# Cache Key Explosion Auditor

> Audits a sample of HTTP request URLs against explicit, documented cache-key standardization rules...

- name: com.mcpscores/cache-key-explosion-auditor
- version: 0.1.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 79/100 flags: no-repository
- quality: 91/100 (strong)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.mcpscores%2Fcache-key-explosion-auditor
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.mcpscores%2Fcache-key-explosion-auditor/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "cache-key-explosion-auditor": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mcp-factory.bowling-anthony.workers.dev/cache-key-explosion-auditor/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```


## Trust

- hygiene: 80
- liveness: 99
- freshness: 85
- provenance: 55
- drivers: +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-97% ~updated-45d-ago -no-repository
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 91/100 (strong)

### protocol: 75 (weight 25)

- warn `protocol.modern`: newest supported version is 2025-06-18; 2026-07-28 not supported, older versions are deprecated until 2027-07-28
- n/a `protocol.stateless`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- n/a `protocol.list_ttl`: only applies to 2026-07-28 servers

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 100 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 1 of 1 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- pass `tools.directory_hints`: every tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 386 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 1, about 386 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: 0e521a67b6b673126de3800a65b10e74
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/com.mcpscores/cache-key-explosion-auditor.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/com.mcpscores/cache-key-explosion-auditor)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://mcp-factory.bowling-anthony.workers.dev/cache-key-explosion-auditor/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 0.96581197)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (1)

- `cache_key_explosion_auditor`: Audits a sample of HTTP request URLs against explicit, documented cache-key standardization rules (query param drops, query sorting, fragment dropping) and reports which distinct request variants would collapse onto the same proposed cache key. Never fetches or applies anything: it is a bounded, pure computation over the exact samples you provide. Equivalence between merged variants is only ever reported as "observed_equivalent" when every contributing sample carries the same explicit representation_id; otherwise the merge is flagged "conflict" (proven mismatch) or "unproven" (no evidence either way). No hit-rate, revenue, or cache-performance prediction is made, and no CDN/Cloudflare rule is ever read or written. Price: 0.05 USDC per completed bounded job on Base.