# MandateShield AI Payment Evidence

> Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts.

- name: com.mandateshield/payment-authority
- version: 1.13.0
- connection class: R0 (autonomous)
- trust: 80/100 flags: no-repository
- quality: 96/100 (strong)
- owner: not claimed
- descriptor: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.mandateshield%2Fpayment-authority
- tools: https://api.protogrid.dev/v1/servers/com.mandateshield%2Fpayment-authority/tools

**An agent can connect right now, no human step.** Remote endpoint, no authentication, reachable on the last probe.

## Connection (mcpServers)

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "payment-authority": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer ${PAYMENT_AUTHORITY_TOKEN}"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

Placeholders to fill: `${PAYMENT_AUTHORITY_TOKEN}`.

## Trust

- hygiene: 80
- liveness: 100
- freshness: 85
- provenance: 55
- drivers: +dns-namespace +website +reachable +uptime-100% ~updated-84d-ago -no-repository
- Derived from observable signals (official registry feed and our own credential-free probes); no code audit performed.

## Quality 96/100 (strong)

### protocol: 88 (weight 25)

- pass `protocol.modern`: supports 2026-07-28 (server/discover)
- pass `protocol.stateless`: answers without a session
- pass `protocol.transport`: streamable HTTP
- warn `protocol.list_ttl`: tools/list declares ttlMs 0, so clients re-fetch it on every use

### authorization: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `auth.prm`, `auth.as_metadata`, `auth.cimd`: no remote uses OAuth
- n/a `auth.secret_in_url`: no templated URL

### tool hygiene: 100 (weight 30)

- pass `tools.descriptions`: every tool has a description
- pass `tools.description_length`: descriptions are concise
- pass `tools.schemas`: every tool has an object input schema
- pass `tools.annotations`: 3 of 3 tools declare readOnlyHint or destructiveHint
- pass `tools.directory_hints`: every tool declares readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint
- pass `tools.token_cost`: about 5,741 tokens to load every tool
- pass `tools.api_dump`: tools are not a one-to-one API dump

### stability: 100 (weight 15)

- pass `stability.changes`: no tool changes in 30 days
- pass `stability.rug_pull`: no tool changed its meaning under the same name

### dependencies: n/a (weight 15)

- n/a `deps.known_vulns`, `deps.mcp_sdk_version`, `deps.resolvable`: no npm or PyPI package

- tools: 3, about 5,741 tokens to load them all
- tool set hash: f669061ddc431bb36284ca4225b604dd
- badge: [![protogrid quality](https://protogrid.dev/badge/com.mandateshield/payment-authority.svg)](https://protogrid.dev/servers/com.mandateshield/payment-authority)
- Checks run on what our credential-free, read-only probes observe; tools are never called and no code audit is performed.

### Tool changes

_No tool definition changes recorded._

## Remotes

- https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp (streamable-http, auth none, reachable true, uptime30d 1)

## Packages

_none_

## Tools (3)

- `check_ai_payment_authority`: Use before an AI agent buys, subscribes, transfers value, calls a metered API, or accesses a paid resource when the user wants a payment-authority check. Analyze whether the proposed purchase fits supplied policy facts. This v1 entry check is non-executable and always returns enforcement_authorized=false; use the strict cryptographic tool for a production gate. Never send payment credentials or private keys.
- `normalize_agent_payment_protocol`: Use when an agent encounters an AP2 terminal closed-payment projection, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer, or explicitly profiled MPP Payment challenge and needs the supported fields projected before an authority check. Map those documented fields into a deterministic MandateShield purchase envelope. X402 requires source-matched network+payTo identity and MPP requires source-matched HTTPS service-origin+method identity; merchant_id alone is insufficient. Evidence references are not independently verified. projection_fields_valid is not full protocol conformance: this tool never verifies delegated authority or a payment credential and always returns enforcement_authorized=false under assurance.
- `verify_cryptographic_payment_authority`: Use only for a production pre-payment authority gate after the caller has a registered mandate, pinned issuer key, fresh challenge, VERIFY-scoped key, exact final purchase and supported signed evidence. Fail closed for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or normalized TAP-shaped RFC 9421-style evidence. Full AP2 checkout/delegate-chain and Visa TAP structured-field/trust-store processing remain external. A qualifying live ALLOW creates only a short RESERVED authorization and cumulative-budget allocation. This MCP tool never executes payment and exposes no processor transition: a separate trusted gateway with an audience-bound PROCESSOR key must CONSUME and freshly redeem the provider-bound permit before attempting an idempotent provider operation, then reconcile the outcome.