# Moltline Agent Governance > Audit MCP configs and skill files for over-broad scope and injection risk. 6 of 8 free. - name: com.moltlinestudio/govern - version: 1.2.0 - connection class: R0 (autonomous) - trust: 84/100 flags: duplicate-repo - quality: 91/100 (strong) - owner: not claimed - descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.moltlinestudio%2Fgovern - tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.moltlinestudio%2Fgovern/tools **An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe. ## Connection (mcpServers) ```json { "mcpServers": { "govern": { "type": "http", "url": "https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern" } } } ``` ## Trust - hygiene: 60 - liveness: 98 - freshness: 85 - provenance: 85 - drivers: +repository +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-95% ~updated-42d-ago -duplicate-repo(22 names) - Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed. ## Quality 91/100 (strong) ### protocol: 75 (weight 25) - warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-11-25; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28 - n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers - pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP - n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers ### authorization: n/a (weight 15) - n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth - n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL ### tool hygiene: 100 (weight 30) - pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description - pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise - pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema - pass `tools.annotations`: 8 of 8 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint - pass `tools.directory_hints`: every tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint - pass `tools.token_cost`: about 2,401 tokens to load every tool - pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump ### stability: 100 (weight 15) - pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days - pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name ### dependencies: n/a (weight 15) - n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package - tools: 8, about 2,401 tokens to load them all - tool set hash: 1766f0a956b43c2623ed3cd523fb7b1a - badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/com.moltlinestudio/govern.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/com.moltlinestudio/govern) - Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed. ### Tool changes _No tool definition changes recorded._ ## Remotes - https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.94736844) ## Packages _none_ ## Tools (8) - `agent_readiness_scan`: Score a public domain against 21 agent-readiness checks. FREE. Use when you need to know whether an autonomous agent can discover, read, use or pay a website - your own, or a vendor you are evaluating before recommending it. Typical input {"domain": "example.com"} returns {"score": 8, "total": 21, "grade": "F", "passed": [...], "failed": [{"title": "...", "detail": "...", "fix": "..."}], "report_url": "..."} where report_url is a permanent shareable page for the same result. Not for auditing an MCP client configuration (audit_mcp_config) and not for scanning text for injection (injection_scan) - this one reaches out over the network and fetches public URLs on a live domain. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": ""} (for example {"error": "The readiness scanner is not reachable right now."}). Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry. - `audit_mcp_config`: Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, and dangerous auto-run flags. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"config": ""} returns {"posture_score": 0-100, "verdict": "...", "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "fix": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry. - `audit_skill_file`: Audit an agent skill or instruction file before you trust it. FREE. Checks for governance smells: prompt-injection and guardrail-bypass phrasing, concealment instructions ('don't tell the user'), exfiltration language, and exposed credential material. Typical input {"content": ""} returns {"verdict": "reject — do not install" | "no governance red flags on a pattern pass", "findings": [{"severity": 1-5, "issue": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use before trusting a skill or instruction file that came from outside your own repository. Not for arbitrary untrusted input at run time (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry. - `get_auditor_persona`: Load the Governance Auditor persona for consistent fleet audits. PREMIUM (license). The persona is methodical, evidence-driven, and allergic to 'it's probably fine'. Takes no arguments. Returns {"persona": ..., "identity": ..., "rules": ["...", ...], "opening_move": "..."} ready to adopt as a system prompt. Use to keep repeated audits consistent in voice and rigor. Not for running an audit - the audit tools do that. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry. - `governance_policy`: Generate an audit-ready agent-governance policy for a fleet. PREMIUM (license). Covers inventory cadence, ownership rules, least-privilege approval gates, injection defense, logging/retention, and decommissioning triggers. Typical input {"fleet_context": "20 agents, 3 with shell access, one finance bot"} returns {"policy": ..., "sections": {...}, "context_note": ..., "audit_checklist": ["...", ...]}. Use when a fleet needs a written policy document. Not for assessing what the fleet currently does (inventory_report, audit_mcp_config). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry. - `injection_scan`: Scan untrusted text for prompt-injection patterns before ingestion. FREE. Use on any web page, email, or document an agent is about to ingest to catch prompt-injection and data-exfiltration patterns before they reach the agent's context. Typical input {"text": ""} returns {"injection_suspected": bool, "count": N, "hits": [{"line": N, "pattern": "...", "text": ""}], "note": "..."}. Not for reviewing a skill file you control (audit_skill_file), and a clean result is not a guarantee of safety - it reports pattern matches only. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry. - `inventory_report`: Build a governance inventory with risk tiers from a raw agent list. FREE. Turns a list of agents / MCP servers / skills into an audit-ready summary with critical/elevated/standard tiers and unowned-agent flags. Typical input {"items": "[{\"name\": \"deploy-bot\", \"owner\": \"ana\"}]"} returns {"total": N, "tiers": {"critical": N, ...}, "unowned_agents": [...], "inventory": [{"name": ..., "owner": ..., "tier": ..., "orphaned": bool}], "reading": "...", "note": "..."}. Use to turn a raw agent list into risk tiers. Not for auditing any single agent in depth (audit_mcp_config, scope_check). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry. - `scope_check`: Score the blast radius of every tool in a permission manifest. FREE. Ranks each tool by capability risk (command exec > money/delete > file-write/messaging > read > network) and flags the over-privileged ones that need approval gates. Typical input {"tools": "[\"run_shell\", \"read_docs\"]"} returns {"tools_scored": N, "high_risk_tools": N, "ranking": [{"tool": ..., "blast_radius": 0-5, "capabilities": [...]}], "recommendation": ["..."], "note": "..."}. Use on a permission manifest to rank tools by blast radius. Not for the configuration that mounts them (audit_mcp_config). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.