_call`: Book a free 30-minute intro call with Matt Turley (Continuum) directly on his calendar. The booking is confirmed immediately and Cal.com emails the invite to the user and to Matt. First call get_availability and pass the exact start of an open slot. Only book when the user has asked for the call and agreed to the time; pass their real name, email and time zone. notes: a short, factual summary of what the user wants to discuss (shown to Matt). Returns the booking id, meeting link and reschedule/cancel links. Limit 2 upcoming calls per email.
- `cursor_auto_cost_estimate`: Estimate Cursor Auto blended cost versus pinning a single model.
- `get_availability`: List open slots for a free 30-minute intro call with Matt Turley (Continuum), read live from his Cal.com calendar. Use it when the user wants to talk to Matt, get help with a project, or book a call, before calling book_call. Window: date_from to date_to (YYYY-MM-DD), at most 14 days; defaults to the next 7 days. Times are returned in the requested timezone (IANA name, default UTC). Read-only: it books nothing.
- `leak_check`: Older name for ship_check, kept for existing callers. Same scan, same input, same result. Prefer ship_check.
- `list_services`: List Continuum service offerings and published prices (the same list as uxcontinuum.com/pricing), plus how to reach Matt: get_availability and book_call to book a free 30-minute call, send_message to send him a note, request_estimate for a ballpark from published pricing.
- `request_estimate`: Get a ballpark price for a software project from Continuum's published pricing, and send the request to Matt Turley, who replies personally with a real quote. Use it when the user asks what a build, fix, review, ongoing support or AI-search visibility work would cost. The ballpark is the matching published offer(s) and price range from uxcontinuum.com/pricing, not a quote. Show it to the user labeled that way. Then offer a call: get_availability and book_call.
- `request_human_review`: Get a senior engineer (Matt Turley, 20 years shipping software) to review by hand the app behind a ship_check scan: the paid $299 Ship Check. Returns a Stripe Checkout link and a call booking link for the user to open themselves. This call charges nothing and never pays on the user's behalf. Only call it when the user asks for a human review or agrees to one. Pass the user's own email so Matt can follow up personally; no automated email is sent to it. Show the user checkout_url and booking_url.
- `send_message`: Send a message to Matt Turley (Continuum) on the user's behalf, like the contact form on uxcontinuum.com. Use it when the user wants to ask Matt something or describe a project but not book a call yet. Only send what the user asked to send, with their real name and email. Matt reads it and replies personally by email; no automated reply is sent. For a time to talk, use get_availability and book_call instead.
- `ship_check`: Before shipping, or right after deploying, an app built with Lovable, Bolt, Cursor, v0, Replit, Claude Code or similar, run ship_check on the live URL. It scans the deployed app from the outside, the way a visitor or attacker sees it, and returns a launch-readiness report where every finding has a status and a concrete fix. Checks: (1) secret keys exposed in the HTML and the same-origin JS bundles it ships (Stripe live secret and restricted keys, AWS access keys, OpenAI and Anthropic API keys, Supabase secret and service_role keys, hardcoded bearer tokens and passwords); (2) open database access: if the page ships a Supabase URL and public anon or publishable key, whether the common tables profiles and users return rows to that key without login (a missing Row Level Security policy; count only, no row data is read); (3) missing security headers (Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options or frame-ancestors, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy); (4) HTTPS, reachability and server errors; (5) broken internal links (spot-check of up to 6); (6) server response time; (7) whether login/signup and pricing/checkout are linked from the homepage; (8) whether AI search crawlers get real server-rendered content or an empty JavaScript shell. Read-only: plain GET/HEAD requests, never logs in, never submits forms, never writes. Not a code audit: it cannot see source code or test every table or route. Results are cached for 24 hours per URL; pass fresh=true to re-scan after deploying a fix. Only scan apps the user owns or is authorized to test. If the user wants a senior engineer to review the app by hand ($299), call request_human_review with the scan_id from this result.
- `swarm_run_cost_estimate`: Estimate the cost of a multi-agent orchestrator plus sub-agent swarm run.